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Essays on China’s Tax System
The tax system is one of the best starting points for investigating
China’s transitional course because the transformation of a society
always involves rapid changes in its old fiscal regime. Seeing central
government, local governments and firms as three major players, this
dissertation shows that interactions between them lead to the
emergence of China’s unique “central-local dual-track” tax system.
The central government mobilizes local governments by fiscal
decentralization, which results in growing local autonomy and thus
drives them to maximize local tax revenues. They compete for mobile
tax bases – firms – by manipulating local tax policies. Thus, in contrast
to a formal and standardized national tax system overseen by the
central government, informal and flexible local tax systems are
operated by local governments. This dissertation consists of four
essays. The first essay systematically analyzes the evolution history
and status quo of China’s tax system, which illustrates that the formal
and informal interaction between the central government, local
governments and firms shapes the institution building process of
China’s tax system. The second essay, then, examines the interaction
between the former two players in fiscal decentralization and finds
that it curtails the expansion of government size. The third essay
models the interaction between the latter two players by a
bargaining game in which a firm employs an exit and voice strategy
to bargain with a local government for preferential tax treatments
and thus explains the diversity of local tax systems. The last essay
models changes of the tax system as a result of interactions between
the above three players under various economic, political and social
constraints; the changes reach a general equilibrium in which
efficiency, power and legitimacy are balanced.
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Chapter 1
1
“The public finances are one of the best starting points for an investigation of society,
especially though not exclusively of its political life.
The full fruitfulness of this approach is seen particularly at those turning points,
or better epochs, during which existing forms begin to die off and to change into something new,
and which always involve a crisis of the old fiscal methods.”
– Schumpeter (1918, p.101)
1. Introduction
1.1. Background
axation is at the very core of any state (Schumpeter 1918). It forms the base for
government activities, such as allocating resources, redistributing income, and
stabilizing business cycles (Musgrave 1959). Yet, taxation is not neutral, which is
especially linked to the development of the modern democratic state. History offers
England’s Glorious Revolution of the seventeenth century and the French Revolution of
the eighteenth century (Kiser and Kane 2001) to name but two examples; while in modern
times, we have witnessed the important role of tax reform in the transformation of Eastern
Europe (Bird et al. 1995). Modern democracies, contrary to expectations, have a wide
variety of tax systems, differing dramatically in structure, size, role and function. The
intriguing question then is why do they vary and how do they come into being?
Existing literature offers competing theoretical models but mostly focus on those
developed countries and thus provides limited theoretical explanation for transition
economies and, more importantly, less operational guide for their transformation courses
toward a democratic governance. Therefore, this prompts the research on changes of tax
systems in transition economies.
As the largest and most successful transition country with 1.3 billion population
and average 10 per cent annual GDP growth rate after the reform in 1978 (UNTCAD
2005), China is a typical case for such research. In contrast to the fall of former Soviet
Union blocs, China’s rise also lends deep theoretical implications and ample practical
suggestions for the world transition economy. Moreover, despite an authoritarian political
regime in China, a series of fiscal and tax reforms have resulted in a de facto fiscal
decentralization. It yields appropriate incentives and hard budget constraints as powerful
T
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“carrots and sticks” to align local officials’ interests with local economic prosperity and
steer their behaviors in favor of market transformation. Since local governments not only
obtain considerable discretionary power over budget, investment, land-sale, taxation and
the like, but also shoulder substantive top-down mandatory tasks providing of public goods
and services, such as education, health, social insurance, and infrastructure, to develop
market economy is, therefore, a rational choice for local governments. They relax the
control of sate-owned enterprises (SOEs) and township and village enterprises (TVEs) by
privatizing, bankrupting, merging, or outsourcing, protect market transaction by enforcing
legislations and contracts, and coordinate business activities by building a compatible tax
system with substantive tax incentives. Some scholars depict such institutional setting as a
“market-preserving federalism” (Montinola et al 1995; Qian and Roland 1998; Qian and
Weingast 1996, 1997; Weingast 1995). However, the main characteristics of the system is
not its federalism, which is in any case not constitution-based and rather weak, but the
existence of “local autonomy” emerged at the interplay of formal and informal governance
structures, given the unique “central-local dual-track” tax system. On the one hand, a
formal and standardized national tax system operates under the custody of the central
government while de facto informal and flexible local tax systems are managed by local
governments resulted from the fiscal decentralization after 1978 on the other hand.
The last issue is the major concern of this research, namely the emergence of the
“central-local dual-track” tax system in China’s transition economy, which prompts an
in-depth insight into interactions between the central government, local governments and
firms during such institution building process.
1.2. Theoretical Issues
This dissertation applies New Institutional Economics (NIE) into the field of public
finance based on two reasons: 1) unstable institutional environment and 2) immature
democracy in transition economy. Neither Public Finance theory (e.g. Musgrave 1959,
1969) nor Public Choice theory (e.g. Brennan and Buchanan 1980; Mueller 2003; Oates
1972; Olson 1969) is capable of tackling these two issues since the former takes
institutions as given and the latter is grounded on the democracy. From the perspective of
NIE (North 1990, 2005), the tax system is a part of state institutions and thus changed by a
dynamic institution building process, in which various political/economic agents
continuously interact with each other. The existing institutional framework dictates the
perceptions and learning process of the agents who adjusts their behaviors by competition
and cooperation (North 1993, 1995). The central government, local governments and firms
15
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are three major agents for institution building of the tax system in China. On the one hand,
the central government initiates the top-down institutional change by enacting tax laws and
regulations (formal institutions) and firms trigger the bottom-up tax changes by various tax
practices (informal institutions) on the other hand. More importantly, the increasing local
autonomy resulted from the ongoing fiscal decentralization enables local governments to
coordinate and integrate the institutional supply from the central government and
institutional demand from firms. As a result, the interaction between the central
government, local governments and firms shapes China’s idiosyncratic “central-local
dual-track” tax system.
Figure 1.1 describes an analytic framework of this dissertation. Institutional
environment impacts behaviors of the central government, local governments, and firms,
who interact with each other and shape the formation of tax system. During the institution
building process, the interactions between these three players are constrained by efficiency,
power and legitimacy. The dissertation seeks to establish the causal mechanisms of the
macro-micro-macro sequences of changes by examining the interaction between the
central government and local governments at macro level, the interaction between local
governments and firms at micro level, and overall changing process of the tax system at
macro level.
Figure 1.1: Analytical Framework of the Evolution of China’s Tax System
! Tax farming, local autonomy and local diversity. Like English and French monarchs in
seventeenth and eighteenth century (e.g. Kiser 1994; Kiser and Kane 2001; O’Brien
National tax systemInteraction
Institutional
environment
Central government
" Efficiency
" Power
" Legitimacy
Interaction
Shaping
Shaping
Constraint
Constraint
Changes
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Firms
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1988; Donald and O’Brien 2002; Weir 1989; White 1995, 2004), Chinese central
government farmed out tax authority to local governments for reliable tax revenue at
the beginning of the reform. Being the residual claimant of tax collection, local
governments are extremely mobilized to foster local economic growth. More
importantly, local autonomy is growing up (e.g. Oi 1992; Qian and Weingast 1996;
Wong 1991, 2000; World Bank 1995). This has important consequences. The institution
building is devolved from the central government to the local level which allows local
governments either to accommodate national tax policy to local differences or to
formulate local tax systems through coordination with local economic actors. The
central government cannot monopolize the institution building of tax system but have
to tolerate various local diversities in local tax systems (Hendrischke 2003; Krug 2004a;
Krug and Hendrischke 2003). (Chapter 2)
! Leviathan model, fiscal federalism, and yardstick competition. In Brennan and
Buchanan’s model (1980), the government is depicted as a monolithic Leviathan
maximizing its tax revenue, which should be restrained by the institutional setting of
fiscal federalism. Yet, the model cannot be directly applied to China, although a de
facto fiscal federalism exists (Montinola et al 1995; Qian and Roland 1998; Qian and
Weingast 1996, 1997; Weingast 1995). First, one-party ruling regime dismisses the
democracy ground of the Leviathan theory, i.e. constituencies cannot influence
government decision by voting by hands. Second, the inter-regional mobility of
resident (Tiebout 1956), i.e. voting by feet, is hampered by a
household-registration-system (hukou) 1 . Considering these two facts, Chapter 3
modifies the Leviathan model by dropping the assumption of election-based and
mobility-driven inter-jurisdictional competition and arguing that the top-down
supervision and promotion system of party cadres induces yardstick competition
(Shleifer 1985; Besley and Case 1995) among local officials. Moreover, increasing
local autonomy under the de facto fiscal federalism intensifies such kind of
inter-jurisdictional competition for mobile resources and tax bases. In this sense, the
Leviathan model still holds in the Chinese case. (Chapter 3)
! Tax competition and exit-voice game. The de facto fiscal federalism invites tax
competition among local governments (Brean 1998; Wong 1997; Zhu and Krug 2007).
1 The household-registration-system (hukou) was adopted in 1948. After then, a regulation in 1958
restrained the resident mobility by requiring households to register their place of residence and apply
for official permission for any change in residence.
17
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In order to attract investment, various local tax concessions are offered and firm’s tax
burden is even opened to negotiate. However, this phenomenon, to our best knowledge,
receives no special attention in the field of China research (cf. international tax
competition literature, e.g. Bond and Samuelson 1986; Doyle and van Wijnbergen 1994;
Janeba 2000, 2002; King et al. 1993). Furthermore, in the existing international tax
competition models, firm only has a passive strategy of exit. Instead, we observe an
exit-voice game that firms play with local governments by performing an active voice
strategy to influence local policy-making in China. Hirschman’s exit-voice framework
(1970) is applied to model the bargaining game between firms and local governments.
(Chapter 4)
! Institutional building and changes of tax system. The Public Choice theory is not
directly applicable to China because of its basic assumption of election constraint on
government behavior. Instead, based on NIE (North 1990), we see the tax system as an
institution and its changes as institution building process shaped by interactions
between the central government, local governments and firms. More importantly,
historical institutionalism approach (Steinmo 1993; Steinmo et al. 1992) brings us to
the deep insight into the very link between tax changes and Chinese idiosyncratic
politics. By understanding dynamic institutions in Chinese historical context, we find
that efficiency, power and legitimacy are three fundamental factors shape changes of
the tax system. (Chapter 5)
1.3. Research Design
Data about Chinese taxes, especially at local level, are hard to come by. Official statistical
yearbook only offers general information at national and/or provincial level. This explains
that most studies on China’s central-local fiscal relation stop at the provincial level. It is
even more frustrating to find documents which would allow describing local tax systems.
The informal character of local tax systems also exacerbates this problem. For these
reasons we embarked on a rather unusual method in addition to the econometrics methods
commonly used in the field of public finance. We first interviewed firms in two provinces,
by which we could re-construct the actual local institutional landscape and learn about the
informal part of local tax systems. In a second step we interviewed representatives of local
tax bureaus or finance departments to understand the formal part of local tax systems.
More importantly, thanks to local coordinator’s special network, these local officials are
willing to disclose more information of their informal policies, thereby offering us a deep
18
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insight into the complex of formal and informal local tax administration. Moreover, in
order to capture the interaction between local governments and firms, a game model is
employed and further developed in three case studies.
Three types of data are collected, i.e. published official documents, archive data
from firms, and face-to-face interviews. The published official documents include
statistical yearbooks, government report, and county gazetteer. The archive data from firms
consist of organization charters, financial reports, enterprise brochures and magazines.
Interviews are conducted with local officials and managers or CEOs of private enterprises,
using open-ended and semi-structured questionnaire in bilingual: English and Chinese. To
assure the accuracy of the interview data, Chinese was used in conversations and interview
notes, which was double-checked by the original informants and then translated into
English.
Chapter 2 is based on the fieldwork in Zhejiang and Jiangsu province, adjacent to
Shanghai, in June and July 2004. With an area of 101,800 sq. km and a population of 47
million, Zhejiang province was famous for the Wenzhou model characterized by
flourishing private entrepreneurship while Jiangsu province, a home to 74 million
population with an area of 102,600 sq. km., was successful for its Sunan model
encouraging township and village enterprises (TVEs) in 1990s. Nowadays, both provinces
are one of the most developed and open regions in China, which doubled per capita GDP
of the national level in 20042. Around thirty in-depth interviews with heads of township,
tax officials and officials of finance department at provincial, county (city) and township
level, and mangers and CEOs of firms were conducted in these two provinces.
Considering the macro-level of analysis in Chapter 3 and 5, econometrics is
performed based on provincial panel data obtained from various statistical yearbooks,
government reports and the author’s calculation.
Chapter 4 develops a game model on the exit-voice game between the local
government and firm in which several equilibrium outcomes are derived and further
illustrated by three empirical cases. The case study is based on the fieldwork in July and
August 2005 with three firms. Seven managers and entrepreneurs were interviewed at
length using open-ended questionnaire and story-telling conversation. Hundreds of pages
of organization charts, corporate brochures, annual reports, newspapers and contracts
between the firm and government were also collected.
1.4. Outline of the Dissertation
2 Zhejiang and Jiangsu province yielded per capita GDP of 23,942 and 20,705 RMB, respectively,
compared to the national level of 10,561 RMB in 2004 (NBS 2005).
19
Chapter 1
7
The dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 provides a detailed and systematic
empirical research of evolution history and stats quo of China’s tax system, especially at
sub-provincial level. Based on the fieldwork in Zhejiang and Jiangsu province, the chapter
illustrates how a conventional tax structure under nationally legislated hierarchical
command is paralleled by a separate nested hierarchy of local jurisdictions that practice tax
farming. In this local hierarchy, local tax and finance authorities interact to negotiate tax
payment and reimbursements with individual firms. Therefore, as an amalgam of formal
and informal elements resulted from the fiscal decentralization, China’s unique
“central-local dual track” tax system sets incentives for local government to promote
private business activities.
Chapter 3 focuses on the fiscal decentralization between the central and local
government and its influence on the size of public sector. In addition to three conventional
explanations of insufficient government revenue, decline of public demand and statistical
technique problem for China’s shrinking public sector, the chapter offers an alternative
approach of Leviathan model (Brennan and Buchanan 1980). Importantly, the precondition
of democratic electoral constraint for Leviathan model is dropped. Instead the chapter
proposes that top-down appointment supervision within the Party cadre system induces
inter-jurisdictional yardstick competition and thus restricts local government behavior.
Chapter 3 empirically tests the Leviathan hypothesis in terms of vertical decentralization,
horizontal fragmentation, yardstick competition, and intergovernmental collusion and finds
supportive evidences in China.
The fiscal decentralization also invites tax competition amongst local governments
competing for mobile tax bases (firms) by offering a variety of tax concessions. Thus, tax
liabilities of firms are subject to negotiation. Chapter 4 constructs game models in which a
firm bargains with a local government for preferential tax treatments. In addition to the
“exit” option overstressed in tax competition literature (e.g. Bond and Samuelson 1986;
Doyle and van Wijnbergen 1994; Janeba 2000, 2002; King et al. 1993), the model
incorporates a “voice” option based on Hirschman’s (1970) Exit-voice theory. Moreover,
the voice is constructed in a unique Chinese way of guanxi networking in accordance with
the business reality in China. The models show that equilibrium outcomes are determined
by changes of involved exit and voice cost and information structure. In addition to exit
strategy as a threat, a rational firm will opt for voice strategy. Particularly, when holding
private information of exit costs, the firm will resort to bluffing strategy. The empirical
cases fully illustrate such rational entrepreneurship of exit plus voice to profit from local
preferential policies.
20
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Chapter 5 provides a new approach to taxation research in transition economy since
traditional Public Finance literature takes institutional environment as given and
approaches taxation from a normative way based on equity and efficiency while Public
Choice literature incorporates the (political) institutional factor into the taxation research
yet basically models the tax changes and government behaviors on the ground of a mature
democracy, which is not suitable for those transition economies like China. The chapter
attempts to combine North’s (1990) perspective of institutions and institutional changes
and Steinmo’s (1993) historical institutionalism approach by modeling the tax changes as a
result of interaction between the central government, local governments, and firms under
various economic, political and social constraints. A systematic analysis of the evolution of
China’s tax system shows that the changes reach a general equilibrium in which efficiency,
power and legitimacy are balanced. Following Hettich and Winer (1999), empirical results
lend supportive evidence.
Chapter 6 summarizes the dissertation with main findings of previous chapters and
concludes.
21
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2. China’s Emerging Tax system: Local Tax Farming and
Central Tax Bureaucracy3
2.1. Introduction
conomic transformation asks not only for less state appropriation of resources, it also
asks for a change of the means by which the state does so. Generally speaking, there
are four ways to generate budgetary revenues: first, exploitation of state owned/controlled
resources; second, taxation of assets and income or trade flows; third, forced loans on
economic agents and finally, seigniorage, i.e. printing money. Given their commitment to
stability, the Chinese government is forced to rely on the first three revenue sources. Yet,
privatization and un-competitiveness of state-owned firms reduce government revenue
from the state sector; while revenue from forced loans, i.e. compulsory transfers of the
firms’ cash flow and compulsory saving of private households, declines following price
and wage liberalization. Subsequently, state expenditure depends increasingly on taxation,
which needs to be revised to comply with the reform course.
This shift in state revenue sources draws attention to the fact that transition
economies need to establish market conforming taxation. Three aspects can be singled out.
First, new tax codes need to include the reemerging private sector, such as firms or
investors, and foreign companies. Second, a new system of intergovernmental transfers
needs to replace the old planning bureaucracy allowing for decentralization. Third, a new
tax bureaucracy needs to be established. In contrast to the European transition economies,
3 This chapter has been published as Z. Zhu and B. Krug. 2007. China’s Emerging Tax Regime:
Local Tax Farming and Central Tax Bureaucracy. in B. Krug and H. Hendrischke. (eds.) China’s
Economy in the 21st century: Enterprise and Business Behavior. London: Edward Elgar.
E
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which right from the beginning copied tax codes from neighboring countries (or the EU),
China opted for incremental reform of its tax system. In other words, one component of
economic transformation is the change in the country’s public finance.
While traditional public finance theory (e.g. Musgrave 1959; 1969) propagating
rational financial systems concentrates on the effectivity of taxation (and spending) with
respect to well-defined goals, public choice literature treats the state as a Leviathan (e.g.
Brennan and Buchanan 1980) and sees fiscal federalism (e.g. Oates 1972; Olson 1969) as
institutional remedy. The trade off between rational taxation versus small government
(expenditure) was taken up again in the discussion of institutional change in transition
economies, where two opposing hypotheses define the conceptual and empirical discussion,
namely the “Grabbing Hand”-hypothesis (Frye and Shleifer 1997; Shleifer and Treisman
1999) pointing to the risk that the Leviathan will survive economic transformation (the
Russian case), and the “Helping Hand”-hypothesis (e.g. Oi 1992; Walder 1995) stressing
the benefit of continuing state intervention during the transformation period (the China
case). The China specific dimension of this debate centers around three features: local
autonomy; local diversity; and tax farming.
2.1.1. Local Autonomy
Descriptive analysis of China’s fiscal reform since 1978 concludes that fiscal
decentralization, whether intended or not, generated local autonomy. Some studies attribute
China’s success to a market-preserving federalism that empowers local governments and
offers them positive incentives for promoting local economic growth (e.g. Montinola et al.
1995; Qian and Roland 1998; Qian and Weingast 1996, 1997; Weingast 1995). For
example, local state corporatism (Oi 1992, 1994, 1995) describes the local government as
a business corporation which mobilizes resources ad hoc, offers preferential tax policy, or
brokers bank credit as a means to insure profitability of its tax base. Such a form of
corporatism, based on loosely coupled coalitions (Nee 1992, 1998) between local
government agencies and the emerging private sector, leads to minimized upward tax
transfers and facilitates privatization from below (Naughton 1994). Then the industrial
base of a locality can be added to the local tax base.
In the case of Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs), local governments act as
quasi-owners when they claim residual profit and as quasi-tax-legislators when they levy
taxes on TVEs provided these are registered as firms “outside the planned economy”.
Subsequently, this institutional setting not only secures local property rights in a weak
market setting and uncertain institutional environment (e.g. Chang and Wang 1994; Li
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1996; Weitzman and Xu 1994), but also gradually releases resources from state control
accompanied by a shift of revenue sources from direct expropriation of profit or cash flow
to taxation of firms in the non-state sector.
2.1.2. Local Diversity
Characterized by a severe principal-agent problem between the central government as the
principal and local units as agents, fiscal decentralization must also lead to local diversity
(Hendrischke 2003; Krug 2004a; Krug and Hendrischke 2003). First, the central
government grants different “degrees” of independent decision-making to different local
government agencies (Bird and Chen 1998) as in the case of Special Economic Zones.
Second, different local government agencies react differently to the same central policy
guidelines according to different local conditions, such as size, geography, history and
resource endowments (Krug 2004b; Hsu 2004). Third, jurisdictional competition forces
local governments to generate competitive advantages by offering preferential taxation and
subsidies to its tax base (Walder 1995, 1996). Fourth, an alliance between firms and local
government agencies facilitates escaping national legislation, if not manipulating national
tax legislation (Chen and Rozelle 1999; Goodman 2000; Shirk 1993; Wank 1996;
Wedeman 2003)4.
2.1.3. Tax Farming
One unexpected component of decentralization was the introduction of tax farming in
general. A tax farming system is connected to the pre-modern states of England and France
(e.g. Donald and O’Brien 2002; Kiser 1994; Kiser and Kane 2001; O’Brien 1988; Weir
1989; White 1995, 2004)5. It was only after the Glorious Revolution in the former and
French Revolution in the later that a centralized tax bureaucracy developed in both
countries in response to changing transaction costs, and the expansion of financial markets,
which offered an alternative means for financing state budgets. An economic analysis of
this change argues that two factors influence institutional choice: the monarch’s (state’s)
attitude toward (economic or political) risk and the incentives necessary to make lower
4 There is a measurement problem. With the notable exception of World Bank (2002), most studies
stop at provincial level (e.g. Wong 1991, 1992, 1997; Wong et al. 1995; World Bank 1990, 1993,
1995; Brean 1998; Ma 1995; Oksenberg and Tong 1991; Chung 1995; Lee 2000; Tsui and Wang
2004; OECD 2005) due to the lack of statistical data to the effect that a systematic analysis across
provinces, prefectures, counties (districts) and townships is missing.
5 The French as well as the tax farming system in Imperial China “farmed out” tax authority not only
to lower administrative levels but also to private persons.
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administrative units to act as tax agencies on behalf of the monarch. With respect to the
incentive structure, three different forms of tax systems can be singled out, usually
described as contractual arrangements between the central state and local agents: a
rent-based, a wage-based and a (crop-) sharing contractual arrangement (e.g. Allen and
Lueck 1995; Sappington 1991; Stiglitz 1974). The first refers to a lump sum contract-type
where the central state “farms out” tax authority to local governments in return for a
guaranteed (low risk) fixed sum. By doing so, local tax agents become the residual
claimant on tax revenue. The second wage-based arrangement refers to a professional
bureaucracy, which in return for a share of the national budget, fixed wages and promotion
within the state bureaucracy “selflessly” implements central policy without bearing
individually or organizational risks. The third form follows crop-shared contracts in which
both central as lesser and local governments as lessee share economic risk productivity
gains in tax administration (cropping sharing contract).
While in the socialist era, China had a Weberian-style of bureaucracy, it started
experimenting with tax farming in the eighties to be followed (in the nineties) by a
widespread (tax) sharing system and the re-introduction of a bureaucratic system. This
unusual phenomenon of different tax systems coexisting, calls for empirical analysis. Does
that kind of institutional choice follow arguments offered by the analytical concepts? Or
which other factors that prompted institutional change can be singled out:
! Normative considerations, such as taxing “equal activities equally”?
! Distributional considerations, most prominently the problem of regional disparities?
! Economic considerations, such as standardization gains or transaction costs in
monitoring and enforcement?
! Political considerations such as conflicting interests between the central and local
government agencies, or setting incentives that ensure local government agencies
comply with the reform course?
As will be shown in what follows the different reforms aimed mostly for a mixture
of all these motives. However, in the end, economic and political considerations prevailed.
A second set of questions refers to the present state of affairs: What is the effect of
the tax reform in 1994? How did the local governments react? What is the status quo of the
tax system at the local level at the lowest governmental level, the township? What can we
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say about the de facto as opposed to the de jure tax system?
In order to analyze local autonomy and local diversity caused by taxation (tax
farming), and to answer the questions above, it is necessary to explore not only recent
developments. Such an analysis needs also to endogenize formal and informal elements in
actual tax policy. For this reason findings from fieldwork undertaken in Zhejiang and
Jiangsu province in 2004 and 2005 will be included in the part that deals with the actual
functioning of the tax system at the township level.
Here follows a descriptive analysis of the different reforms since 1978 stressing the
causes and effects of institutional change with respect to local autonomy and local
diversity (Section 2.2 and 2.3). Then a status quo analysis of the present tax system
(Section 2.4) serves as an introduction to the analysis of how the present tax system, local
autonomy and local diversity interact -formally and informally -at the lowest layer of
government in China (Section 2.5). This is done in order to illustrate the difference
between the intended functioning of the tax system and the actual interplay between
taxation and the emerging market sector. Section 2.6 presents a summary of the empirical
results and a general assessment of China’s tax system.
2.2. Rebuilding Tax Codes: Shifting Government Revenue
In the pre-reform era three categories of indirect taxes6, i.e. the industrial and commercial
tax, tariff and the agriculture tax, were levied in China7. State-owned enterprises (SOEs)
were subject to the industrial and commercial tax in addition to the compulsory transfer of
“profit” and cash flow. Tax revenue (1978: 46 per cent) and profit remittance (1978: 51 per
cent) were the two dominant resources of total revenue (MOF 2005). To increase
productive efficiency while avoiding privatization, the reforms introduced first a “contract
responsibility system” (chengbao zeren zhi) to be followed by a “tax-for-profit” scheme (li
gai shui) in 1983 and 1984. Both reforms acknowledged the SOEs as independent
economic actors entitled to part of profit which they could allocate internally to working
capital, investment, wages, and bonuses without state intervention as long as they fulfilled
the contract quota. The share of after tax profit and the tax rate were subject to individual
negotiations between the firm and the responsible state agency and varied according to
enterprise size, sector and ad hoc situation. It quickly turned out that in response to fuzzy
6 Except the urban real estate tax.
7 Totally 13 taxes were levied after 1973 which were industrial and commercial tax, consolidated
industrial and commercial tax, industrial and commercial income tax, tariff, cattle transaction tax,
bazaar transaction tax, urban real estate tax, vehicle and vessel usage license tax, vessel tonnage tax,
slaughter tax, agricultural tax, animal husbandry tax, and deed tax.
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property rights the SOE managers channeled undisclosed profit into their private pocket by
establishing joint ventures with TVEs or by outsourcing production to new private firms
rather than reinvest in productivity increasing change. That asset-stripping eroded the state
sector’s profitability further and ended in a sharp increase of loss making SOEs. Yet, with a
state sector still not liable to a hard budget constraint (Kornai 1986), the underperformance
of the state sector directly translated into higher government expenditure in the form of
subsidies or loans necessary to “bail out” the bankrupt SOEs. The situation was further
aggravated when the non-state sector started to out-compete the SOEs further reducing the
latter’s profit remittance and tax contribution. In 1985 already, subsidies for SOEs were
eleven times higher than the revenues from SOEs (MOF 2005). Facing such eroding
revenue base the central government had incentive enough to search for a new broader tax
base, namely one that included foreign enterprises and all forms of joint ventures.
Thus, direct (income) taxation made its re-appearance in China, which foreign
enterprises, joint ventures, SOEs, collective enterprises and individuals became subject to.
Simultaneously the reform of indirect taxes started with introducing a VAT for twelve
categories of products, (such as machinery, and steel, but also consumer goods, such as
bicycles, electric fans, or sewing machines) with rates between six per cent and 16 per cent.
Other economic transactions were taxed by product (270 items) subject to a flat rate
varying from three per cent to 60 per cent in 1984. Such a diversified tax structure
increased the monitoring and enforcement cost for tax collection and administration
considerably. Not surprisingly, the 1994 reforms abolished the product tax, expanded VAT
to all manufactured products with a standard rate of 17 per cent (and a reduced rate of 13
per cent for necessities), and levied a business tax on the service industry but kept the
consumption tax on eleven categories of goods8. Since then total 29 taxes have been levied
on turnover, income, resources, property and behavior (Table 2.1)9. Now, indirect taxes are
the major revenue source of the Chinese state. In 2003 VAT, consumption tax, business tax
and custom duties added up to 69 per cent of total tax revenue, in which the VAT alone
provided 36 per cent of total revenue (SAT 2003).
After all, the reforms of 1994 support the assumption that tax changes can (and will)
follow transaction costs considerations, i.e. monitoring, collecting and enforcement costs
when indirect taxes were introduced. As is pointed out elsewhere, indirect taxation allows
concentrating on a few taxable assets thereby offering lower collection costs than a system
8 Consumption tax encompasses eleven tax items and often enough serves as an educational tax
discouraging the consumption or use of luxury products, such as cigarettes, liquor, cosmetics,
jewellery, firework, gasoline, diesel oil, car tyre, motorcycle, and cars.
9 In fact, total tax items are 26 not 29 because inheritance tax, security transaction tax and fuel tax
are not levied yet. An illustration of the tax system can be found in Table 2.1.
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that aims at assets or income of all (potential) tax payers (Ardant 1975; Kiser and Kane
2001). China’s WTO entry in 2001 prompted further changes in order to comply with
international standards. Foreign (15 per cent income tax) and domestic (25 per cent income
tax) firms will no longer be treated differently by the tax authorities (Mui and Jia 2002).
The scope of VAT will be expanded to cover a broader range of products. A new social
security and property tax are aimed at better coping with challenges created by the
economic transformation, including employment insecurity and greater disparities in
wealth.
Table 2.1: Chinese Tax Codes After 1994
Taxes
National tax Consumption tax, Tariff, Income tax on FIEs and FEs a, Vehicle acquisition tax
Local tax
Business tax b, Agricultural tax, Tax on special agricultural produce, Animal
husbandry tax, Resource tax c, Urban and township land usage tax, Occupied
farmland tax, Real estate tax d, Urban real estate tax d, Land appreciation tax,
Urban maintenance and construction tax e, Deed tax, Vehicle and vessel usage
license tax, Vehicle and vessel usage tax, Vessel tonnage tax, Slaughter tax f,
Banquet tax f, Orientation adjustment tax on investment in fixed asset g
Shared tax Value-added tax (VAT), Enterprise income tax h, Individual income tax, Stamp tax
Notes:
a Enterprises with foreign investment (FIEs) include Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures, Chinese-foreign contractual joint ventures and
wholly foreign-owned enterprises; Foreign enterprises (FEs) include foreign companies, and other economic organizations that are not
Chinese legal entities, but operate in China. The nominal income tax rate on FIEs and FEs is 33% of which 30% are allocated to the central,
and 3% to the local government.
b Business taxes on railway, headquarters of banks or insurance companies go to the central government.
c The resource tax on ocean and petrol companies goes to the central government.
d Domestic enterprises and Chinese citizens are subject to the real estate tax while FEs, FIEs and foreigners are subject to the urban real estate
tax.
e Urban maintenance and construction tax of the Railway Administration, the headquarters of banks and insurance companies go to the central
government.
f According to State Council circular (Guofa[1994]No.7) local government are expected to abolish the slaughter tax and banquet tax.
g The Ministry of Finance (MOF), State Administration of Taxation (SAT) and National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) jointly
issued a circular (Caishuifa[1999] No.299) to suspend levying the orientation adjustment tax on investment in fixed asset.
h Income tax of the enterprises subordinate to the central government, local banks, foreign-funded banks and non-bank financial institutions are
allocated to the central government.
Source: State Administration of Taxation, P.R. China, www.chinatax.gov.cn
All in all, the institutional change within the tax systems reflects the attempt to
define a tax base and establish tax codes compatible with a market economy. The
description also shows that transaction costs played a major role when it came to designing
and re-designing the tax base, and tax rates.
2.3. Tax Farming: Positive Incentives and Local Autonomy
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Fiscal decentralization in China refers to taxation and intergovernmental fiscal relations, i.e.
the allocation of revenue and expenditure across different government levels, based on a
decentralization of regulatory power or agreed upon transfers. The inherited centralized
fiscal system relied on local government agencies to collect revenues for transfer to the
national treasury. In return, the central government assigned (expenditure) items financed
basically by re-transferring revenues to local budgets. Labeled as “eating from the big pot
(chi da guo fan)” local agencies had neither an incentive to promote the local economy, nor
did they have the leeway to do so.
To redress this problem, the reforms started with transferring fiscal authority, i.e.
the power to tax, to local governments. Several experiments were carried out, such as a
“fixed overall revenue sharing rate” in Jiangsu province in 1977, “dividing central, local
and central-local sharing revenue” in Sichuan province in 1979 and a “fixed lump sum
transfer” in Guangdong and Fujian province in 1979, later (1980-1993) expanded to six
types of contract arrangements (e.g. Oksenberg and Tong 1991; Wong 1991, 1992). It is
worth mentioning that these fiscal arrangements are modifications of tax contracting
analytical models described earlier10.
Empirical fieldwork suggests that the rental-based model quickly emerged as the
dominant form. In this kind of tax contracting, the central government negotiates a fixed
share of revenue (in absolute terms, or as a ratio) leaving the local government the de facto
residual claimant of revenue. From the local perspective, disposable revenues were directly
linked to economic growth and/or the attractiveness of the local economy for investment
from outside (other jurisdictions or foreign companies). Yet, as suggested in the economic
analysis of tax farming, three unintended consequences emerged. First, the principal-agent
problem remains unsolved: local governments profit from asymmetric information; hiding
the correct information (if not falsifying tax reports) is an easy way to minimize the
amount of tax revenue to be transferred to the contract partner. Second, renegotiable
contracts include an element of uncertainty in local budget planning as well as in
anticipating budgeting across localities. With the length of contracts and the sharing
formulas re-negotiable, future budgetary revenue depends less on economic trends but
rather on the relative power positions of the contract partners. Contract arrangements vary
also with respect to sharing rates, time period, or spatial factors, when some provinces,
regions, or localities are granted special licenses from the central government. Third, as all
10 For those rich provinces, they may keep certain portion of increment revenue based on preset
shared ratio or formula while those poor provinces received subsidies and grants from the central
government.
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“agents” share the interest to minimize upward transfers and manipulate the tax base, the 
state’s financial base is eroded even further. Whether the trend is measured as total 
government revenue per GDP, or central revenue as a share of total government revenue 
during the 1980-1993 period, the result is the same: the ratio of total government revenue 
to GDP fell from an already low 26 per cent in 1980 to 13 per cent in 1993. The share of 
the central revenue to total government revenue fell from 41 per cent (1984) to 22 per cent 
(1993) (Figure 2.1).  
 
Notes:  
a The government revenue refers to budgetary revenue.  
b Domestic and foreign debts are excludes.  
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, P. R. China. 2004. China Statistical Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistics Press)  
Figure 2.1: Ratio of Government Revenue to GDP and Central to Total Government 
Revenue  
 
The introduction of tax farming reflects three aims of the Chinese government: first, 
to mobilize local support for the implementation of the reform course; second, to link the 
self-interest of local government agencies to the economic performance of their local 
jurisdictions; and third, to offer enough flexibility in the tax system that widely differing 
local conditions can be accommodated. 
 
2.4. Tax Sharing: Bureaucratizing Tax Administration 
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authority in the reforms of 1994 by building up a central tax bureaucracy regarded to more
effectively implement tax collection. Yet, not much unlike the monarchs in Europe before
them (Kiser and Kane 2001) the central government had to accept that local autonomy is
not easily disposed of. The Tax Sharing System (fen shui zhi) (e.g. Wong 1997; Wong et al.
1995) aimed at replacing locally negotiated tax farming with a unified national system of
taxation. Aside from the re-centralization effort, the change was expected to address three
further issues. A unified tax system would ensure equal taxation for equal transactions and
tax base. A higher share of central revenue would ensure that distributional effects could be
mitigated, as the system of local autonomy had no provision (and no incentive) for
inter-provincial transfers. A third intention, namely the abolishment of extra-and
off-budgetary revenue sources will be dealt with separately.
The newly introduced tax sharing system does not refer to a separation of tasks
between different layers of government to which specific sources of revenues (taxes) are
allocated as in “Western” models of multi-layered government, such as federalist states or
the EU for example. Instead, the tax revenue (and not tax legislation) is divided in such a
way that some taxes are exclusively assigned to the central level, some are assigned
exclusively to the local level, and some taxes are shared between both levels according to a
fixed ration. It is worth stressing that the category of local revenues includes fees and other
kinds of revenue which are manipulated by local governments. As Table 2.1 illustrates
these local taxes encompass a variety of fees and taxes, which reflect the willingness and
ability to tap local resources when they concentrate on the taxation of relatively immobile
factors rather than following an economic policy of generating competitive advantages for
a locality11. At first sight the tax sharing system seems to follow international practice in
the sense that the two largest revenue sources, namely the VAT and income tax, are divided
between the central and local level (see Table 2.2). That revenues from tariffs go directly to
the national coffer is also common. On the other hand the socialist legacy can be seen in
the fact that the income taxation of foreign firms remains a concern of the central
government.
To better cope with the monitoring and enforcement problem, the tax
administration was split into two separate bureaucracies, each with a distinctive line of
command. The national tax bureau (guoshuiju, NTBs) subordinate to the State
Administration of Taxation (SAT), (defined as a ministry since 1993), was put in charge of
central and shared taxes12. While the SAT is autonomous with respect to central taxes, its
11 This is known in public finance as Ramsey rule (1927): immobile factors are more vulnerable to
tax as the exit option can be considered at high costs only.
12 The shared tax would be retransferred to local government based on the shared ratio.
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role changes when it comes to local taxes administered by local tax bureaus (dishuiju,
LTBs), the second tax bureaucracy. As stipulated by the law, the SAT and local government
“jointly” supervise the LTBs, which in the case of the SAT limits its role to operational
guidance (yewu zhidao) and comment on nominations for tax personnel to the provincial
LTBs (Figure 2.2). In other words, LTBs, in particular below the provincial level, are de
facto subordinate to local governments leaving the institutional architecture of local
autonomy unchanged.
Table 2.2: Central-local Taxes: Sharing Formula
Shared taxes Central Local
VAT 75% 25%
Enterprises income tax a
50%(2002)
60%(2003)
50%(2002)
40%(2003)
Individual income tax b
50%(2002)
60%(2003)
50%(2002)
40%(2003)
94% of taxes on security
transactionStamp tax
6% of taxes on security
transaction
Other stamp taxes
Notes:
a. Before 2002 the “corporate income tax” on domestic enterprises was a local tax, since then it is a shared tax.
b. Taxes on capital gains go to the central government. Before 2002 the personal income tax was a local tax, afterwards it became a shared tax
after.
Source: Certified Public Accountant (CPA) Committee, Ministry of Finance (MOF), P. R. China. 2003. Taxation laws (Beijing: China
Economic Press)
Unintentionally, the tax reforms established a dual tax system where a streamlined
Weberian bureaucracy for central taxation (including those taxes whose revenue were to be
shared with local units) and largely unreformed local tax farming co-exist. A closer look at
the reforms indicates that the reason for such top down bureaucratization is to be found in
the shortage of professional tax personnel able to run a modern centralized tax
administration, and the lack of modern monitoring devices that would keep the costs of tax
collection (and moral hazard) low13.
13 Thus, for example in order to prevent fraud of VAT invoices, a computer network
connecting the SAT and its branches down to the county (district) level, the so-called
Golden Taxation Project, - was launched in 1994. By the end of 2002, it had installed 1.4
thousand servers, 25 thousand PC servers and 0.4 million PCs, staffed 26 thousand
computer technicians and covered approximately 0.6 million units, i.e. about 45% of
taxpayers (SAT 2003).
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Notes:
a. The hierarchy of taxation administration is corresponding to government administrative structure.
b. The black line refers to vertical leadership.
c. The dashed line refers to operational guidance.
Source: State Administration of Taxation, P. R. China. www.chinatax.gov.cn
Figure 2.2: Structure of Taxation Administration
Aside from the introduction of computer based monitoring devices, a system of
merit-based recruitment and systematic government training (0.4 million national and 0.35
million local tax officials in 2002 alone) are seen as the first necessary steps for shifting
toward a bureaucratic tax system at all levels of government. At the same time, the
personnel deployment policy, which asks for out of place-of-origin appointments and job
rotation, is seen as a means to prevent corruption. This follows stricter legislation as
stipulated in the Law on the Administration of Tax Collection (1995) and the amendment to
the Criminal Law which explicitly addresses the problem of tax collection and dereliction
of duty on taxation (1997).
While generally successful in consolidating central state control14, a more detailed
analysis shows that the system was rather ineffective in establishing rational unified tax
codes and tax bureaucracy. Tax farming is still the dominant institutional architecture at the
lower level of the state political and administrative system. Once more transaction cost
considerations and the need to compromise politically with local politicians and agencies
prevail in institutional choice.
14 The ratio of total government revenue to GDP increased from 13% in 1993 to 19% in 2003. The
share of the central government revenue to total revenue in 2003 (55%) is about two times of that in
1993 (22%), as shown in Figure 1.
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2.5. The Status quo of the Tax System
It is worth emphasizing that all reforms in the last three decades were directed toward the
provincial level, while sub-provincial government agencies were rarely mentioned.
General recommendations, such as “promoting” local initiatives (fangquan rangli) or
“adjusting” for local conditions (yindi zhiyi) left the provinces with considerable leeway to
modify central policy. Thus, for example, the 1994 reform merely stipulates that provinces
improve sub-provincial fiscal administration without giving further directions. This
apparent neglect should be interpreted as a political compromise where rich provinces (in
particular) and/or sub-provincial government agencies saw their discretionary powers
re-confirmed in return for compliance with other parts of the reform program. The creation
of a national tax bureaucracy outside the reach of “local” control is a good example of this.
2.5.1. Ad hoc Non-tax Levies
One of the most striking differences between the Chinese and international tax systems are
the so-called extra-budgetary revenues (EBRs) and off-budgetary revenues (OBRs), two
devices inherited from the socialist past yet in the nineties re-invented for ad hoc taxation,
and for legitimizing income from commercial activities (e.g. Wong 1997, 1998; Fan 1998;
Eckaus 2003).
Extra-budgetary revenues (EBRs) originated in 1950 as a means to locally finance
specially earmarked local expenditures. It includes three major parts: 1) government funds
and surtaxes, such as agriculture surtax, and education surtax, levied on the income,
consumption, profit or turnover base; 2) a hold up of special funds of SOEs, such as
depreciation, major repair, and innovation funds; and 3) locally self-raised funds and
administrative fees, such as road construction fund, public utility fee, road toll, and tuition
fee15. OBRs on the other hand are public “voluntary” contributions made by individuals,
firms or Overseas Chinese, various unregulated fees, and lately, profits from TVEs, and
revenues from land sales (Fan 1998). Lacking uniform procedures with respect to
computation, base, rate, or frequency means that in fact, EBRs (or OBRs) are quasi-taxes.
Their ambiguous legal status adds support to the notion of strong local autonomy in
today’s fiscal system (Wong 1998).
15 Major changes of composition of extra-budgetary revenue in 1993 and 1997 excluded the
innovation fund, the major repair fund and government funds.
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Table 2.3: Tax Collections by Authorities
Collection authority Items
National tax
bureaus (NTBs)
Consumption tax, VAT, income tax on enterprises a, Income tax on FIEs
and FEs, stamp tax on security transaction, vehicle acquisition tax
Local tax bureaus
(LTBs)
Business tax, individual income tax b, resource tax, urban and township
land usage tax, urban maintenance and construction tax, real estate tax,
urban real estate tax, land appreciation tax, vehicle and vessel usage
license tax, vehicle and vessel usage tax, slaughter tax, banquet tax,
other stamp taxes
Customs
Tariff, VAT (collected by Customs), consumption tax (collected by the
Customs), vessel tonnage tax
MOF/LTBs c
Agricultural tax, tax on special agricultural produce, animal husbandry
tax, deed tax, and occupied farmland tax
Notes:
a. The local tax bureau collects corporate income tax of those domestic firms established before 1 January 2002. The SAT collects the
same tax of younger firms. The SAT also collects the corporate income tax on central government owned SOEs, ministry of railway,
headquarters of banks, and ocean and petrol companies.
b. Individual income tax became a shared tax in 2002 but is still collected by the local tax bureau.
c. Before 1996, Ministry of Finance (MOF) collected occupied farmland tax, deed tax, agricultural tax, tax on special agricultural
produce and the animal husbandry tax, to be replaced bay local tax bureaus.
Sources: Certified Public Accountant (CPA) Committee, Ministry of Finance (MOF), P. R. China. 2003. Taxation laws (Beijing: Zhongguo
Jingji Chubanshe); State Administration of Taxation, P. R. China. www.chinatax.gov.cn
EBRs and OBRs were hardly worth mentioning if they had not been hijacked by
local governments in the nineties to legitimize new revenue sources. As previously
mentioned, local governments have no tax legislation power and are only entitled to collect
“local tax” legislated by the national government whose total amount cannot but add to a
minor fraction of local budgets (Table 2.3). Yet, driven by local self-interests and
disposable revenue maximization, local governments are motivated to search for additional
revenue sources whether entitled to do so or not. They sell state assets, invest in business
activities, apportion mandatory contributions to local projects, issue local bonds, or levy
illegal service charges, the proceeds of which are listed as EBRs and OBRs in order to
suggest legitimate revenue sources. As will be shown later (Tables 2.4 and 2.5) the
revenues from commercial activities for which there is no precedent in the socialist era
became the largest source for local income in particular in the rich East. Profits (or
dividends) or local taxes on TVEs, as well as proceeds from land deals and real estate
management can increase the independence of local government agencies. EBRs and
OBRs are used to legitimize revenue maximization, which is further evidence of local
resistance to central budgetary control.
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EBRs and OBRs remain a controversial issue. Some analysts stress the negative
influence on economic stabilization, state redistribution capacity and fiscal administration
(e.g. Lee 2000; Wong 1998), while others emphasize its positive outcome in the form of
local wealth as measured in the provision of local public goods and services, such as
school or heath care (Fan 1998). In some places, such as the less-developed inland regions,
arbitrary EBR-or OBR-extraction has led to rural protest and violence (Bernstein and Lü
2003; Tsui and Wang 2004). On the other hand, in coastal and developed provinces, the
advantages of EBRs or OBRs are seen in the ability of local government agencies to
quickly respond to local public needs, if not as a starting point for more civil participation
in local policy formation ( as demonstrated in Fan’s field research of 1998).
2.5.2. Complicated Intergovernmental Transfer System
There is still no procedure for coordinating intergovernmental transfers between the five
layers of the administrative hierarchy (central, provincial, prefecture, county and township).
The present tax sharing system only deals with the central-provincial level and leaves
considerable discretionary power for sub-provincial transfer practices. Diversity within the
sub-provincial intergovernmental transfer system is unavoidable. The 1994 reforms did not
tackle the problem; to the contrary it became even more complicated by adding the new
transfer modes of national taxation.
Under the previous tax farming system, local governments transfer the contracted
lump-sum amount, a progressive sharing ratio on incremental revenue, or a fixed sharing
ratio of overall revenues (or a combination of all these). In return, the central government
re-transfers subsidies to the provinces according to the agreed upon fixed amount,
earmarked purposes or ad hoc appropriation of local budget surpluses (jiesuan) at the end
of fiscal year. Aside from the former negotiable transfer system, the present reforms
introduced the rule-based transfer for the national taxes supervised by the SAT. For
instance, local governments are entitled to the re-transfer of 25, 40 and 40 per cent of the
VAT, corporate and individual income tax respectively.
In other words, the tax farming nature of sub-provincial intergovernmental relations
is kept unchanged. Superior layers of government farm out taxation to lower layers. Such a
tax contract describes the agreed upon share of tax revenue to be transferred to the superior
level as well as the agreed upon provision of public services invested and operated by the
lower level. Negotiations between different levels of local governments on transfer and
re-transfer of revenue became a constant feature of local intergovernmental relations.
Regardless which version of tax contracting is chosen, two systematic features dominate
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the effects: First, as a “lessee” and residual claimant, each agency at the lower level
attempting to maximize discretionary revenue will shift expenditures for public services
upwards while manipulating the tax base to minimize upward transfers (Tsui and Wang
2004); Second, as will be seen presently, effective tax rates do not reflect tax legislation;
they are rather the outcome of intergovernmental tax contracting, and the unsolved
principal agent problem, or reflect the ingenuity of sub-provincial government agencies in
finding new revenue generating sources.
2.5.3. Dual Tax Administration System
As said earlier, two tax systems co-exist in China. One is defined by national legislation
which stipulates the tax base, tax rates, and the procedure by which taxes are enforced, and
how total revenue is shared between the central and local budgets (consolidated at the
provincial level). The other one is characterized by provincial and sub-provincial
discretion and tax contracting, ad hoc taxation, and unspecified procedures. This dual tax
system has major implications. First, firms can calculate the effective tax rate only ex post
when the exact local rates and fees are known. This makes, second, the local government
agencies the ultimate authority in defining effective tax rates. Third, local government
agencies facing different (financial) needs and/or different political leverage in tax
contracting will differ in their revenue generating policy, subsequently contributing to the
diversity of the local business environment. Finally, the national treasury or central
government has only limited ways of controlling overall taxation. The most recent reform
focused only on the revenue and central-provincial sharing side and cut off the link to the
government spending. Moreover, the “tax-for-fee” reform launched in 2000 attempted to
put an end to the practices of sub-provincial government agencies using ad hoc fees (Yep
2004) and aimed at tighter budgetary control, yet also on limiting the overall tax burden for
overcharged peasant households, i.e. distributional purposes. Since local governments were
obliged to generate even more revenue sources by embarking on commercial activities, the
effect was minimal, if not counterproductive.
2.6. Township M and L: Budgets and Intergovernmental Transfer
China has an atypical system of taxation where different jurisdictions overlap and
procedures are left unspecified, or burdened with a political rhetoric that confuses even the
technical side of tax collection. How does this system work in practice? With only little
information available at the local, i.e. prefecture, county and township level, data needed to
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be generated before a systematic analysis could be attempted. We decided to focus on the
lowest level of the political and administrative hierarchy, namely the township, as this is
the government agent, which meets the taxpayer (in most cases firms)16. On the factual
side, we wanted to know how the dual tax system affects local budgets, and how
intergovernmental transfers contribute to local revenues.
On the behavioral side, we wanted to know how the effective tax rate for firms is
calculated, how much disposable income townships have and how they make use of their
disposable funds. Finally, we expected that the answers to these questions would shed
more light on the problem of diversity and local autonomy. The interviews conducted
between 2003 and 2005 cannot answer all these questions. Instead of offering general
interpretations, we decided to present two case studies, which, to the best of our
knowledge, offer the first complete picture of budgets and budgetary procedures in two
townships, called M and L17.
2.6.1. Revenues
The budgets of the two townships presented in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5, offer different
pictures which is partly caused by different ways to categorize revenue items. Township M
classifies all revenue into two categories only, namely budgetary revenue and
extra-budgetary revenue, while Township L is much more specific. In the latter case
revenues are listed as budgetary revenue, budgetary fund revenue, earmarked fund revenue
and “other revenue” (Table 2.4). This practice confirms the findings from the World Bank
(2002, p. 64) that there is no standard procedure for reporting revenues at the local level.
After reclassifying the revenue items (in Table 2.5), it becomes clear that Township
M depends much more on taxation (45.2 per cent of total financial revenue) and
extra-budgetary revenues (22.3 per cent) than Township L (24.4 per cent and 11.6 per cent,
respectively). To put it differently, the category of “other revenue” is essentially revenue
from commercial activities, such as land deals, TVE shareholding and other business
activities. It contributes 32.5 per cent of total revenue in Township M, yet 64 per cent in
Township L, in turn suggesting that the latter is more entrepreneurial. It is worth
emphasizing the returns from TVEs (dividends or profit) contribute 9.9 per cent of total
revenue compared to the proceeds from land sales plus local tax on transaction, which add
16 The following findings form part of the larger research project on local autonomy. The authors
thank Hans Hendrischke for generously providing some findings of his interviews on 2004 and 2005.
17 Close to Suzhou, Jiangsu province, Township M covers 34 square kilometers with population of
53,000 in 2003. Township L is located at 15 kilometers away from Hanghzou, capital of Zhejiang
province and covers 43 square kilometers with population of 60,000 in 2003.
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up to 53.6 per cent of total revenue, in Township L!
Table 2.4: The Revenue Side of M and L Township’s Budgets
M Township Original tax
base
L Township Original tax
base
Budgetary revenue Income,
output
Budgetary revenue Income,
output
Bonus remittance of taxes Bonus remittance of taxes
Fixed remittance of taxes Fixed remittance of taxes
Earmarked subsidy Earmarked subsidy
Extra-budgetary revenue Budgetary fund revenue
Surcharges to taxes for
education
Income,
output
Surcharges to taxes for rural
education
Income,
output
Fee for garbage collection user Surcharges to taxes for education Income,
output
Fee for sewage disposal user Earmarked fund revenue
Fee for public security p.c., per firm Profit of TVEs
Fee for public utility user Fee from administration agencies User, p.c.
Water rates user Water conservancy construction
fund
p.c., per firm
Fee for family planning p.c. Proceeds of education-assets-sale
Banking interests Other subsidy
Other subsidy Other revenue
Proceeds of land-sale Proceeds of land-sale
Fee for land transaction Fee for land transaction
Other Other
Note: User charges asked by those units that provides the service, i.e. usually public utilities, are not fees in budgetary terms but charged by
the providers directly (Eckaus 2003, p.78)
Source: Respondent 24 & 26 (2004)
2.6.2. Intergovernmental Transfer
Information about intergovernmental transfer of taxes is not published but needs to be
generated by interviewing three to four groups of economic agents: representatives of the
national and local tax administration, representatives of the local government, and firms.
Instead the transfers follow the bargaining between government agencies, and between the
township and firms. The interviews in Township M suggest three features that characterize
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transfer practice at the township level.
Table 2.5: Composition Revenue, 2003: M and L Township
Items M (%) L (%)
Total financial revenue 100 100
Budgetary revenue 45.23 24.40
thereof
Bonus remittance of taxes 31.90 18.20
Fixed remittance of taxes 12.78 4.58
Earmarked subsidy 0.55 1.62
Extra-budgetary revenue 22.28 11.65
thereof
Surcharges to taxes for education 4.08 5.44
Fees charged by administration agencies 6.51 1.63
Other 11.69 4.58
Other revenue 32.49 63.95
thereof
Proceeds of land-sale 26.99 44.58
Fees for land transaction 5.24 8.98
Profit of TVEs or governmental investments 0.03 9.85
Other 0.69 0.54
Source: Respondent 24 & 26 (2004)
1. Township M has to share revenue with four superior government layers: local (county
level), prefecture, provincial, and national. Interaction between these different layers
of government agencies is partly statutory, i.e. based on legislation, and partly
resulting from previous negotiations. At the time of the interview, seven transfer
modes were employed. Aside from the standardized sharing rules supervised by the
SAT, a negotiated sharing of “excess” tax income, as for example more revenue from
VAT than anticipated in the tax contracts for a budget year (see below). Other sharing
formulas address “approved budgetary expenditure”, “approved budgetary
expenditure of financial department”, “other shared tax items”, “subsidy from
superior units” and “remittance to the prefecture level”. Each mode follows
distinctive formulae such as quota-based, growth-based, progressive or regressive
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rates. For instance, in the tax contract for 2003, M Township agreed to collect 120
million RMB in VAT and consumption tax on behalf of the SAT. The actually
collected amount added up to 160 million, which was not allocated according to the
usual 75:25 percentage formula between the centre and the local units. Instead,
Township M is entitled to a bonus based on the 40 million of “excess” revenue. The
calculation follows a ‘progressive’ rate: 12 per cent bonus for the first 12 per cent of
the excess revenue (1.73 million), 15 per cent bonus for the following 12-15 per cent
of excess revenue (54 thousand) and 18 per cent bonus for any excess beyond 15 per
cent (3.94 million). The total amount of the thus calculated bonus added up to 6.2
million RMB considerably lower than the ten million RMB the local tax agencies
would have been entitled to, if the usual tax sharing formula had been applied (Table
2.6).
2. Superior government agencies, such as the province, prefecture or county can and
will press for a sharing formula which squeezes the township of the tax income
generated here. All that is needed is a document written on an official letterhead
(hongtou wenjian). This form of state capture (Hellman 1998) can be illustrated by
the way the bonus on VAT collection allocated to different layers of government. For
instance, Township M was entitled to a due share of 3.88 per cent of total VAT and
consumption tax generated in the township. Yet, Suzhou city, superior to Township M,
appropriated 0.6 per cent, leaving M with 3.28 per cent. Even worse, for 2004 Suzhou
increased “its” share to 1.6 per cent, which would cut Township M’s share to 2.06 per
cent (Table 2.6).
3. Generally in Jiangsu province, out of the 25 per cent that goes to local units from
consumption taxes, 50 per cent is claimed by the provincial government, 16 per cent
is claimed at the prefecture level, 6.8 percent remains at the county level, and only
27.2 per cent remains in the township. Likewise, of the total tax revenue collected by
Township M in 2003, 40 per cent went to the central budget, 27 per cent to the
provincial budget, ten per cent to the prefecture budget, five per cent to the district
(county) budget and 18 per cent to the township budget. Not surprisingly, the local
government officials in Township M “lament that they are sacrificed for superior
officials”. They, as most other townships, must search for alternative revenue sources.
These are usually off-budgetary activities.
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Table 2.6: A Case of State Capture: Sharing VAT and Consumption Tax Revenue M
Township (2003 -2004 in mil. RMB)
No. Item 2003 2004 Remarks
1 VAT and consumption tax 160 210 a Total tax revenue collected.
2 Revenue target 120 160
Total tax revenue collected
in last year.
3 Growth part above revenue target 39 49 3=1-2
4 Share based on 0-12% part of growth part 1.73 2.31
Shared ratio 12%;
4=2*12%*12%
5 Share based on 12-15% part of growth part 0.54 0.72
Shared ratio 15%;
5=2*(15%-12%)*15%
6 Share based on above 15% part of growth part 3.94 4.66
Shared ratio 18%;
6=(3-2*15%)*18%
7 Township entitlement to share 6.21 7.69 7=4+5+6
8 Remittance to prefecture level 0.96 3.36
8=1*remittance ratio; (0.6%
2003, 1.6% 2004)
9 Actual shred revenue 5.25 4.33 9=7-8
10 Actual shared percentage (%) 3.28% 2.06% 10=9/1
Note: Predicted figure based on revenue task 2004.
Source: Respondent 24 (2004)
2.6.3. Expenditures
Only after looking at both revenue and expenditure can the complete picture of financial
flows around the local tax system be seen (Figure 2.3). One major reason why expenditure
needs to be integrated into the analysis of intergovernmental transfers and local budgets is
the fact that tax farming between the township and the tax payer shows up on the
expenditure side. As said before, the township cannot change or modify tax legislation,
while at the same time having a strong incentive to cultivate a wealthy tax base, if not to
expand the tax base by attracting additional investment. Thus, the tax contracts between
the township and individual firms do not prescribe lower tax rates, for example. Instead tax
rebates or exemption, bonus, grants, subsidy, or awards are negotiated which promise ex
post reimbursement for taxes paid. These rebates are usually listed as means for supporting
the local economic sector.
Thus for example, L Township grants all firms established since 2001 a three-year
exemption (via ex post reimbursements from local budget) from VAT, enterprise income
tax and business tax. Likewise, firms investing more than ten million RMB in
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technological innovation enjoy a three-year tax refund. These refunds show up on the
expenditure side of the Township L (Table 2.7) under industry and transportation items in
2003, reaching 38 million RMB at 20.9 per cent of Township L’s total financial
expenditure. In addition to tax preferential treatment, Township L invested 46 million
RMB (25.6 per cent of total expenditure) in infrastructure and 65 million RMB (35.9 per
cent of total expenditure) in education to improve the investment environment. Land prices
are another are of inter-jurisdictional competition, which at a discounted rate can be used
for attracting investment. As Township L claims it was this policy that enabled them to
attract 83 new established enterprises in 2003, of which 40 enterprises were from other
localities.
Note: Black part of expenditure refers to extra expenditure of actual amount.
Figure 2.3: Financial Revenue and Expenditure at Township Level
Financial revenue pool
Budgetary revenue
Extra-budgetary
revenue
Funds/surcharges/fees
Off-budgetary revenue
Proceeds of land sale
Financial expenditure package
Budgetary
expenditure
Extra-budgetary
expenditure
Soft
constrain
Hard
constrain
Upper jurisdiction
Public
expenditure
Supporting local economic sector
Tax refund/subsidy
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Table 2.7: The Expenditure Side of L Township’ Budget, 2003
Items Amount (million RMB) Per cent
Total financial expenditure 181 100
Agriculture 4 2.5
Industry and transportation 38 20.9
Infrastructure 46 25.6
Education 65 35.9
Culture 8 4.5
Health 3 1.9
Social 4 2.4
Administration 10 5.4
Other 2 0.9
Source: Respondent 26 (2004)
To sum up, tax farming at the lowest administrative level defines the effective tax
rate for firms, i.e. by far the largest taxpayer. The effective tax rate can be calculated only
ex post, as the rate depends on reimbursement in the following year. Jurisdictional
competition between lower level government agencies exists and thrives; yet alimented by
local returns from commercial activities of government agencies rather than by “tax
design”. Intergovernmental transfer is renegotiable and enables agencies (in particular, the
middle-layers of government, such as prefecture and county) to appropriate a share of tax
revenues. At the township level, tax administration and tax policy cannot be separated.
Despite all the technical formulae used within the tax sharing process, the budget
procedure at the township level follows three rather straightforward steps. The township
first estimates the total amount needed to fulfill the mandatory tasks, keeping the agreed
upon commitments to different groups (such as firms) and the money needed to run the
local government. In a second step, the township negotiates the volume of tax revenue to
be transferred and re-transferred with all other local government agencies. As the township
knows the range of transfers and re-transfers from past experience, it can anticipate a
deficit or surplus. The township will simultaneously, in a third step, search for additional
revenue sources outside the bureaucratic tax system. In short, the township is not forced to
adjust expenditure to revenue available, but adjusts revenue to expenditure planned and
contracted. The system implies further that the more the central state attempts to harden
the budget constraint the more entrepreneurial townships will become, by embarking on
business activities outside the reach of bureaucratic control.
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2.7. Conclusions
China’s tax system is unique. We don’t know of any other case where a national tax
bureaucracy and local tax farming co-exist. It would however be misleading to interpret
this co-existence as a case where the socialist legacy prevails. To the contrary, the
institutional change in taxation is the deliberate response to the political and economic
development in China’s economic transformation.
First, aside from the rhetoric, the reforms were driven by transaction cost
considerations and political compromises. Each reform step reveals the search for a
broader tax base, and enforcement mechanisms, which increase administrative efficiency.
Second, reforms to the tax system serve as a means to better align the interests of different
government agencies. Unlike other countries where taxation defines hard (budget)
constraints and state enforcement agencies, China’s tax system offers positive incentives
for its tax agents which in return for compliance to the national tax codes (if not the whole
reform program) are entitled to residual tax revenue. Third, tax farming harnesses local
autonomy. It offers townships a resource base outside central control. It is worth stressing
that local autonomy in China is not the consequence of a constitutional separation of power,
but the consequence of decentralization, i.e. the transfer of regulatory power to local
agencies, and the transfer of resources that enable local jurisdictions, such as the township,
to finance local policy. Fourth, not surprisingly then, tax farming must contribute to
diversity in economic outcomes as well as diversity in the institutional architecture at the
local level. It is hard to find evidence which would support the Grabbing Hand -or state
seizure-hypothesis (Frye 2002; Northrup and Rowan 1963) on the one hand and the
Helping Hand or state capture hypothesis (Hellman 1998) on the other hand, which claims
that over time the central state will increasingly appropriate more resources in the case of
the former; or that the alliance between the business community and local government
agencies will over time subvert the institutional architecture to better serve their own
self-interest. Both would imply the emergence of informal (if not illegal) organizations and
institutions, while the tax farming bargaining game is part of the official tax system. From
this point of view, local tax farming can be seen as an ex ante device for limiting, if not
even legitimizing, ex post opportunism (of the tax agents). Finally, jurisdictional
competition seems to work, limiting overall taxation. This does not mean however that
China can expect a corporatist state with as many local business and tax systems as
townships or counties. As the interviews indicate, imitation of good (tax) practices in
neighboring localities will lead to at least regional convergence of the de facto tax systems,
if not tax practices.
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3. The Central Government and Local Governments: Fiscal
Decentralization as Deterrence to Public Sector Growth18
3.1. Introduction
hina seems to defy Wagner’s Law, which describes a positive correlation between the
expansion of the public sector and economic development (Dudley and Witt 2004;
Bird 1970; Krusell and Rios-Rull 1999; Meltzer and Richard 1981; Musgrave 1959, 1969;
Peacock and Wiseman 1961). Despite an average annual GDP growth rate of 9.6 per cent
since the beginning of reform, the Chinese public sector, measured by the size of
government expenditure19 relative to total GDP, has decreased from 31 per cent in 1978 to
21 per cent in 2004 (NBS 2006) , as shown in Figure 3.1. In contrast, the average size in
the OECD countries climbed to 45 per cent (OECD 2005). The intriguing question
therefore is why does China depart from not only theoretical prediction but also the
empirical facts from these market economies?
18 This chapter is based on Zhu and Krug. 2005. Is China a Leviathan? ERIM Working Paper. I am
grateful to Bruno Frey, Lars Feld, and Frank Bohn for helpful comments and suggestions. The
chapter has also benefited from presentations at the Annual Meeting of European Public Choice
Society (EPCS), April 20-23, 2006 in Turku (Finland) and a workshop, Shifts in Governance (NWO
project), July 24-28, 2006 in Hangzhou (China).
19 The Chinese public budgety system includes extra-budgetary revenue and expenditure, which
supplement the regular budget. Data on extra-budgetary revenue and expenditure only began to be
compiled after 1982 when statistical reporting was established. In this paper, “government revenue
and expenditure”, unless otherwise stated, refers to formal budgetary revenue and expenditure only.
C
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics, P. R. China. 1996-2005. China Statistical Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistics Press) 
Figure 3.1: Government Expenditure and as Percentage of GDP: 1978-2004 
 
There are three possible explanations: 1) the retreat of government from the 
economy demands less government outlay; 2) shrinking government revenues reduce the 
government budget relative to GDP; and 3) technical flaws in the statistics might cause 
under-reporting of total government revenues and expenditures (Zhu and Krug 2007). In 
addition, we propose that Chinese government size is curtailed by the de facto fiscal 
decentralization that has developed since the early 1980s. This new approach takes the 
Leviathan model which sees the state as a monolithic entity maximizing its (tax) revenue 
with fiscal decentralization acting as a strong institutional constraint on its reach (Brennan 
and Buchanan 1980). Yet, testing the Leviathan hypothesis has been so far restricted to 
functioning market economies, in particular those where decentralization takes the form of 
a federalist state (Litwack 2002). China is not a federalist state but operates in a “Chinese 
style of fiscal federalism” (Montinola et al. 1995; Qian and Weingast 1996, 1997; 
Weingast 1995). In China, there are no general elections and no significant democratic 
constraints. Instead, we observe a centralized top-down party cadre system of supervision, 
which dramatically induces yardstick competition among local officials (Besley and Case 
1995; Shleifer 1985). Thus, China offers the opportunity to analyze the effects of fiscal 
decentralization on government size irrespective of the democratic political market, 
thereby extending the applicability of the Leviathan hypothesis to non-democratic states. 
Moreover, our empirical investigation of China’s fiscal decentralization and its government 
size performed in the paper also contributes to the field in which, to our best knowledge, 
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few work has been done (cf. Lin and Liu 2000; Ma 1997; Zhang and Zou 1998 on fiscal 
decentralization and economic performance). 
The remainder proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 summarizes the three conventional 
explanations for China’s shrinking public sector (as noted above). Section 3.3 presents the 
Leviathan hypothesis, followed by a survey of empirical literature and fiscal 
decentralization in China. Section 3.4 describes methodology and data. Section 3.5 
provides the empirical results followed by our conclusions. 
 
3.2. Changing Government Size in China 
 
3.2.1. The Demand Side 
 
Reform-era price liberalization and privatization reduced the government’s planning and 
control functions in the economy since the emerging market functions in the place of 
government intervention (Walder 1996; Naughton 1995). For example, from 1980 the 
non-state sector tripled its share of gross industrial output value (GIOV) to 65 per cent and 
quadrupled its share of fixed investment to 64 per cent by 2004 (Figure 3.2). As a result, 
government expenditure for economic development dropped from 20 per cent of GDP in 
1978 to 6 per cent in 2004 (Figure 3.3). 
 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, P. R. China. 1996-2005. China Statistical Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistics Press) 
Figure 3.2: Development of Non-state Sector 
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics, P. R. China. 1996-2005. China Statistical Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistics Press) 
Figure 3.3: Government Expenditure by Function (% of GDP) 
 
3.2.2. The Supply Side 
 
China transformed its fiscal regime from a socialist “owner-state” surviving on controlled 
resources (Campbell 1996) to a “tax-state” subject to its capability and legitimacy to 
extract the surplus from tax bases (Schumpeter 1918). Indeed, this transformation, to a 
large extent, jeopardizes revenue extraction. Before reform, government budgets basically 
relied on profit remittances from state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which generated 51 per 
cent of total government revenue in 1978. However, SOEs struggled to be profitable when 
exposed to market competition and are no longer reliable revenue bases. Rather they have 
often become a financial burden. The subsidy to loss-making SOEs held 25 per cent of 
total government revenue, about 13 times more than the revenue they contributed in 1985 
(Figure 3.4). An alternative is to tax non-state sectors, i.e. a large number of small and 
medium private enterprises and individuals, which gravely challenges government’s tax 
administration (Wong 1997; World Bank 2002). A lack of traditional tax compliance also 
exacerbates the tax collection problem. Consequently, the ratio of total government 
revenue to GDP plummeted from 31 per cent in 1978 to a rock bottom of 11 per cent in 
1995, while recently recovering to 20 per cent in 2004 (NBS 2006). 
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics, P. R. China. 1996-2005. China Statistical Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistics Press) 
Figure 3.4: Government Revenue by Source (%) 
 
3.2.3. The Hidden Figures 
 
The existence of extensive extra-budgetary or even off-budgetary activities implies that the 
actual amount of government revenue and expenditure is much larger than official statistics 
suggest (Eckaus 2003; Fan 1998; Wong 1998; Zhu and Krug 2007). To mitigate the 
scarcity of local financial resources, extra-budgetary revenues consisting of administrative 
service charges, fees, and various surcharges are levied for Central and provincial 
governments, and corresponding financial and regulatory departments. They remained a 
minor part of economic life in China before the 1980s but experienced a vicious spiral 
after that. In 1978, extra-budgetary revenues represented 10 per cent of GDP and escalated 
to an average of 17 per cent during 1980s. Although they have sharply decreased since 
1993, they represented about 4 per cent of GDP in 2003 (NBS 2006) (Figure 3.5). In 
addition, volumes of off-budgetary revenues and expenditures escape from the public 
budget system and are excluded from official budgetary figures. Thus, the actual 
government size of China is, to a large extent, underestimated. 
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics, P. R. China. 1996-2005. China Statistical Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistics Press) 
Figure 3.5: Government Budgetary and Extra-budgetary Revenue as a Percentage of 
GDP 
 
3.3. Taming the Dragon: The Leviathan Model and China 
 
3.3.1. Leviathan Theory and Hypotheses 
 
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) claim that a state maximizes revenue, and simultaneously 
fully appropriates the monopolistic rent for those goods and services whose provision is 
regarded – or defined – as the exclusive right of the government due to market failure or 
(more often) a proclaimed public consent. To restrain the Leviathan, an electoral process is 
presumed to result in political competition offering comparable services and public goods 
at the lowest price and tax rates. In addition, fiscal federalism further effectively curtails 
the expansion of government size thanks to two major merits: information revelation and 
competition (Musgrave 1959, 1969; Oates 1972). On the one hand, a decentralized 
decision-making process (Hayek 1945) addresses the principal-agent problem between 
government agencies and constituencies by releasing enough information to provide an 
effective check and balance on government’s coercive power to tax. Similarly, fiscal 
decentralization invites Tieboutian competititon (1956), i.e. citizens migrate among 
different jurisdictions searching for public goods and services at the lowest costs, which 
forces government agencies to compete with each other for a reliable tax base.   
However, since the Leviathan hypothesis is grounded on the assumption of 
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democracy it is not directly applicable in China. As we observe, a centralized party cadre
system empowers the central government to control local officials in their career
development. Any promotion within the bureaucratic/party hierarchy, especially at the
provincial level, is decided by the superior and, eventually, the central government.
Moreover, promotion is, to a large extent, based on officials’ performance, especially the
economic development of their jurisdiction. Consequently, in contrast to the bottom-up
constraints imposed by constituencies in a democratic society, such top-down supervision
from higher level hierarchy induces yardstick competition (Besley and Case 1995; Shleifer
1985) among local officials. Moreover, increasing fiscal autonomy intensifies the
inter-jurisdictional competition for mobile resources and tax bases. In this sense, fiscal
decentralization serves as a powerful institutional constraint on local government
expansion.
Therefore, the Leviathan hypotheses still holds, only the logic behind fiscal
decentralization influencing government size is modified for the Chinese scenario. Taking
the ratio of lower level government agencies to total government revenue and expenditure
as a measure for effective decentralization allows for the formulation of a decentralization
hypothesis:
The more fiscal authority is transferred to lower levels of government, the smaller the total
public sector.
As the intensity of Tieboutian competition depends on factor mobility and the
availability of numerous competing jurisdictions a fragmentation hypothesis can be
assumed:
The larger the number of competing jurisdictions, the smaller the total public sector.
Using the average government size of neighboring localities as a benchmark,
competition should result and a yardstick competition hypothesis can be assumed:
The smaller the public sector of neighboring provinces, the smaller the public sector in
one’s own province.
Furthermore, in practice, fiscal federalism normally sees tax revenue and
expenditures assigned to different levels of government based on the following factors:
mobility of tax base, economies of scale and scope, fiscal equity ground, and spillover
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effect (McLure 1983; Musgrave 1997; Oates 1999). In other words, central government
levies part of taxes and transfers revenues to local government. However, Brennan and
Buchanan (1980) emphasize that such intergovernmental transfers may subvert
jurisdictional competition and thus stimulate a larger government; the collusion hypothesis:
The more intergovernmental grants, the larger the total government size.
In short, the effect of decentralization on the size of the public sector depends on
four factors: decentralization, fragmentation, yardstick competition and intergovernmental
collusion. Here, the first three factors limit, while the last enlarges government size.
3.3.2. A Survey of Empirical Literature
Although the Leviathan hypothesis appears to be on sound theoretical ground, numerous
empirical studies headed by Oates have shown inconsistent evidence at national,
subnational and/or local level (Table 3.1)20. Based on a cross-sectional sample of 57
countries, Oates (1972) conducted a simple regression of government size (share of tax
revenues in national income) on decentralization (central government tax revenue as a
fraction of total tax revenues) and found a significant inverse relationship: increased
decentralization resulted in a larger government sector. After controlling the variable of
income level for Wagner’s Law, the coefficient remained negative but statistically
insignificant, which lent no support to the decentralization hypothesis. In 1985, Oates used
a sample of 43 IMF countries and again found no statistically significant association
between fiscal decentralization and government size. Yet, the empirical results verified the
collusion hypothesis that relatively heavy intergovernmental grants induce larger public
sectors. To address the possible unreliability of IMF data, Heil (1991) used two
comparison samples of 22 OECD and 39 IMF countries. In addition to the Ordinary Least
Squares technique, he also ran the Two-Stage Least Squares regression by constructing
federal structure, literacy rate and gross exports as a percentage of GDP as instrumental
variables. In all cases, no significant impact of fiscal decentralization on government size
was obtained at the national level. Moreover, Stein (1999) observed relatively larger
governments in fiscally decentralized Latin America, particularly when subnational
governments enjoyed extensive vertical imbalances, discretional transfers and borrowing
autonomy. Yet, in Moesen and van Cauwenberge (2000), the decentralization variable was
matched by local tax autonomy, thereby excluding intergovernmental grants and local
20 The survey of previous empirical literatures is based on Shadbegian (1999) and Feld (2003).
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borrowing, i.e., subnational government taxes as a percentage of total government
expenditures. The results from 19 OECD countries supported the Leviathan hypothesis that
a decentralized tax authority tended to reduce overall government size. Rodden (2003) and
Anderson and van Den Berg (1998) confirmed this point as well. Furthermore, Rodden
provided empirical evidence that decentralization accompanied by intergovernmental
transfers produced a larger government. Jin and Zou (2002) explored how government size
at different levels was influenced by different fiscal decentralization measures. Using panel
data from 17 industrial and 15 developing countries from 1980-1994, they found that: i)
expenditure decentralization resulted in smaller national governments, larger subnational
governments and larger overall government size; ii) revenue decentralization increased
subnational government size but greatly reduced national government, thereby reducing
aggregate government size; and iii) intergovernmental grants enlarged government size at
all levels. Marlow (1988) initially performed a time-series regression on 1946-1985 data
from the United State and found strong supporting evidence for the decentralization
hypothesis. Later, Grossman (1989a; 1989b), using the same data set, verified that
decentralization (the share of subnational expenditure in total government expenditure)
curtailed government spending (total government expenditure relative to GNP, in this case)
while federal-to-state grants encouraged government expansion. Similarly, data from
Australia (1950-1984) and Canada (1958-1987) was tested by Grossman (1992) and
Grossman and West (1994), respectively. In the former case, the collusion hypothesis was
demonstrated but not the decentralization one; while in the latter case, both hypotheses
were supported. Kwon (2003) analyzed time-series data from Korea (1979 to 2001) and
obtained supporting evidence for the decentralization hypothesis.
At the subnational level, Oates (1985) performed a regression analysis on
cross-sectional data from 48 contiguous US states. In his estimated specification, the
dependent variable was the state government size measured by aggregate state-local tax
receipts as a fraction of personal income. The explanatory variables included the state
share of state-local revenues and expenditures (decentralization hypothesis), number of
local government units (fragmentation hypothesis), and intergovernmental grants as a
percentage of state-local general revenues (collusion hypothesis). Per capita personal
income, population and urbanization ratios were the control variables. Neither of the
regression results showed a statistically significant association between explanatory
variables and dependent variables. Nonetheless, the collusion hypothesis was partially
supported by one of the three equations in which a positive and statistically significant
coefficient resulted. The decentralization hypothesis was also notably supported by Wallis
and Oates (1988), Joulfaian and Marlow (1990, 1991), and Shadbegian (1999). Meanwhile,
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the collusion hypothesis was supported by Raimondo (1989), Grossman (1989) and
Shadbegian (1999). With regard to the fragmentation hypothesis, Nelson (1986, 1987)
found general-purpose local government units increased intergovernmental competition
and then restricted the state-local government size. In addition to US states data, de Mello
(2001) examined data from 38 rayons (subnational units) in Moldova that provided
supporting evidence for the above three hypotheses. Feld et al. (2003) also lent support to
the decentralization and collusion hypotheses (though not the fragmentation hypothesis)
based on evidence from 26 Swiss cantons (subnational units).
Empirical studies at the local level mainly concentrate on counties and
municipalities in Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) of the United States.
Forbes and Zampelli (1989) reject the fragmentation hypothesis with a positive and
significant effect of the number of counties on county government size, using a sample of
345 counties in 157 SMSAs. Zax (1989), using a larger sample of 3022 counties and
Eberts and Gronberg (1988) using 2900 counties, both observed that increased
general-purpose local government units were likely to reduce government size. Sjoquist
(1982), Schneider (1986), and Eberts and Gronberg (1990) also found supporting evidence
for the fragmentation hypothesis at municipal or SMSA level. A more recent investigation
undertaken by Campbell (2004) looked at how different government levels impact on
government size: 1) increased decentralization of expenditures tended to decrease
municipal expenditures while having no influence on county expenditures; 2) increased
fragmentation reduced county expenditures while having no effect on municipal
expenditures.
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3.3.3. Chinese Fiscal Decentralization 
 
Considering the mixed empirical results, further study based on new data sets is warranted 
to unravel the contradictions in the existing literature. China is a good place to look. First, 
de facto fiscal decentralization has developed here over the last three decades. Local 
interest in development, together with the policy legacy of rural autarky from the Mao era, 
accelerated the formation of a Chinese style of fiscal federalism (Montinola et al. 1995; 
Qian and Weingast 1996, 1997; Weingast 1995). Since the beginning of reform in 1978, 
decentralization in China has emerged through a series of tax and fiscal reforms: 
tax-for-profit reform (1983-84), the fiscal contracting system (1985-93) and the 1994 
tax-sharing system (World Bank 1995, 2002; Wong 1995, 1997). Under the fiscal 
contracting system, the central government assigned fixed revenue-remittance contracts 
and made local governments de facto residual claimants (Zhu and Krug 2007). As shown 
in Figure 3.6, the central share of budgetary revenue diminished during the period 1985-93, 
which dropped 16 percent (from 38 per cent to 22 per cent). The central share of budgetary 
expenditure fell from 40 per cent to 28 per cent in the same period, provoking tax reforms 
in 1994, aimed at arresting this declining trend. The results were dramatic: the central 
share of budgetary revenue increased to 56 per cent in 1994 and has maintained an average 
of 51 per cent in recent years. Yet, on the extra-budgetary revenue and expenditure side, 
remarkable decentralization has occurred, particularly after 1992: the local share of 
extra-budgetary revenue and expenditure rocketed from 56 per cent in 1992 to a high of 95 
per cent in 1998 and averaged 92 per cent to 2003 (Figure 3.7). 
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics, P. R. China. 1996-2005. China Statistical Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistics Press) 
Figure 3.6: Central and Local Share of Budgetary Government Revenue and 
Expenditure 
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics, P. R. China. 1996-2005. China Statistical Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistics Press) 
Figure 3.7: Central and Local Share of Extra-budgetary Government Revenue and 
Expenditure 
 
      Second, as Brennan and Buchanan point out, fiscal decentralization may effectively 
constrain government’s power to tax even without a democratic monitor. From this point of 
view, the absence of democracy in China offers a great opportunity for testing such a 
hypothesis. Third, China’s sheer size – 31 provincial level government units, 333 
prefectures, 2,074 counties, and 44,741 townships (NBS 2006) – allows for panel data 
analysis at the subnational level. 
 
3.4. Empirical Model 
 
We intend to test the impact of decentralization, fragmentation, yardstick competition and 
intergovernmental collusion on government size, thereby addressing the inconsistency of 
shrinking public sector and Wagner’s Law in China.  
 
3.4.1. Variables and Model 
 
The empirical model is as follows: 
 
GOVit= 0+ x Xit+ c Cit+ s Sit +uit                                   (1) 
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where i and t denotes province and year, respectively. GOVit stands for government size;
Xit denotes the set of independent variables which we are interested in; Cit denotes
conventional control variables used in previous empirical studies; Sit is specific control
variables to capture the Chinese transition situation, and uit denotes the error term.
Figure 3.8: Map of China
Following previous empirical literature (Campbell 2004; Joulfaian and Marlow
1991; Schneider 1986), government size is measured by per capita aggregate provincial
expenditure. Considering China-specific extra-budgetary spending, we have GOVBE,
GOVEE and GOVCE for the budgetary, extra-budgetary and consolidated (sum of the
former two) provincial expenditure, respectively. Zhang and Zou (1998) suggest that
revenue is not a good indicator of decentralization in China; following this, we construct
four fiscal decentralization variables based on expenditure at two different levels. At the
central-provincial level, DEC_CPBE is the ratio of provincial to central budgetary
expenditure per capita; DEC_CPEE is the ratio of provincial to central extra-budgetary
expenditure per capita; DEC_CPCE is the ratio of provincial to central consolidated
budgetary and extra-budgetary expenditure per capita. At the provincial-local level,
DEC_PL is the share of subprovincial in aggregate provincial-subprovincial consolidated
budgetary and extra-budgetary expenditure. The predicted signs of these four
decentralization variables should be negative. In addition to the vertical dimension of fiscal
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decentralization, the number of local government units per million populations (NUMLG)
reflects the degree of inter-jurisdictional competition at the horizontal fragmentation
dimension which should be negatively correlated with government size. We use average
GOVBE, GOVEE, and GOVCE of geographically neighboring provinces as the performance
benchmarks for yardstick competition21 (Figure 3.8). We expect a positive relationship
between government size in one’s own province and neighboring provinces. Following
Grossman (1989), we test the influence of intergovernmental collusion on the dependent
variables: GRANTSBE, GRANTSEE and GRANTSCE represent the share of total central
grants to provinces in aggregate provincial-subprovincial budgetary, extra-budgetary, and
consolidated expenditure respectively. A positive correlation is expected. Population (POP),
urbanization (URB) and per capita income (INC) are conventional control variables that
are always included in the regression and should have a positive influence on government
size according to Wagner’s law. Two specific control variables – the share of SOEs in total
gross industrial output value of each province (SOE); and the share of total volume of
foreign trade (sum of exports and imports) in provincial GDP (OPENNESS) – capture the
transitional nature of the Chinese economy. The effect of SOEs on government size is open
to test. Meanwhile OPENNESS should present a positive sign, which has previously been
shown by Rodrik (1998). Table 2 shows the description of variables. Table 3.2 shows the
description of variables.
3.4.2. Data
Since tax reform in 1994 dramatically changed China’s tax and fiscal system, we choose
annual data from 1995 to 2002 across 31 provinces22. Data of GOVBE, GOVEE, GOVCE,
NUMLG, YSBE, YSEE, YSCE, GRANTSBE, GRANTSEE, GRANTSCE, POP, INC, URB,
SOE and OPENNESS are from China Statistical Yearbooks; DEC_PL are from Provincial
Finance Yearbooks and Provincial Budget Reports; DEC_CPBE, DEC_CPEE and
DEC_CPCE are from China Finance Yearbooks.
21 As Besley and Case (1995) pointed out, using geographic neighboring provinces as a benchmark,
to the largest extent, captures the similarity.
22 Provincial level government units refer to 22 provinces (sheng), 5 autonomous regions (zizhiqu),
and 4 autonomous municipalities (zhixiashi, Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing). Taiwan
province and two special administrative regions, Hong Kong and Macao are excluded.
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Table 3.2: Variable Descriptions
Variable Descriptions Predicted sign
GOVBE Per capita provincial budgetary expenditure
GOVEE Per capita Provincial extra-budgetary expenditure
GOVCE Per capita Provincial consolidated expenditure
DEC_CPBE Provincial /central budgetary expenditure
(expressed in per capita term)
-
DEC_CPEE Provincial /central extra-budgetary expenditure
(expressed in per capita term)
-
DEC_CPCE Provincial /central consolidated expenditure
(expressed in per capita term)
-
DEC_PL Subprovincial/provincial consolidated expenditure -
NUMLG Number of local government units per million population -
YSBE Average GOVBE in neighboring provinces +
YSEE Average GOVEE in neighboring provinces +
YSCE Average GOVCE in neighboring provinces +
GRANTSBE Central grants/provincial budgetary expenditure +
GRANTSEE Central grants/provincial extra-budgetary expenditure +
GRANTSCE Central grants/provincial consolidated expenditure +
POP Provincial population (millions) +
INC Per capita income in urban and rural region (RMB) +
URB Urban residing population/provincial population +
SOE SOEs’ GIOV/provincial GIOV ?
OPENNESS Volume of foreign trade (exports + imports)/provincial GDP +
Table 3.3 reports the mean of variables from 1995 to 2002 across eastern, middle
and western regions23. An astonishing disparity exists among different localities. The
eastern region has the highest per capita expenditure. Its average GOVBE and GOVCE
reaches 1,312 and 1,736 RMB, twice as large as those lowest in the middle region, and its
average GOVEE is 423 RMB, almost treble that in the western region. The eastern region,
obviously, has gained much more fiscal autonomy from the central compared with other
regions, as shown by the highest DEC_CPBE, DEC_CPEE and DEC_CPCE of 4.31, 24.77
and 5.24, respectively. The subprovincial decentralization (DEC_PL) seems close across
three regions with 71 per cent in the eastern region, 72 per cent in the middle region, and
62 per cent in the western region. The western region receives the most central
23 See Appendix for the grouping.
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grants-in-aid which hold 62 per cent of budgetary expenditure (GRANTSBE) and 51 per
cent of consolidated expenditure (GRANTSCE) while the eastern region the least potion of
29 per cent and 19 per cent, respectively. The number of local government units measured
in per million populations is lower in the eastern and middle region with 2.12 and 2.67
compared with 7.76 in the western region. Average population is 43 million in the eastern
region, 51 million in the middle region, and 25 million in the western region. By contrast,
the per capita annual income presents a reverse order with 5,216 RMB, 3,455 RMB, and
3,358 RMB, respectively. Moreover, as the most developed region, the eastern region has
the highest urbanization ratio (35 per cent), the lowest share of SOEs (42 per cent), and the
largest openness in economy (56 per cent).
Table 3.3: Mean of Variables: 1995-2002
3.5. Empirical Results
To mitigate the potential heteroskedasticity problem, all variables are measured in
percentage or per capita values instead of absolute values. Cross section and period effects
Region Eastern Middle Western
GOVBE 1,312 604 972
GOVEE 423 191 148
GOVCE 1,736 795 1,120
DEC_CPBE 4.31 1.92 3.09
DEC_CPEE 24.77 11.35 8.52
DEC_CPCE 5.24 2.36 3.27
DEC_PL 0.71 0.72 0.62
YSBE 0.10 0.12 0.19
YSEE 0.04 0.03 0.04
YSCE 0.13 0.15 0.22
GRANTBE 0.29 0.47 0.62
GRANTEE -0.09 -0.06 -0.10
GRANTCE 0.19 0.34 0.51
NUMLG 2.12 2.67 7.76
POP 0.43 0.51 0.25
INC 5,216 3,455 3,358
URB 0.35 0.26 0.21
SOE 0.42 0.65 0.76
OPENNESS 0.56 0.09 0.11
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are fixed in the regression. In addition, White diagonal standard errors and covariance
provides consistent estimates of the coefficient in the presence of heteroskedasticity of
unknown form. Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS) and lag of the decentralization variable
as instrumental variable are employed to tackle potential endogenous problems (Feld et al.
2003; Hettich and Winer 1999).
3.5.1. Central-provincial Decentralization
Table 3.4 reports the TSLS regression results. In three models, DEC_CP shows a strongly
statistically significant (1 per cent level) and positive relationship with provincial
government size. Our findings agree with Jin and Zou (2002) that federal-state
(central-provincial) fiscal decentralization may induce a larger subnational government
size. A general explanation proposed by John Wallis (Wallis’s hypothesis) is that since
individuals may have more influence on state (provincial) level government agencies than
those at federal (national) level, they are thus more willing to empower the former with a
wider range of public functions and responsibilities (Oates 1985). A China-specific
explanation may be that when the central government decentralizes fiscal power, it
simultaneously shifts major mandatory tasks downwards to provinces, such as social,
health and education spending, which inevitably enlarges provincial government size.
Therefore, our empirical results confirm that the greater the central-provincial fiscal
decentralization, ceteris paribus, the larger the provincial government size. NUMLG holds
negative relations statistically significant at the 1 per cent level in three models, which
shows that jurisdictional competition curtails government expansion. The yardstick
competition variable holds positive signs but is only statistically significant in Models 1
and 3 confirming that neighboring provinces’ budgetary and consolidated spending serve
as a benchmark for one’s own province. We also find that extra-budgetary spending is
significantly positively related to central grants.
The income variable is positively significant in all models in line with Wagner’s Law
that government expenditure increases with economic development. However, the
population is significantly negative relative to government size showing that public
expenditure does not keep pace with the increasing population of the world’s most
populous country. Urbanization presents no significant signs in all models. The coefficient
of SOE is positive in all models and strongly significant with budgetary and consolidated
expenditure. It indicates that a large portion of budgetary (consolidated) expenditure is
subsidies to loss-making SOEs resulting in a larger total budgetary (consolidated)
government size. OPENNESS is positive in all models but only strongly significant in
68
The Central Government and Local Governments: Fiscal Decentralization
56
Model 2 suggesting the essential role of the government’s fiscal policy in the economy.
Chinese local governments boost economic development by large investments in fixed
assets, such as infrastructure, public housing and other projects, via extra-budgetary
spending. Such government spending also serves as a risk-reducing device in the local
economy exposed to significant external risks related to international trade (Rodrik 1998).
3.5.2. Provincial-local Decentralization
As shown in the Table 3.5, the signs of our primary concerned variables are basically
consistent with the prediction and similar to those in Table 3.4. NUMLG holds negative in
all models and significant at 1 per cent with budgetary and consolidated expenditure.
Significant positive signs of yardstick competition again confirm the benchmark effect of
other provincial budgetary and consolidated public spending. Central grants only present
significantly positive correlation with extra-budgetary spending. As for control variables,
most signs are the same as those in Table 3.4. In contrast, the DEC_PL holds negative yet
insignificant in Models 4 and 6, indicating provincial-local decentralization might
constrain budgetary and consolidated provincial spending. It also shows a positive yet
insignificant coefficient in Model 5 that suggests provincial-local level decentralization
might enlarge extra-budgetary spending. It is worth stressing that extra-budgetary revenues
and expenditures are usually ad hoc levies with ambiguous legal status and lacking
uniform procedures of computation, base, rate, or frequency (Eckaus 2003; Wong 1998).
Such ambiguity provides local government with considerable discretionary power in
collection and spending. Moreover, unlike central-provincial decentralization with
powerful monitoring measures, very few checks and balances at the provincial-local level
exist. This dramatically induces local government agencies to pursue extra-budgetary
revenue and spending.
3.6. Conclusions
This chapter explains the departure of China from Wagner’s Law by proposing a new
approach. Seeing the centralized party cadre system and top-down supervision in China,
we claim that a yardstick competition among local officials functions in the place of
democratic constraint and thus makes fiscal decentralization a powerful restraint on the
expansion of government size. Consequently, this chapter contributes to the Leviathan
model by relaxing its democratic premise. Moreover, we find empirical evidence for the
Leviathan model from vertical decentralization, horizontal fragmentation, yardstick
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competition and intergovernmental collusion at central-provincial and provincial-local
level in the context of China’s transition economy. In particular, vertical decentralization at
different level exerts effects on government size poles apart. Central-provincial
decentralization stimulates expansion of provincial government spending whereas
provincial-local decentralization curtails it.
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Table 3.4: TSLS Estimates for Central-provincial Decentralization: 1995-2002
Dependent Variable GOVBE GOVEE GOVCE
Model(1) Model(2) Model(3)
Constant -1354.726 -33.37031 -2214.472
(-1.33643) (-0.361751) (-2.268048)
DEC_CPBE 195.9213*
(1.814955)
DEC_CPEE 5.957125***
(3.02752)
DEC_CPCE 315.5208***
(2.628631)
NUMLG -505.6416*** -21.92055*** -404.3624***
(-5.221977) (-2.93644) (-5.546242)
YSBE 1754.708***
(3.07508)
YSEE 633.4524
(0.571258)
YSCE 1015.603*
(1.726262)
GRANTBE -206.5735
(-0.466202)
GRANTEE 89.04097**
(2.538333)
GRANTCE -558.1778
(-1.206624)
POP -12.8421* -1.102532** -8.653233*
(-1.738478) (-2.391428) (-1.795102)
INC 0.756456*** 0.045773*** 0.803979***
(5.987823) (2.600355) (7.065459)
URB -287.712 49.44133 -534.8685
(-1.009219) (1.394464) (-1.487994)
SOE 1378.988*** 97.85616 1324.813***
(2.722277) (1.298533) (2.676092)
OPENNESS 344.8516 210.6635*** 775.587
(0.774922) (2.698163) (1.442198)
Period effect Yes Yes Yes
Cross-section effect Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.953113 0.966686 0.963265
Jarque-Bera 320.3233*** 68.58648*** 126.5542***
Cross-sections 31 31 31
Observations 213 213 213
Notes: a. t-statistics in parentheses. b. * Statistically significant at 10 per cent level; ** statistically significant at 5 per cent level; ***
statistically significant at 1 per cent level. c. White diagonal standard errors & covariance (no d.f. corrected). d. The Jarque-Bera is a test
statistic for testing whether the residuals are normally distributed. Significant Jarque-Bera value leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis
of a normal distribution e. Instrument list: C, DEC_CPBE (-1) (DEC_CPEE (-1), DEC_CPCE (-1)), NUMLG, YSBE (YSEE, YSCE), GRANTBE
(GRANTEE, GRANTCE), POP, INC, URB, SOE, and OPENNESS.
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Table 3.5: TSLS Estimates for Provincial-local Decentralization: 1995-2002
Dependent Variable GOVBE GOVEE GOVCE
Model(4) Model(5) Model(6)
Constant 461.9691 -36.20891 83.07641
(0.385917) (-0.192083) (0.069783)
DEC_PL -878.3655 41.96712 -796.7552
(-1.338038) (0.35286) (-1.253185)
NUMLG -450.1624*** -3.92247 -449.1406***
(-3.835571) (-0.498271) (-3.903144)
YSBE 2187.9***
(3.047233)
YSEE -2127.049
(-1.318638)
YSCE 2103.191***
(2.985666)
GRANTBE -443.4199
(-0.860129)
GRANTEE 109.7251*
(1.932679)
GRANTCE -281.2483
(-0.538481)
POP -18.01043** -0.88584 -17.59**
(-2.335736) (-1.037048) (-2.085744)
INC 0.721398*** 0.06045** 0.799585***
(6.671033) (2.008967) (6.96933)
URB 11.78942 134.7273** 120.589
(0.049353) (2.335374) (0.530676)
SOE 779.8136* 160.6108 851.9306*
(1.842577) (1.274958) (1.953075)
OPENNESS -162.5543 84.66226 -148.9203
(-0.339574) (0.62327) (-0.304438)
Period effect Yes Yes Yes
Cross-section effect Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.94425 0.932065 0.953565
Jarque-Bera 1228.025*** 950.4197*** 848.4799***
Cross-sections 31 31 31
Observations 201 201 201
Notes: a. t-statistics in parentheses. b. * Statistically significant at 10 per cent level; ** statistically significant at 5 per cent level; ***
statistically significant at 1 per cent level. c. White cross-section standard errors & covariance (no d.f. corrected). d. The Jarque-Bera is a
test statistic for testing whether the residuals are normally distributed. Significant Jarque-Bera value leads to the rejection of the null
hypothesis of a normal distribution e. Instrument list: C, DEC_PL (-1), NUMLG, YSBE (YSEE, YSCE), GRANTBE (GRANTEE, GRANTCE),
POP, INC, URB, SOE, and OPENNESS.
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Appendix
Table 3.6: Sample of Provinces, China
Eastern region Middle region Western region
Beijing Jilin Guangxi
Tianjin Heilongjiang Guizhou
Hebei Shanxi Yunnan
Liaoning Inner Mongolia Tibet
Shandong Jiangxi Shaanxi
Shanghai Anhui Gansu
Jiangsu Henan Qinghai
Zhejiang Hubei Ningxia
Fujian Hunan Xinjiang
Guangdong Chongqing
Hainan Sichuan
Source: National Statistics Bureau, P. R. China. www.stats.gov.cn
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4. Local Governments and Firms: An Exit-voice Game24
4.1. Introduction
s shown in Chapter 2 and 3, the de facto fiscal decentralization has been one of the
most significant consequences of fiscal and tax reforms in China. It invites tax
competition amongst local governments which bid for firms by offering various tax
concessions (Brean 1998; Wong 1997; Zhu and Krug 2007), thereby enabling firms to
negotiate with local governments for their tax burden. No attention has yet been paid to the
pervasive bargaining game between firms and local governments in China; instead, most
literature examines the intergovernmental institutional setting within an authoritarian
political system (Montinola et al. 1995; Qian and Weingast 1996, 1997). On the other hand,
international tax competition literature focuses on the interplay between multinational
firms and host-country governments (Bond and Samuelson 1986; Doyle and van
Wijnbergen 1994; Janeba 2000, 2002; King et al. 1993) and, to the best of our knowledge,
has not investigated the Chinese situation. Moreover, this school only models firm’s
behavior in a passive way by taking “exit” – relocation – as the outside option to threaten a
host government in the bargaining game. In fact, firms can proactively opt for “voice” to
24 This chapter is based on Z. Zhu, B. Krug, and G.W.J. Henderikse. 2006. Rational
Entrepreneurship in Local China: Exit plus Voice for Preferential Tax Treatments. ERIM Working
Paper. I am grateful to Bruno Frey, Lars Feld, Bart Nooteboom, and two anonymous referees for
helpful comments and suggestions. The chapter has also benefited from presentations at the Meeting
of International Association for Chinese Management Research (IACMR), June 15-18, 2006 in
Nanjing (China), the 5th Asia Academy of Management Conference (AAOM), December 19-21, 2006,
Tokyo (Japan), and a workshop, Shifts in Governance (NWO project), July 24-28, 2006 in Hangzhou
(China).
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directly influence government’s policy decision (Hirschman 1970)25.
Hence, to fill the gaps, this paper constructs two dynamic game models in which an
existing firm employs exit and voice strategies to pursue preferential tax treatment.
Furthermore, it’s worth stressing that those common voice actions in a democracy (voting,
protest, etc.) are at best limited in their extent in China. Instead, the specific Chinese way
to express voice is through guanxi networks, which play an irreplaceable role in Chinese
business practices of long-standing. This point is shared by many academic researchers and
business managers (Bian 1997; Boisot and Child 1996; Hendrischke 2007; Peng 2003;
Peng and Zhou 2005; Redding 1990; Xin and Pearce 1996; Yang 1994, 2002).
The exit-voice framework has been applied in various fields. Yet, it encounters
criticisms, including those that point to an allegedly vague notion of voice, complex
exit-voice relations, the scarcity of hard empirical data, and the absence of a rigorous
research methodology (Dowding et al. 2000). This paper also contributes to Hirschman’s
exit-voice theory by addressing these problems.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 conceptualizes exit and
voice in Chinese context. Section 4.3 and 4.4 present the basic and extended model of the
exit-voice game between an existing firm and a local government with corresponding
equilibrium outcomes, followed by the section of empirical cases (Section 4.5). The final
section draws conclusions.
4.2. Exit-voice Framework
4.2.1. Tiebout’s Exit and Hirschman’s Voice
Tax competition literature (for a review see Wilson 1999) stresses Tiebout’s exit (1956),
which allows firms to migrate among regions for a lower tax burden and thus induces
inter-jurisdictional competition for mobile firms. This especially happens when
host-countries compete for multinational firms. Several game models have been developed.
Black and Hoyt (1989) use a static model to show that competition for multinational firms
improves social welfare by addressing inherent distortions in the provision of public goods
and services. Moreover, such competition may lead to government subsidies to firms or
public investments in infrastructure (King et al. 1993). Doyle and van Wijnbergen’s (1994)
25 For instance, a joint memorial (On New Corporate Income Tax Law: Standpoints of
Multinationals Investing in China) was submitted to the State Council, Ministry of Finance, State
Administration of Taxation, and Ministry of Commerce by 54 multinational which petitioned
Chinese government to extend their tax holiday in the corporate income tax reform in 2005. (See
name list in Appendix A).
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infinite sequential game model confirms that the sunk cost of irreversible investment in a
host-country creates an ex post bilateral monopoly situation that enables the host-country
to exploit the lock-in effect by gradually increasing tax rates from an initially low level to a
constant maximum level over time (tax holiday). In contrast, Bond and Samuelson (1986)
demonstrate that such tax concessions are a sign of a host-country’s productivity for
multinational firms. Janeba (2000) finds a quasi exit option in holding excess production
capacity in two countries, which acts as a countervailing threat that compels a host country
to commit to offering tax concessions. He also reveals the importance of credibility for a
host-country government, together with tax and production cost considerations, in
multinational firm’s investment patterns (Janeba 2002).
The above models build on exit as an outside option that allows multinational firms
to threaten host-country governments. Exiting is, in real life, not so easy to be executed.
Rather, it may involve prohibitive costs due to physical asset specificity (Williamson 1985)
or human capital specificity (Blankart 2002). It’s not surprising that the Tiebout model has
received numerous theoretical critiques (see Bewley 1981) and experienced empirical
challenges (see Dowding et al. 1994). Moreover, the above models neglect the alternative
firm may have, namely to actively influence government’s decision-making by voice. Such
“voting by hand” may be more attractive than the passive way of “voting by feet”.
Hirschman (1970, p.30) defines voice as “any attempt at all to change, rather than
to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs” and points out that “voice is nothing but a
basic portion and function of any political system”. However, different political
institutional settings determine the variation of means and extent of voice. On a continuum
from pure direct democracy, to representative democracy, to non-democracy, the
possibility and effectiveness of voice, in a formal institutional sense, declines (Feld 1997).
With its authoritarian political regime, China, if not dismissing, at least limits those kinds
of voice common in a democracy. Instead, an informal channel for voice is provided
through guanxi network, a unique cultural, social and informal institutional element deeply
embedded in Chinese society.
4.2.2. Exit and Voice in China
The de facto fiscal decentralization has led to some degree of local autonomy throughout
China (Fan 1998; Zhu and Krug 2007). On the one hand, local governments are forced to
raise revenues to finance decentralized mandatory tasks (the provision of local public
goods and services etc.); on the other hand, decentralized regulatory and tax powers allow
local governments to compete for investments and tax bases by offering local preferential
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tax policies. Such inter-jurisdictional tax competition, thus, encourages firms to negotiate
for their tax burden. As a result, firms either migrate to the locality where a lower tax rate
is imposed or express their voice via a guanxi network to negotiate for tax concessions.
Having far-reaching cultural and historical roots in ancient Confucian ethics
emphasizing order, hierarchy, family unit and social harmony (Hofstede 1991; Redding
1990), guanxi network plays a crucial role in every aspects of daily life and evolves in
accordance with the on-going transformation of China (Yang 2002). From a
resource-dependent viewpoint (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), firms obtain needed resources,
which cannot be generated internally, via external exchanges in its network with its task
environment. Given the unstable environment in China, guanxi networking with all levels
of governments is particularly vital to firm’s survival and success. The significant
contribution of guanxi to doing business gains not only theoretical support (Nee 1998;
Peng 2003), but also empirical confirmation in firm performance (Luo and Chen 1996;
Luo 1997; Park and Luo 2001; Peng and Luo 2000), in competitive advantage (Peng and
Heath 1996; Tsang 1998; Yeung and Tung 1996), in rural industrialization (Peng 2004), in
job-seeking (Bian 1997), and as a substitute for formal institutional support (Xin and
Pearce 1996) during the early phase of institutional transition. With the current
development of a market economy and the underpinning formal institutions, guanxi
network may change dramatically and may gradually decline in significance over time
(Guthrie 1998; Peng 2003), transform from a strong to a weak-tie (Peng and Zhou 2005),
adapt to a new environment (Yang 2002), or eventually reform following a model of
network capitalism (Boisot and Child 1996).
Nevertheless, guanxi network exists and will remain a feature of the Chinese
economy and business environment for the foreseeable future, though varying in form and
function in response to varying circumstance. As a social mechanism coordinating
individual behavior (Hendrischke 2007), the guanxi network is a web of interpersonal
connections structured in concentric circles extending from the family at the core, to
relatives, friends and acquaintances located on the periphery according to the distance of
the relationship (Fei 1992). It “involves the exchange of gifts, favors and banquets; the
cultivation of personal relationships and networks of mutual dependence; and the
manufacturing of obligation and indebtedness” (Yang 1994, p.6). A commitment to trust
and reciprocity holds the guanxi network members together. Any deviation from this
commitment is sanctioned by losing one’s face (mianzi), or social and professional
reputation. Reciprocity leverages interpersonal exchanges in favor of forming social
obligations (renqing) among members. Moreover, a long-term relationship prevents
opportunism since this requires members to invest substantial time, money and effort to
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cultivate, maintain and expand the guanxi network. Therefore, with regard to business, its
value depends, to a large extent, on: 1) the durability of the relationship in the long-term; 2)
the wielding of discretionary power over scarce resources; 3) connectivity to expand the
network; and 4) the degree of tightness (Wank, 1996). Not surprisingly, the utilitarian
rather than emotional function of the guanxi network blurs the line between means and
ends can result in confusion between “corruption” on the one hand and the normal
functioning of a guanxi network on the other. However, as Yang (1994, 2002) points out,
guanxi network places much more emphasis on renqing (long-term social and professional
obligations) than on relationships of purely material exchange.
In short, the interaction between firms and local governments in China is
characteristic of a bargaining game. Firms are able to employ either exit strategy of
relocation or voice strategy via a guanxi network to influence local government’s
policy-making.
4.3. Exit-voice Game: The Basic Model
4.3.1. Structure of the Game
Consider in a locality, a firm generates profits and a local government agency imposes a
tax rate r. At the same time, a local government agency in a neighboring locality (the third
passive player) levies a lower tax rate rL (rL<r), thereby allowing the firm an outside option
to relocate its plant for a lower tax burden. The firm also has a voice option to directly
influence local government’s tax policy via a guanxi network. Neither exit nor voice is
costless. Relocation of the firm incurs exit costs, CE (CE>0), such as costs for establishing
a new factory, recruiting and training staffs, and purchasing equipments. Voice action
requires a firm to pay considerable rent, CV (CV>0), to local government via a guanxi
network, which could include donations to public projects, investment for local
employment, even bribes. Considering the potential for corruption involved in such guanxi
networking, the local government may only capture part of such rent CV in which
(0 1) is the rent-dissipation coefficient. If the firm accepts the current tax rate r, no extra
cost is incurred. On the other hand, the local government has two options: to maintain the
tax rate r or reduce it to rL26. The firm seeks to maximize its profits net of tax and incurred
26 As the different forms of preferential tax treatments virtually reduce ex post effective tax rate to
firm, local government’s strategy is simplified to reduce or maintain the tax rate in the model. It is
further assumed that the costs for collecting taxes are negligible at the local level for simplifying
purpose.
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exit or voice costs, while the local government seeks to maximize its corporate tax revenue.
The game consists of three stages with complete and perfect information. The order of
moves of the firm and local government is as follows (Figure 4.1 characterizes the
extensive form.):
1. In the first stage, the firm opts for the Exit, Voice or Accept option. Exit means that the
firm migrates to a neighboring locality and ends the game with higher after-tax-profits
adjusted for exit cost (1-rL) -CE to the firm and zero tax revenue to the local
government. If choosing the Accept option, the firm stays in the locality and remains
subject to the current tax rate r. Consequently, it receives net profits (1-r) and local
government obtains tax revenue of r . The Voice option of the firm brings the game
into the second stage.
2. In the second stage, if the local government decides to reduce the tax rate r to rL, the
game is ended. The firm obtains higher after-tax-profits minus voice cost (1-rL) -CV
while the local government gains lower tax revenue plus part of the voice rent
rLR+ CV. The game continues if the local government takes the Maintain option.
3. In the third and last stage, the firm has two options: Accept or Exit. The Accept option
yields profits net of the current tax burden and voice cost (1-r) -CV to the firm and
current tax revenue plus part of the voice rent r + CV to the local government. If
choosing the Exit option, the firm receives higher after-tax-profits minus voice and
exit costs (1-rL) -CV-CE, while the local government obtains zero tax revenue but part
of voice rent CV.
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Figure 4.1: The Basic Model in Extensive Form
4.3.2. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
We use backwards induction to solve this game for subgame perfect equilibrium. Three
types of equilibria are derived depending on the relationships between exit cost CE, voice
cost CV and regional tax differential (r-rL) . Table 4.1 illustrates the three cases.
Table 4.1: Three Cases and Equilibria
Stage 3 Stage 2 Stage 1Case
Firm Local government Firm
Equilibrium
1. CE (r-rL) Accept Maintain Accept Firm accepts current tax rate.
2. CE<(r-rL)
and CE<CV
Exit Reduce Exit Firm exits to neighboring locality.
3. CE<(r-rL)
and CV<CE
Exit Reduce Voice
Firm voices.
Local government reduces tax rate.
Initially, in the third stage, the firm maximizes its payoff between the actions
Accept and Exit:
EA
Max
,
{(1-r) -CV, (1-rL) -CV-CE}. In Case 1, if CE (r-rL)
Firm
Firm
Local government
VoiceAccept
MaintainReduce
Exit
(1-r)
r
(1-rL) -CV
rL + CV
(1-r) -CV
r + CV
(1-rL) -CV -CE
CV
Exit (1-rL) -CE
0
Payoff to firm
Payoff to local government
Accept
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! (1-r) -CV (1-rL) -CV-CE, then the firm will opt for Accept. Similarly, in Case 2 and 3,
if CE <(r-rL) ! (1-r) -CV<(1-rL) -CV-CE, then the firm will choose Exit.
Local government’s optimal strategy in the second stage depends on the firm’s
strategy in the final stage. If CE (r-rL) (Case 1), the local government anticipates that the
firm will resort to Accept and then maximizes its payoff between Reduce and
Maintain:
MR
Max
,
{rL + CV, r + CV}. The local government will choose Maintain since
rL + CV<r + CV. If CE <(r-rL) (Case 2 and 3), i.e. if the firm chooses Exit in the third
stage, the local government’s maximum payoff becomes
MR
Max
,
{rL + CV, CV}. Obviously,
the local government will opt for Reduce because rL + CV> CV.
Finally, in the first stage, if CE (r-rL) (Case 1), the firm predicts that government
will maintain the present tax rate in the second stage and force it to opt for Accept in the
final stage. Using the voice option for firms in the first stage will result in a payoff of
(1-r) -CV. Thus, the firm’s maximum payoff between Accept, Voice and Exit
is:
EVA
Max
,,
{(1-r) , (1-r) -CV, (1-rL) -CE}. The firm will resort to Accept because CE (r-rL)
! (1-r) >(1-r) -CV and (1-r) >(1-rL) -CE. On the other hand, if CE <(r-rL) (Case 2 and
3), local government’s strategy in the second stage will be Reduce and thus the firm’s
payoff of Voice will be (1-rL) -CV. Consequently, the firm maximizes payoff of:
EVA
Max
,,
{(1-r) , (1-rL) -CV, (1-rL) -CE}. In Case 2, if CE<(r-rL) and CE<CV
! (1-rL) -CE>(1-r) and (1-rL) -CE >(1-rL) -CV, then the firm chooses Exit; in Case 3, if
CE<(r-rL) and CV<CE ! (1-rL) -CV>(1-rL) -CE >(1-r) , then the firm prefers Voice. The
above findings are summarized with the following propositions:
Proposition 1: If the exit cost is higher than the regional tax differential (CE>(r-rL) ), then
the firm will stay and accept the present tax rate.
Proposition 2: If the exit cost is lower than the regional tax differential (CE<(r-rL) ) and
voice cost (CE<CV), then the firm will move to neighboring locality for preferential tax
treatments.
Proposition 3: If the exit cost is lower than the regional tax differential (CE<(r-rL) ) but
larger than voice cost (CE>CV), then the firm will embark on a voice strategy resulting in
the reduction of the tax rate by the local government.
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Proof. Omitted.
4.3.3. Efficiency Analysis
We have derived three equilibria from the basic model depending on the exogenous
parameter value of exit cost CE, voice cost CV and regional tax differential (r-rL) . To
determine which equilibrium outcome is the most efficient, we need to compare the sum of
social welfare, i.e. the total payoffs of all players (active and passive) in the basic model.
Table 4.2 illustrates the efficiency analysis of equilibrium outcomes.
Table 4.2: Efficiency Analysis of Equilibrium Outcomes of the Basic Model
Player/payoff Equilibrium 1 Equilibrium 2 Equilibrium 3
Firm (1-r) (1-rL) -CE (1-rL) -CV
Local government r 0 rL + CV
Local government
(in neighboring locality) 0 rL 0
Total payoffs -CE -(1- )CV
Suppose exit and voice are costless, i.e. CE=CV=0, then all equilibria are equally
efficient with equal total payoffs . However, when exit and voice costs are positive, i.e.
CE>0, CV>0, Equilibrium 1, namely that local government maintains the current tax rate
and the firm accepts it, is the first-best as > -CE and > -(1- )CV. Given that the
rent-dissipation coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, two extremes may result: =0 or =1. In
the former case, there is severe corruption and all voice rent is dissipated inefficiently.
Equilibrium 1 continues to be the first-best while the second-best equilibrium is either
Equilibrium 2 (if CE<CV) or the Equilibrium 3 (if CE>CV). When =1, which means no
corruption occurs, the local government captures all voice rent from the firm, thereby
yielding total payoffs of in Equilibrium 3. As a result, Equilibrium 3 is as efficient as
Equilibrium 1, while Equilibrium 2 is the second-best ( > -CE). If the value of is
between 0 and 1, corruption occurs and the local government only receives part of the
voice rent CV. The second-best efficient equilibrium, thus, depends on the value of CE and
(1- )CV: if CE<(1- )CV, Equilibrium 2 becomes the second-best, or Equilibrium 3 is the
second-best if CE>(1- )CV.
4.3.4. Comparative Static Analysis
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Figure 4.2 illustrates the comparative static analysis of the basic model in which changing
the parameter value of exit and voice costs yields different equilibrium outcomes. As
shown in the right column, where the exit cost exceeds the regional tax differential, i.e.
CE (r-rL) , Equilibrium 1 is reached and the firm renounces any attempt of voice or exit
and accepts the current tax rate in the first stage. It confirms the findings of the
conventional analysis of taxation, which claim that immobile firms (high exit costs) are
taxed most heavily (Ramsey’s Rule, 1927). The left-below box indicates the scenario of a
low exit cost (CE<(r-rL) ) and high voice cost (CV CE) in which the equilibrium outcome
is that the firm directly exits to a neighboring locality for a lower tax burden. This draws
attention to Hirschman’s view (1970, p. 43) that an exit option that is too easy will
“atrophy the development of the art of voice”. In other words, voice will not happen. Only
if voice is cheaper than exit in the left-upper box will firm opt for voice while keeping exit
as an outside option. In this case, exit becomes “a reaction of last resort after voice has
failed” (Hirschman, 1970, p.37). If the local government recognizes a threat, then it may
agree to reduce the tax rate. Interestingly, we observe that Chinese firms often use low-cost
quasi-exit options by registering headquarters or establishing nominal affiliated enterprises
in different localities so as to better leverage their exit option when negotiating with local
government agencies.
Figure 4.2: Comparative Static Analysis of the Basic Model
4.4. Exit-voice Game: The Extended Model
4.4.1. Structure of the Game
3: (Voice, Reduce) 1: (Accept)
2: (Exit} 1: (Accept)
Exit cost
Low High
Low
High
V
oice
co
st
CE=(r-rL)
CV=CE
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We change the information structure of the game to allow the firm to keep private
information about its exit costs. Therefore, the extended model proceeds with complete but
imperfect information. The local government no longer knows the exact move of the firm
in the first stage but only infers from its likely actions, following Bayes Rule. With regard
to such an asymmetric information problem, the game starts with an artificial player
(nature) who introduces two types of firms: Type A denotes the firm with a lower exit cost
(CEL<(r-rL) ) and type B with a higher exit cost (CEH>(r-rL) ). pL ( (0,1)) defines the
probability of the firm being Type A and 1-pL for Type B. The assumption here is that only
the firm knows its precise type while the local government only knows the probability pL.
Figure 4.3 describes the extensive form of the extended model. As we are most interested
in the functioning of the guanxi network which offers a low voice cost option at the local
level, we limit our analysis to the case CV<CEL<(r-rL) <CEH, i.e. the voice cost is lower
than the exit cost. Other settings follow the basic model.
Notes: a. Upper-level payoff to the firm and lower-level payoff to the local government. b. The dash line denotes the information set for the
local government.
Figure 4.3: The Extended Model in Extensive Form
4.4.2. Nash Equilibrium
Combining backwards induction and strategic form, we have following Nash equilibra27:
27 We concentrate on the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the chapter but we give the results of
(1-rL) -CV -CEL
CV
(1-r)
r
(1-rL) -CV
rL + CV
(1-r) -CV
r + CV
(1-rL) -CEL
0
Firm
Firm
Local
Government
Voice
Accept
MaintainReduce
Exit
Exit
Accept
(1-rL) -CV -CEH
CV
(1-r)
r
(1-rL) -CV
rL + CV
(1-rL) -CEH
0
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Firm
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MaintainReduce
Exit
Exit
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Proposition 4: Suppose voice cost is lower than exit cost (CV<CEL<(r-rL) <CEH) and the
probability pL (being the low-exit-cost type firm) is smaller than the value of (r-rL)/r, then
we can expect a segregation of different types of firm: low-exit-cost-type firm will migrate
while high-exit-cost-type firm will stay and accept the present tax rate.
Proposition 5: Suppose voice cost is lower than exit cost (CV<CEL<(r-rL) <CEH) and the
probability pL (being the low-exit-cost type firm) exceeds the value of (r-rL)/r, two Nash
equilibria are yielded:
a A low exit-cost firm will migrate while a high exit-cost firm will stay and accept
the present tax rate.
b Both types of firm will embark on voice resulting in a reduction of the tax rate by
the local government. This means that the high exit-cost firm bluffs by pretending
to be a low exit-cost firm.
Proof. See Appendix B.
4.4.3. Efficiency Analysis
Similar to the Section 4.3.3, efficiency analysis is used to compare the total payoffs of all
players for each equilibrium, which are thus determined by the exogenous parameter value
of CEL, CV, r, rL, pL and . Table 4.3 illustrates the total payoffs of each equilibrium
outcome. Two different cases of pL determine the equilibrium outcome, given the
assumption CV<CEL<(r-rL) <CEH. When pL<(r-rL)/r, the low exit-cost firm chooses exit and
the high one accepts the current tax rate resulting in total payoffs to all players -pLCEL.
When pL (r-rL)/r, however, multiple equilibria arise (5a and 5b). Equilibrium 5a is the
same as Equilibrium 4 with total payoffs -pLCEL. The other equilibrium (5b) indicates that
both types of firm will voice, inducing the local government to reduce the tax rate with
total payoffs of -(1- )CV. Therefore, the comparison between Equilibrium 4 and 5b
depends on pLCEL and (1- )CV. When pLCEL>(1- )CV, then the former equilibrium is more
efficient than the latter, or other way around. In fact, Equilibrium 1 is an extreme case of
Equilibrium 4 and 5a when pL=0, i.e. the firm is a high exit-cost type with exit cost larger
than (r-rL) while Equilibrium 5b can be simplified into Equilibrium 3 when pL=1, i.e. the
firm is a low exit-cost type with an exit cost smaller than (r-rL) .
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in Appendix B.
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Table 4.3: Efficiency Analysis of Equilibrium Outcomes of the Extended Model
Player/payoff Equilibrium 4 Equilibrium 5a Equilibrium 5b
Firm
pL[(1-rL) -CEL]
+(1- pL)(1-r)
pL[(1-rL) -CEL]
+(1- pL)(1-r)
(1-rL) -CV
Local government (1-pL)r (1-pL)r rL + CV
Local government
(in neighboring locality) pLrL pLrL 0
Total payoffs -pLCEL -pLCEL -(1- )CV
4.4.4. Comparative Static Analysis
Maintaining the privacy of information regarding exit cost gives firms an advantage in the
game and the parameter value of pL determines the equilibrium outcome (Figure 4.4). One
straightforward outcome is that no matter what the value of pL is, the low exit-cost firm
always exits and the high exit-cost firm accepts since the firm knows exactly what its exit
cost is and acts rationally according to this (Proposition 4 and 5a). This result (re)confirms
Proposition 1 and 2 which claim that a low cost exit option prompts migration without
expressing objections, whereas a high exit cost prevents firm from migrating and
expressing voice. Consequently, a segregation of different types of firm can be expected.
For instance, labor-intensive firms (low exit-cost) will concentrate in low tax localities
while capital intensive firms (high exit-cost) will be found in localities with higher tax
rates. However, when pL exceeds a certain level of (r-rL)/r, an interesting equilibrium may
arise, namely both types of firms will choose voice with the result that the local
government reduces the tax rate (Proposition 5b). The logic behind this finding is as
follows. A Type B firm, i.e. one with a high exit-cost, will pretend to be a Type A firm, i.e.
one with a low exit-cost (bluffing). Given the high likelihood of dealing with a real low
exit-cost firm, the local government will find it safer to compromise than insisting on the
current tax rate, making the voice option effective.
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Figure 4.4: Comparative Static Analysis of the Extended Model
4.5. Empirical Cases
This section intends to demonstrate the validity of the findings in Section 4.3 and 4.4 in the
context of real life in China. Considering the practical difficulty of collecting data for
“real” exit-voice costs, effective tax rate and informal interaction between firm and local
government, a case study is our preferred research method to uncover, filter and analyze
useful information from the real-life context (Yin 2003). Three empirical cases are selected
based on the following considerations: First, a multinational firm (P&G), a joint venture
(SZCH), and a domestic private company (WZSL) are chosen in order to give a complete
picture of different ownership types of firms; Second, different industries of consuming
product, manufacturing, and processing are selected to avoid biased information of similar
behavior pattern of firms within the same industry; Third, a practical factor is the access to
informants. The case study is based on in-depth interviews, archives, and other
publications28. In July and August 2005, we interviewed seven managers and entrepreneurs
using an open-ended questionnaire and a narrative interview style. The average interview
time was more than three hours. We also collected hundreds of pages of archival data
including organization charts, corporate brochures, annual reports, newspapers and
contracts between the firm and government. Names of firms, localities, and interviewees
are disguised to ensure confidentiality.
4.5.1. Exit plus Voice Strategy: Strong Bargaining Position
Procter & Gamble (P&G) entered China by a joint venture – Guangzhou P&G – in 1988.
This was followed by a rapid expansion of operations with total thirteen joint ventures and
28 For instance, www.pg.com, www.sz-changhong.com, www.sanlian-group.com, and Dyer, D.,
Dalzell, F. and Olegario, R. 2004. Rising Tide: Lessons from 165 Years of Brand Building at Procter
& Gamble. Harvard Business School Press.
4: (Exit, Accept) 5a: (Exit, Accept)
5b: (Voice, Voice)/(Reduce)
Probability of low-exit-cost
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wholly owned companies located in five provinces.
Two motivations, i.e. tax avoidance and mobility, drove P&G to rapidly
geographically diversify its operation. First, establishing subsidiaries in different regions
allows P&G not only to shift income via transfer pricing and exploit tax benefits in
different localities, but also to use financial techniques, such as thin capitalization –
financing subsidiaries with debts in order to avoid tax obligations. A case in point is that
Guangzhou P&G obtained a bank loan of 2 billion RMB in 2002 and then made
interest-free loans to its subsidiaries. By doing so, Guangzhou P&G reduced its taxable
income by interest deductions on the one hand and avoided taxable interest incomes from
other subsidiaries on the other hand. Consequently, a total of 81.5 million RMB corporate
income taxes were evaded (CBT 2004). Second, diversified operations in different
localities enhance P&G’s mobility, thereby increasing its bargaining power in negotiations
with government. In 2002, P&G forced the Guangzhou government to give up its shares in
Guangzhou P&G by threatening to move to Tianjin. As a result, P&G successfully took
over Guangzhou P&G (acquiring 99 per cent of its shares) leaving the Guangzhou
government a symbolic 1 per cent share.
In addition to the exit strategy, P&G also commits itself to the voice strategy by
cultivating a strong relationship with government at national and especially provincial and
local levels. Donations to public projects are an effective means. During the period of
1996-2003, P&G donated total 16 million RMB to a rural education project, 10.7 million
RMB to Tsinghua University, 7 million RMB to the Ministry of Education, 1.5 million to
the China Wildlife Conservation Fund, 1 million RMB to the World Gymnastics
Championships 1999 (Tianjin), and 3 million RMB to the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games.
Meeting high-ranking official is another way to ensure good connections with government.
The meeting list includes former premiers Zhu Rongji and Li Peng, former vice-premiers
Qian Qichen, Wu Xueqian and Tian Jiyun and mayors of Beijing, Shanghai and
Guangzhou. Such a strong guanxi network with governments at all levels helps P&G
express voice for various tax privileges29.
The P&G case illustrates propositions 2, 3 and 5b. Exit and voice are not mutually
exclusive and can be combined to strengthen the bargaining position in the game with
government as shown in the case of P&G. In this case, the exit strategy is carried out by
establishing subsidiaries in other localities that enhance the mobility and facilitates
inter-subsidiary tax avoidance. P&G also employs a voice strategy by guanxi networking
29 For instance, P&G received a special tax deduction of 86.8 million RMB for ‘disposal of asset
loss’ in 2004. See a circular (Yu Guoshui Han [2004] 333) issued by State Administration of Taxation
(Guangdong) on 2 July 2004.
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with all levels of government through donations, meetings, and investments. Moreover, it
maintains the private information regarding its exit cost and performs bluffing strategy.
Consequently, such multiple strategies achieve the purposes of various tax concessions.
4.5.2. Voice-centered Strategy: Exit as a Backup
Founded in 1997, SZCH specializes in manufacturing precision moulds and is today a
leading company in the industry. SZCH has total assets of 130 million RMB and 288
employees. Its key customers include Panasonic, Konica-Minolta, Canon, Epson, Brother,
Sony, Samsung, Sharp and Ricoh. In 2002, HKCH was established as headquarters in
Hong Kong. Two years later, a joint venture, SHCM was founded with registered capital of
18 million RMB (HKCH 70 per cent and SZCH 30 per cent) in Shanghai.
SZCH has three shareholders: Mr. Li (80 per cent), Mr. Hua (10 per cent) and Mr.
Xu (10 per cent), all three are from the same county and know each other for more than ten
years. They cultivate an extensive guanxi network with local officials in Shenzhen and
Shanghai. In particular, Mr. Hua’s guanxi network with several officials from Shenzhen
LG district is essential to SZCH’s success. He first met Mr. Jiang, head of the credit
department of Bank of China and later was introduced to Jiang’s colleague, Mr. Zhang,
director of Bank of China. Jiang also introduced his friend Mr. Peng, director of the
Economic and Trade Bureau to Mr. Hua. Later, Mr. Peng brought in his friend Mr. Xiong,
director of the Science and Technology Bureau, and his friend Mr. Wang, Governor of PS
Township.
SZCH benefits tremendously from this guanxi network. First, Mr. Xiong qualified
SZCH as a Shenzhen New & High-Tech Company in 2003. This brought various
preferential treatments, such as an exemption from import equipment tax, an exemption
from corporate income tax for the first three year and half liability for corporate income tax
for the following six years. Second, Mr. Peng and Mr. Zhang brokered a 50 million RMB
interest-reduced bank loan. Third, SZCH purchased 25,000 sq. m. of land from Mr. Wang
in PS Township at a low price of 160 RMB per sq. m., which saved the company 8.5
million RBM compared to the estimated market price. At the same time, SZCH was
exempted from paying tax on land purchases thanks to the New & High-Tech qualification.
The SZCH case illustrates Proposition 3 in which the firm resorts to voice but
keeps exit as a backup. In this case, as a joint venture, the SZCH relies on a
network-centric strategy to obtain valuable resources. An extensive guanxi network with a
few powerful figures who could arbitrarily allocate controlled key resources yields credit,
land and tax benefits for the firm. Moreover, a complementary exit strategy is performed
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by setting up a joint venture (SHCM) in Shanghai as an outside option in order to mitigate
the potential risks associated with the guanxi network, including the disruption caused by
an official retiring, resigning or being reassigned.
4.5.3. Bluffing Strategy: Partial Exit
In his hometown AJ Township in P County, Mr. Wang set up WZSL to produce gear units
in 1985. Twenty years later, WZSL became a holding company with total assets of 200
million RMB and 500 employees. Its operations have expanded into several sectors
including variable speed machinery, real estate, stationary, and utilities (water, in this case).
As former chairman of the Private Entrepreneur Association, Mr. Wang is
connected to an extensive and embedded guanxi network in P County. WZSL was
accredited as a Wenzhou New & Hi-Tech Company in 2000 and therefore enjoyed a
three-year-exemption from corporate income tax. It also purchased 34,000 sq. m. land in
the industrial park at only 225 RMB per sq. m compared to the estimated market price of
600 RMB per sq. m. However, a political struggle between the county head, Mr. Dai, and
the party secretary, Mr. Cao, nearly ruined Mr. Wang’s guanxi network and business in
2002 since his political friends from both sides abandoned him. The following case of a
water-supply co-project between Mr. Wang and the county government illustrate this point.
He invested 50 million RMB in this project yet suffered 2 million RMB losses every year
as the county government refused to purchase the water at the agreed price of 1.55 RMB
per cubic meters. Instead, the county government forced Mr. Wang to accept the low price
of 0.6 RMB by threatening him with tax inspections and the withdrawal of preferential tax
treatments.
In 2003, the head of Y County, Shangdong Province, thousands of kilometers from
P County, tried to attract investment by offering considerable tax concessions, free land
(only 7 RMB per sq. m.) and sufficient bank credit. Mr. Wang wanted to move his factory
to Y County. He purchased 134,000 sq. m. of land and received a 20 million RMB loan
from the Y County branch of Construction Bank. Yet, Mr. Wang underestimated the exit
cost since the total shift would stop production for at least half a year, causing a significant
loss of 20 million RMB. Political risk in Y County also needed to be reckoned with. In the
end, Mr. Wang decided to temporarily move ten per cent of the production capacity to his
new factory in Y County in 2004. Knowing Mr. Wang’s plans to move to Shandong
Province, the P county government responded more positively. Mr. Wang took the chance
to rebuild his guanxi network. The tension between him and P county officials declined
after several official contacts and negotiations. As a result, the P county government
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arranged several things for WZSL. First, the provincial subisidy of 20 million RMB, which
had been frozen by the P county government for two years, was transferred to the
water-supply project. Second, the P county government also negotiated with Industrial &
Commercial Bank to write off 29 million RMB of debts from the water-supply project.
Third, WZSL had their qualification as Wenzhou New and Hi-tech Company renewed and
was thereby granted a new tax holiday for three years.
The WZSL case illustrates Proposition 5b. In this case, the exit option is not easily
executed since the sunk cost and exit cost are prohibitive which allows local government to
exploit the firm to an extreme extent. However, when firms lower their exit cost by using a
partial exit strategy and maintaining the private information pertaining to its exit costs, it
gains advantage in the bargaining game that allows the firm to bluff. Confronted by a
credible threat, the local government compromises and responds to the firm’s voice by
offering preferential tax treatments. Thus, the bluffing strategy, supported by a voice
strategy, succeeds as long as local government is unaware of the firm’s exact exit cost.
4.6. Conclusions
The chapter contributes to Hirschman’s exit-voice theory by providing a clear notion of
voice, explicit exit-voice relations, solid empirical data, and rigorous research
methodology (cf. Dowding et al. 2000). Using game models, we deal with the pervasive
bargaining game between firms and local governments for preferential tax treatments in
local China where firms either follow an exit strategy by establishing subsidiaries in other
localities, changing organizational forms, and diversifying investments or follow a voice
strategy in a Chinese specific way of cultivating, maintaining and expanding a guanxi
network with government at all levels. The models indicate that relative exit-voice costs
and information structures are critical factors in determining equilibrium outcomes.
Moreover, exit and voice are not mutually exclusive, but can be combined to reinforce
each other in an exit-cum-voice game (Hirschman 1995) instead of an exit-versus-voice
game (Hirschman 1970). Encouraged by the exit option as a credible threat, the firm is
willing to express voice forcing the local government to offer tax concessions. Furthermore,
an asymmetric information structure in favor of the firm allows it to bluff even without a
feasible exit option. The local government rather believes the threat is ‘credible’ and then
compromises. Empirical cases support the findings of the models by showing that a
rational firm follows a mixed strategy of exit-cum-voice to enhance mobility and the
credibility of its exit threat and to boost the effectiveness of voice.
The policy implication for government is that discriminating tax incentives are
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needed to tackle the information asymmetry problem. For those relatively immobile
industries with heavy investment, government should fix and restrict taxes levied, while
offering a preferential tax menu to those more mobile. Moreover, an information revealing
mechanism should be established to help identify the types of exit cost faced by firms.
Annual financial audit reports may be a reliable source in that the investment level shows
the degree of lock-in, which is sunk cost in a locality and the profit level presents its
opportunity cost weighed in the exit-voice calculation. The level of voice investment in
networks could also be checked as a parameter.
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Appendix A
Table 4.4: Name List of 54 Multinational Firms for Joint-petition
ABB EXXON MOBILE NOKIA
ALCATEL GE OMRON
ALSTOM GENERAL MILLS ORACLE
AMAT GM OTIS
AMWAY HONEYWELL PANASONIC
BASF HP PEPSI
BAYER IBM PHILIPS
BP IKEA PRAXAIR
DEGUSSA ITOCHU SAMSUNG
DELL KCC SCHNEIDER
DELPHI KODAK SHELL
DHL KRAFT SIEMENS
DUPONT LEXMARK SOJITZ
E28 METRO SONY
EFFEM MICROSOFT TNT
EMRSN MOTOROLA TOSHIBA
EPSON NCR UNILEVER
ERICSSON NESTLE YUM
Source: China Business Times, 13 January 2005, www.cbt.com.cn
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Appendix B
Nash Equilibria of the Extended Model
Following backwards induction to solve this game for Nash equilibria, we start at the third
stage in which a firm maximizs its payoff by choosing possible actions. A strategic form is
presented to solve for equilibria in stage 1 and 2 due to the asymmetric information
problem.
A strategy of the firm in the third stage of the game has to specify two actions, i.e.
the responses to local government’s Maintain action when the firm is of a low or high
exit-cost type. Analogous to Section 4.3.2, the Nash equilibrium strategy in the final stage
of the game is:
Table 4.5: Firm’s Strategy in Stage 3
Firm
(A3, A3) when (1-r) -CV>(1-rL) -CV-CEL and (1-r) -CV>(1-rL) -CV-CEH => (r-rL) < CEL<CEH
(E3, A3) when (1-r) -CV<(1-rL) -CV-CEL and (1-r) -CV>(1-rL) -CV-CEH => CEL<(r-rL) <CEH
(E3, E3) when (1-r) -CV<(1-rL) -CV-CEL and (1-r) -CV<(1-rL) -CV-CEH => CEL<CEH<(r-rL)
Note: The subscript 3 denotes the third stage.
Considering twelve possible combinations of CV, CEL, CEH, and (r-rL) , we assume
CV<CEL<(r-rL) <CEH, i.e. the voice cost is lower than the exit cost and that (r-rL) is the
threshold differentiating the high or low exit cost, in order to keep the analysis within
operable bounds. Furthermore, this assumption is in accordance with the real world and
offers the most interesting economic implications.
If CV<CEL<(r-rL) <CEH, firm will choose (E3, A3) in the final stage. This strategy is
incorporated in the strategic form of the first two stages in Table 4.6. The Nash-equilibrium
response of the local government is to choose Reduce when the firm chooses either (V1, A1)
or (V1, E1) because R2>M2; when the firm selects (A1, V1) or (E1, V1), the local
government will prefer Maintain, because M2>R2; while the government will be indifferent
facing firm’s actions of (A1, A1), (A1, E1) or (E1, E1), because M2=R2. If the firm chooses
(V1, V1), the payoff-maximizing strategy of the local government depends on pL versus
(r-rL)/r. When pL (r-rL)/r, the local government prefer Reduce while Maintain is chosen
when pL (r-rL)/r .
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Using iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies for firm, it follows from
Table 4.5 that (A1, A1)<(V1, V1), (A1, V1)<(E1, V1), (A1, E1)<(V1, E1), (V1, A1)<(V1, V1),
(V1, E1)<(V1, A1), (E1, A1)<(E1, V1), (E1, E1)<(E1, V1) and (E1, V1)<(V1, V1) in the left
column, i.e. local government chooses Reduce. Similarly, in the right column of local
government’s Maintain strategy, the firm’s payoff is as such: (A1, A1)<(E1, A1), (A1,
V1)<(A1, A1), (A1, E1)<(E1, A1), (V1, A1)<(E1, A1), (V1, V1)<(V1, A1), (V1, E1)<(V1, A1), (E1,
V1)<(E1, A1) and (E1, E1)<(E1, V1). Thus, simplifying Table 4.6 into Table 4.7, we have
Nash equilibria dependent on the value of pL.
Table 4.7: Simplified Strategic Form of Firm and Local Government in Stage 1 and 2
Local government
Firm R2 M2
(V1, V1)
( (1-rL) -CV, rL + CV ) ( pL[(1-rL) -CV-CEL]+ (1-pL) [(1-r) -CV],
pL CV+(1-pL)(r + CV) )
(E1, A1) ( pL[(1-rL) -CEL]+ (1-pL)(1-r) , (1-pL)r ) ( pL[(1-rL) -CEL]+ (1-pL)(1-r) , (1-pL)r )
Note: The subscript 1 and 2 denotes the first and second stage, respectively.
Case 1: pL<(r-rL)/r
When pL<(r-rL)/r, local government will prefer M2 when the firm chooses (V1, V1) (Table
4.8). We use a graphical representation to solve for the Nash equilibrium.
Table 4.8: The Nash Equilibria in Stage 1 and 2 (pL<(r-rL)/r)
Local government
Firm R2 M2
(V1, V1)
( (1-rL) -CV, rL + CV ) ( pL[(1-rL) -CV-CEL]+ (1-pL) [(1-r) -CV],
pL CV+(1-pL)(r + CV) )
(E1, A1) ( pL[(1-rL) -CEL]+ (1-pL)(1-r) , (1-pL)r ) ( pL[(1-rL) -CEL]+ (1-pL)(1-r) , (1-pL)r )
Note: The subscript 1 and 2 denotes the first and second stage, respectively.
Suppose (p, 1-p) is the mixed strategy in which the firm chooses (V1, V1) with
probability p ( [0,1]) and (E1, A1) with 1-p and suppose (q, 1-q) be local government’s
mixed strategy choosing R2 with probability q ( [0,1]) and M2 with 1-q. If local
government plays (q, 1-q), firm’s expected payoffs are PF(V,
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V)=q[(1-rL) -CV]+(1-q)[pL((1-rL) -CV-CEL)+ (1-pL) ((1-r) -CV)] from choosing (V1, V1)
and PF(E, A)=q[pL((1-rL) -CEL)+(1-pL)(1-r) ]+(1-q)[pL((1-rL) -CEL)+(1-pL)(1-r) ] from
choosing (E1, A1). Then, the best-response correspondence of firm is:
1 for PF(V, V)> PF(E, A) => q>q' (q'=CV/[(1-pL)(r-rL) +pLCEL]);
p*(q)= 0 for PF(V, V)< PF(E, A) => q<q';
[0,1] for PF(V, V)= PF(E, A) => q=q'
Similarly, if the firm plays (p, 1-p), local government’s expected payoffs are
PG(R)=p(rL + CV)+(1-p)(1-pL)r from choosing R2 and
PG(M)=p[pL CV+(1-pL)(r + CV)]+(1-p)(1-pL)r from choosing M2. The best-response
correspondence for local government is:
0 for PG(R)< PG(M) => p>0;
[0,1] for PG(R)= PG(M) => p=0
Thus, in Figure 4.5, the intersection of p*(q) and q*(p) is the horizontal segment: (p=0, q<
q'). We have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium: Firm (E1, A1) when p=0 and q=0 and a
continuum of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria: Firm (E1, A1) and Local government (q, 1-q)
when q< q'.
Figure 4.5: Graphical Representation of the Firm and Local Government’s
Best-response Correspondence (pL<(r-rL)/r)
p
(V1, V1)
(E1, A1)
M2 R2
q
p*(q)
q*(p)
q'
NE
q'=CV/[(1-pL)(r-rL) +pLCEL]
1
1
{
{q*(p)=
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Case 2: pL>(r-rL)/r
When pL>(r-rL)/r, local government will prefer R2 when firm chooses (V1, V1) (Table 4.9).
Table 4.9: The Nash Equilibria in Stage 1 and 2 (pL>(r-rL)/r)
Local government
Firm R2 M2
(V1, V1)
( (1-rL) -CV, rL + CV ) ( pL[(1-rL) -CV-CEL]+ (1-pL) [(1-r) -CV],
pL CV+(1-pL)(r + CV) )
(E1, A1) ( pL[(1-rL) -CEL]+(1-pL)(1-r) , (1-pL)r ) ( pL[(1-rL) -CEL]+(1-pL)(1-r) , (1-pL)r )
Note: The subscript 1 and 2 denotes the first and second stage, respectively.
Analogous to Figure 4.5, the best-response correspondence of firm p*(q) in
Figure 4.6 is: i) if q>q', p*(q)=1; ii) if q<q', p*(q)=0; iii) if q=q', p*(q) [0, 1]. However,
for the local government:
1 for PG(R)> PG(M) => p>0;
[0,1] for PG(R)= PG(M) => p=0
Thus, in Figure 4.6, there are two intersections of p*(q) and q*(p): (p=1, q=1) and (p=0,
q<q'). Therefore, we have two pure-strategy Nash equilibra: i) Firm (E1, A1); ii) Firm (V1,
V1) and Local government R2 and a continuum of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria: Firm (E1,
A1) and Local government (q, 1-q) when q< q'.
{q*(p)=
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Figure 4.6: Graphical Representation of the Firm and Local Government’s
Best-response Correspondence (pL>(r-rL)/r)
Case 3: pL=(r-rL)/r
When pL=(r-rL)/r, local government will be indifferent when firm chooses (V1, V1) (Table
4.10).
Table 4.10: The Nash Equilibria in Stage 1 and 2 (pL=(r-rL)/r)
Local government
Firm R2 M2
(V1, V1)
( (1-rL) -CV, rL + CV ) ( pL[(1-rL) -CV-CEL]+ (1-pL) [(1-r) -CV],
pL CV+(1-pL)(r + CV) )
(E1, A1) ( pL[(1-rL) -CEL]+(1-pL)(1-r) , (1-pL)r ) ( pL[(1-rL) -CEL]+(1-pL)(1-r) , (1-pL)r )
Note: The subscript 1 and 2 denotes the first and second stage, respectively.
Since local government’s expected payoffs of R2 equals to that of M2 (PG(R)=
PG(M)) if the firm plays (p, 1-p), the local government is indifferent to choose either R2 or
M2 for any value of p (the whole shadow square in Figure 4.7). Thus, the intersection of
p*(q) and q*(p) is the value of firm’s best-response correspondence p*(q). We have two
pure-strategy Nash equilibria: i) Firm (E1, A1); ii) Firm (V1, V1) and Government R2 and a
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continuum of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria: i) if q>q', p*(q)=1 and if q<q', p*(q)=0, as
indicated by two horizontal segments of p*(q) in Figure 4.7; ii) if q=q', p*(q') is the entire
interval [0, 1], as indicated by the vertical segment of p*(q).
Figure 4.7: Graphical Representation of the Firm and Local Government’s
Best-response Correspondence (pL=(r-rL)/r)
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5. Changing Tax Structure in China: Efficiency, Power and
Legitimacy as Constraints30
5.1. Introduction
axation is at the very core of any state (Schumpeter 1918) as taxation forms the base
for any government activity, might that be allocating resources and entitlements,
(re-distributing) income or stabilizing business cycles (Musgrave 1959). Moreover, the
history of taxation is also inextricably linked to the development of democracy as has been
shown by the English and French Revolution (Kiser and Kane 2001) or the beginning of
the United States. Yet, when transition economies looked for a blueprint for establishing a
market-conforming tax structure, they quickly enough got frustrated (Bird et al. 1995).
The empirical studies show that there is not one – ideal type – of a tax structure
which fits one political regime, let alone democratic market economies. Instead in
international comparisons we observe tax structures which vary in size of revenue and
expenditure, or role of taxation (e.g. Cukierman et al. 1992; Edwards and Tabellini 1991;
Tanzi 1994). The intriguing puzzle is how do they come into being, and why do they vary
even within the group of market economies? Existing literature offers competing
theoretical models but mostly focuses on developed countries, thereby providing only
limited theoretical and operational guidance for transition economies.
30 This chapter is based on Z. Zhu and B. Krug. 2006. Changing Tax Structure in China: An
Empirical Study. ERIM Working Paper. I am grateful to Lars Feld and Sven Steinmo for helpful
comments and suggestions. The chapter has also benefited from presentations at the Annual
Conference of International Society for New Institutional Economics (ISNIE), September 21-24,
2006 in Boulder, Colorado (USA) and a workshop, Shifts in Governance (NWO project), July 24-28,
2006 in Hangzhou (China).
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Public Finance literature takes institutional environment as a given and examines
equity and efficiency in designing a “good” tax system31. The Equitable Taxation (ET)
stresses equity over efficiency. The ability-to-pay approach concentrates on equivalent
taxable capacity and measures this ability by defining the comprehensive tax base in terms
of comprehensive income (Simons 1938) – one among many measures examined,
including consumption or lifetime income. The sacrifice approach interprets equality as
equal sacrifice of individual utility, be it absolute, proportional or marginal, when paying
tax (e.g. Edgeworth 1897; Pigou 1951). Thus, progressive taxation is advocated.
Acknowledging the necessity of a trade-off between equity and efficiency, Optimal
Taxation (OT) seeks an optimal tax structure to maximize a social welfare function subject
to constraints. Since Ramsey (1927), a large literature of OT has grown up, including
Mirrlees’ (1971) work on income taxation and studies on commodity taxation by Diamond
and Mirrlees (1971) and Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971)32. In contrast to ET and OT, which
both only focus on taxation, Benefit Taxation (BT) links tax payments to public goods and
services via the voluntary exchange approach, emphasizing equivalence of
marginal-benefit-and-cost. Voluntary consent, pricing equilibrium and decision-making
processes (for instance, unanimity), are major concerns of this tradition (Lindahl 1919;
Wicksell 1896)33.
However, Taxation is a product of politics (Holcombe 1998) and any analysis of
taxation without reference to politics leads to incomplete understanding. Following
Wicksell (1896), the Public Choice literature regards taxation as an exchange of public
goods and services in which equilibrium is reached under the collective choice-making
process34. Thus, different (political) institutional factors (namely, direct or representative
democracy and corresponding voting rules) generate diverse tax systems. Given the single
dimension voting issue and single-peaked voters’ preferences, the Median Voter model
(Black 1948) finds that the equilibrium outcome is the peak preference for the median
voter, which allows politicians to design a tax structure and expenditure package in favor
of median voter’s preferences so to maximize their votes (Downs 1957). In the Leviathan
model (Brennan and Buchanan 1980), government is a covetous agency, which designs the
tax system in order to mobilize maximum revenues. In this case, more powerful constraints
should be imposed at the constitutional level, namely, a fiscal constitution (Buchanan and
Tullock 1962; Buchanan 1976). Instead of specific institutional features (legislature and
committee structures, for instance), the Probabilistic Voting model (Hettich and Winer
31 See e.g. Musgrave and Peacock (1967) and Hettich and Winer (1985) for detailed discussion.
32 See Mirrlees (1976) for detailed discussion.
33 See Musgrave (1939) for detailed discussion.
34 See Mueller (2003) and Hettich and Winer (1999) for detailed discussion.
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1984, 1999) focuses on political competition in terms of differing tax and expenditure
policy platforms. In theory then, rational voters may be expected to evaluate the personal
cost to income (including excess burden) caused by taxation against the benefits derived
from public goods and services and cast their vote accordingly, thereby encouraging
political actors to choose an optimal tax structure by equalizing the marginal political cost
of raising additional revenue across tax bands. The Historical Institutionalism approach
(Steinmo 1993; Steinmo et al. 1992) traces the evolution of specific political institutions in
democratic countries and emphasizes their critical influence in forming diverse tax systems
by defining the policy preferences of interest groups, politicians and bureaucrats and
altering their relative bargaining power over public issues within different institutional
contexts. In his comparative analysis of Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United
States, Steinmo (1989, 1993) he finds that constitutional differences (different types of
governance) fundamentally shape diverse tax policy outcomes.
Despite adding (political) institutional factors into taxation analysis, the Public
Choice view is rooted in democratic institutional environment. A competitive electoratal
mechanism is essential in determining the equilibrium associated with political and
economic trade-offs for government using various tax instruments to raise revenues, since
votes are assumed to go to the party or politician that offers the maximum public goods
and services with the minimum tax levy. Yet, this cannot be directly applied to those
transition economies where democracy is underdeveloped or even nonexistant.
In addition, browsing the literature proves that taxation or more generally the
revenue side of government remains an under-researched topic. In striking contrast to
government expenditure, which had been at the core of the academic controversy about the
appropriate government size in a democratic market economy in the eighties (e.g. Mueller
2003), the problem of linking tax structures, i.e. a major component in state revenues, to
political regimes received attention only in connection with developing countries. The few
and more recent attempts to explain the surprising international variations in the “tax mix”
are based on democratic political regimes only (e.g. Hettich and Winer 1999).
Unsurprisingly a systematic analysis of tax reform in China is missing. The
literature sees taxation as part of “Central-Local Relations” (Wong 1991, 1992, 1997; see
also contribution in Brean 1998), or offers an amplitude of case studies in which the tax
practices of counties, villages or within the state sector are described. We try to bridge the
gap between the empirical narratives and models tested in other political contexts. On the
conceptual side the challenge is to 1) include non-democratic regimes in the analysis; 2)
explain change (tax reform) within one country rather through variations in the tax mix
between countries or political regimes; and 3) search for systematic factors behind the
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often confusing reforms steps in China between 1978 and today. On the empirical side, a
descriptive analysis of taxation needs to provide information about the tax base (who pays
taxes and for what), composition of taxes (direct/indirect, “user fees”, other revenues
sources), and the tax regime (who levies taxes, how are taxes collected).
This chapter shows that despite the apparent trial and error process in China’s tax
reforms, some systematic factors can be identified which are open for (further) empirical
testing. So far the findings suggest that the introduction of the new tax structure follows
efficiency considerations, reflects the outcome of interactions between emerging interest
groups within the political sector, and confirms the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP)
concern with legitimacy. The analysis starts with a descriptive analysis of Reform China’s
tax structure in the context of a broader understanding of economic, political and social
interaction. Identifying the major components is the necessary pre-requisite for
constructing the independent variables in the quantitative analysis which will be used for
testing the systematic features behind China’s tax reforms (Section 5.2). Employing
insights from New Institutional Economics, public choice and public finance some
approaches will be selected or modified which allow formulating hypotheses (Section 5.3).
A simple regression model will be introduced (Section 5.4) which within the limits set by
the availability of data shows that indeed China’s tax reform follow certain “logic”. After a
summary of the findings (Section 5.5) we will discuss the limitations of the empirical tests
and draws some conclusions (Section 5.6).
5.2. Toward Non-socialist Taxation35
The lack of a systematic analysis of the changes in taxation and tax administration in
China is in striking contrast to the quickly rising significance of tax revenue as a means to
implement government policy whether for investment or re-distributive purposes. Several
reasons account for this gap in the literature. First, taxation is most frequently seen as part
of central-local relations, a literature where the different administrative layers below the
provincial level remain unspecified (Brean 1998; Wong 1991, 1992, 1997). Second, the
co-existence of national and local tax structures where two systems work according to
different rules offers a confusing picture (Zhu and Krug 2007). Third, the different reform
steps indicate a trial-and-error process leaving doubts whether there is a rationale behind
all that change.
Broadly speaking, there are two major tax structures after the reform in 1978, i.e.
35 Overviews can be found in Brean 1998, Wong 1997; Wong et al. 1995.
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the 1978-1994 and post-1994 (Table 5.1). Before the reform tax structure followed the
socialist notion of an “owner-state” (Campbell 1996) whose dominant revenue source were
“profit” of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Thus for example, if one takes 1972 as a
typical year for the socialist era, profit remittance added up to around 60 per cent of total
revenue. The rest were industrial and commercial tax, customs duties, and an agricultural
tax. This picture quickly changed in Reform China. Being out-performed by non-state
enterprises the SOEs, instead of contributing revenue, needed to be subsidized (11 per cent
of total government revenue in 1992 alone, see Figure 5.1, Panel A). The SOE-induced
drain on overall revenue has been one but not the only reason for the emergence of a
broader tax base as the following considerations show.
The tax system is “the product of political conflict and choice but which at the
same time constrain and shape political strategies and behaviors” (Steinmo et al. 1992, p.
28). To understand why and how the new tax structure evolved asks for “endogenizing”
political factors, such as the CCP which designs the rule of the game that ensure its
dominance as a player, the interaction between different levels of
government/administration and the way political issues are solved. The changes in taxation
can be shown in a route map (Figure 5.2) documenting the different programs, or more
precisely their rhetoric. The reform started with Socialism with Chinese Characteristics
(1982), to be followed by a Planned Commodity Economy (1984), Socialist Market
Economy (1992), Improvement of Socialist Market Economy (2002), and today’s
Construction of a Harmonious Socialist Society (2006) bearing witness that the CCP while
acknowledging the increasing social tension between various interest groups and classes,
and responding to the successful development of neighboring countries attempts to (partly)
save the notion of the “owner state”. And yet, the reforms dramatically changed the
socioeconomic and political context none the least by mobilizing new economic actors and
acknowledging (and empowering) various interest groups (Goodman 1996). As a
consequence taxation became a political issue in the interaction between the CCP,
government agencies and increasingly more relevant interest groups such as firms and the
business community.
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Source: Ministry of Finance, P. R. China. 1996-2005. China Finance Yearbook (Beijing: China Finance Press) 
Figure 5.1: Breakdown of Government Revenue and Tax Revenue: 1972, 1992 and 2002 
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Table 5.1: China’s Tax Structure
1978-1994 post-1994
Value-added tax Value-added tax
Product tax Consumption tax
Business tax Business tax
Consolidated industrial and commercial tax Customs duties
Particular adjustment tax
Customs duties
Turnover
Taxes
Special consumption tax
Income tax on state-owned enterprises Enterprise income tax
Income tax on collective enterprises Income tax on FIEs and FEsa
Income tax on individual unit of industry
and commerce
Individual income tax
Income tax on foreign enterprises Agricultural tax
Income tax on Chinese-foreign Equity Joint
Ventures
Tax on special agricultural
produce
Income tax on foreign business enterprises Animal husbandry tax
Income tax on private enterprises
Individual income tax
Adjustment tax on individual income
Tax on bonus of state-owned enterprises
Adjustment tax on wage of state-owned
enterprises
Tax on bonus of collective enterprises
Tax on bonus of non-profit enterprises
Agricultural tax
Tax on special agricultural produce
Income Taxes
Animal husbandry tax
Resource tax Resource tax
Urban and township land usage tax Urban and township land
usage tax
Occupied farmland tax Occupied farmland tax
Special tax on burning oil
Resource Taxes
Salt tax
Property and Real estate tax Real estate tax
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1978-1994 post-1994
Urban maintenance and construction tax Urban real estate tax
Vehicle and vessel usage license tax Land appreciation tax
Vessel tonnage tax Urban maintenance and
construction tax
Stamp tax Stamp tax
Deed tax Deed tax
Slaughter tax Vehicle acquisition tax
Banquet tax Vehicle and vessel usage
license tax
Livestock transaction tax Vehicle and vessel usage tax
Bazaar transaction tax Vessel tonnage tax
Orientation adjustment tax on investment in
fixed asset
Slaughter tax
Banquet tax
Behavior Taxes
Orientation adjustment tax on
investment in fixed asset
Notes: Enterprises with foreign investment (FIEs) include Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures, Chinese-foreign contractual joint ventures and wholly
foreign-owned enterprises established in China; Foreign enterprises (FEs) include foreign companies, enterprises and other economic
organizations that are not Chinese legal entities, but have establishment or places in China and are engaged in production or business operations.
Source: State Administration of Taxation, P. R. China. www.chinatax.gov.cn
Figure 5.2: Major Institutional Changes and Tax Reforms in China: 1978-2006
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5.2.1. Discovering a New Tax Base: 1978-1991
As the Great Leap Forward (1958-61), and the Culture Revolution (1966-76) had nearly
ruined the legitimacy of the CCP, the Third Plenum of the Eleventh CCP Central
Committee in December 1978 tried to a rescue the Party leadership by changing economic
policy (Krug 1984)36. Such a “pragmatist” course met broad approval within the Party and
led to numerous Party resolutions, government reports and finally a new Constitution37.
Under such economic rationale, various reforms in taxation and public finance were
undertaken. First, decentralization of economic decision making in rural areas introduced
the household responsibility system, relaxation of price control of agricultural products,
and reduction of taxation (Lin 1987; McMillan et al. 1989)38. Second, SOEs were turned
into economic actors responsible for profit and loss while becoming a subject for taxation.
Based on experiments in Hubei (1979), the tax-for-profit reform (1983-84) granted
managerial autonomy to the SOEs who in return for accepting part of the entrepreneurial
risk could keep part of (after tax) profit. Which degree of autonomy, i.e. the right to decide
over the allocation of working capital, investment, wages, and bonus without state
intervention was granted, depended however on enterprises’ size, sector if not ad hoc
situations39. Simultaneously, new taxes were levied on SOEs, such as income tax on SOEs
in 1983, product tax, value-added tax (VAT), business tax and salt tax in 1984 (Table 1).
Third, attracting new tax payers and thereby broadening the tax base. The opening up
policy and the subsequent increasing foreign investments enabled the government to levy
income tax on foreign enterprises, joint ventures and individuals (foreign employees)40. On
36 Hu Qiaomu made it clear: “Why should the masses want the Communist Party if the Communist
Party is unable to serve the interest of the great majority? Why should they support the Communist
Party?” in Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) 6 October 1978.
37 Deng Xiaoping’s address of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” at the Twelfth National
Party Congress (NPC) (Beijing, 1 September 1982); Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jingji tizhi gaige
de jueding (Resolution of the CCP Central Committee on economic system reform), (the Third
Plenum of the Twelfth CCP Central Committee, Beijing, 20 October 1984); Zhao Ziyang’s
government report at the Third session of the Sixth NPC (Beijing, 27 March 1985); New Article 11
of the Constitution, approved by the First Session of the Seventh NPC (Beijing, 12 April 1988).
38 Guanyu jianqing nongcun shuishou fudan wenti de baogao (Report regarding alleviation of rural
tax burden), (the State Council and Ministry of Finance (MOF), 2 December 1978).
39 Caizhengbu guanyu guoying qiye li gai shui shixing banfa (Provisional measure of MOF
regarding the tax-for-profit reform on SOEs), (24 April 1983); Caizhengbu guanyu guoying qiye
dierbu li gai shui shixing banfa (Provisional measure of MOF regarding the second step of
tax-for-profit reform on SOEs), (18 September 1984).
40 The Income Tax Law on Chinese-foreign Equity Joint Venture, promulgated by the Third Session
of the Fifth NPC on 10 September 1980, and annulled on 1 July 1991; The Income Tax Law on
Foreign Enterprises, promulgated by the Fourth Session of the Fifth NPC on 13 December 1981, and
annulled on 1 July 1991; The Individual Income Tax Law, promulgated by the Third Session of the
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the other hand tax concessions were “discovered” as a useful tool for attracting foreign
investments, such as tax holidays and special economic zones (SEZs). The latter started in
Guangdong (Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou) in 198041 and quickly copied by other
province42 became almost synonymous with discriminating tax policy. Fourth, private
entrepreneurship was encouraged as this offered an additional tax base, yet remained at
first under state supervision43.
The introduction of new taxes for a broader tax base asked for accompanying
changes in tax administration. The central government delegated regulatory and fiscal
authority to provincial governments employing contracts which stipulated a fixed sum or a
percentage of revenue to be transferred to the national coffer (Bahl 1998; Oksenberg and
Tong 1991; Wong 1991, 1992)44. This arrangement became to be known as Fiscal
Federalism (Montinola et al. 1995; Qian and Weingast 1996) as it increased local
autonomy when provincial governments used the same mechanism with lower (local)
government agencies. Based on several experiments such as the Jiangsu model of “fixed
overall revenue sharing rate”, the Sichuan model of “dividing central, local and
central-local sharing revenue”, or the Guangdong and Fujian model of “fixed lump sum
transfer”, this “fiscal contracting system” shows intriguing similarities to the “tax farming
system” widely used in 16th/17th century England and France.
The findings of economic history point to efficiency considerations, i.e. low tax
collecting or transaction costs (e.g. Donald and O’Brien 2002; Kiser 1994; Kiser and Kane
2001; White 1995, 2004). It is worth mentioning that the analysis also proves that tax
farming disappeared in Europe when functioning capital markets offered an attractive
re-financing alternative to the government/ruler, to the effect that tax farming lost its
comparative advantage. Yet, the Chinese rationale for opting for tax farming went beyond
Fifth NPC on 10 September 1980, revised on 31 October 1993 and 30 August 1999.
41 Guangdong sheng jingji tequ tiaoli (Provisions of special economic zone in Guangdong province),
(Approved by the fifteenth meeting of the Fifth NPC Standing Committee, 26 August 1980).
42 From 1984-1988, 14 Economic and Technological Development Zones (ETDZs), Dalian,
Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Minhang, Hongqiao, Caohejing,
Ningbo, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang had been approved by the State Council.
43
“The State permits the private sector of the economy to exist and develop within the limits
prescribed by law…The State protects the lawful rights and interests of the private sector of the
economy, and exercises guidance, supervision and control over the private sector of the economy.”
Article 11 of the Constitution 1988.
44 Guowuyuan guanyu shixing “huafen shouzhi, fenji baogan” caizheng guanli tizhi de tongzhi
(Circular of the State Council regarding implementation of fiscal administrative system of dividing
revenue and expenditure along each level government with contract), (1 February 1980); Guowuyuan
guanyu shixing “huafen shuizhong, heding shouzhi, fenji baogan” caizheng guanli tizhi de tongzhi
(Circular of the State Council regarding implementation of fiscal administrative system of dividing
taxes, defining revenue and expenditure, and contracting with government layer), (21 March 1985)
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efficiency considerations. The positive incentives in these contracts which allowed the tax
collecting unit to keep marginal tax revenue mobilized local governments and ensured
compliance with the reform course (Nee and Peng 1994; Bahl 1998; Zhu and Krug 2007).
As a result, tax policy stimulated economic growth and facilitated economic
transformation. Taxes replaced the socialist remittance scheme. Thus for example,
corporate income taxes unknown in socialist China rose to 28 per cent in 1992 (of total
revenue); revenue from custom duties rose from 2 per cent in 1972 to 8 per cent in 1992.
While taxes on the primary (mostly agricultural) sector dropped from 9 per cent in 1972 to
5 per cent in 1992, indirect taxes, such as VAT, business and consumption tax, contributed
about 75-90 per cent of total revenue in the same period. What had been underestimated
however, were the distributional effects of the tax administration reforms which worked to
the detriment of the central budget (Figure 5.1, Panel B)
5.2.2. Re-defining the Boundaries of the State: 1992-2000
One of the unintended effects of the initial tax reform were the drastically shrinking share
of (consolidated) revenue to GDP which fell from 35 per cent (1978) to 20 per cent (1990)
and 13 per cent in 1993 (Wong 1998, 190). In order to maintain (state) planned levels of
expenditure monetary control weakened (Howe et al. 2003). The official figures of
government revenue offer an incomplete picture only as they do not include the so-called
Off- and Extrabudgetary Revenue (EBR) which levied by local government agencies
turned the balance between central government and local government agencies to the
latter’s advantage. While the consolidated revenue (budgetary plus EBRs) declined from
45 per cent (1978) to around 30 per cent (1993) the total local share of the consolidate
budget was as high as 74 per cent in 1993 (Wong 1998, 200). As a remnant from the
socialist past EBRs include local government income from “ownership” of industrial assets
in form of (shares of) township and village enterprises (TVEs), and public infrastructure,
such as electricity, water, roads, or airports. They further include income from land
management, when local governments claim ownership, a source of revenue which since
the early 2000s should become a major cause for social unrest45. Despite names such as
users’ fees or surtaxes the EBRs are a tax which any analysis of the Chinese tax structure
needs to include in the analysis. Subsequently, the Budget Law of 1994 incorporated EBRs
into the consolidated budget46.
From the point of view of the central government the new autonomy of local
45 A detailed description can be found in Wong 1998.
46 Promulgated by the Second Session of the Eighth NPC on 22 March 1994.
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government agencies, SOEs and TVEs with respect to investment, loans and wage
decisions revealed the weakness of the hard budget constraints the state administration can
establish for controlling local expenditure (Kornai 1986). The so-called dual-track price
system invited arbitrage dealings for those bureaucrats, Party official or their relatives who
could move in both – the lower priced state sector and the higher priced market sector (Lau
et al. 2000). Corruption became ubiquitous fuelling the demands of the Democracy Protest
in Tiananmen in 1989. Inflation and political chaos resulted in a Reform-stop and a
subsequent recession caused mainly by anti-inflationary monetary policy. Deng Xiaoping’s
Southern Tour in 1992 and the Fourteenth Party Congress responded by stipulating further
reforms - the so-called Socialist Market Economy- indicating the winning of pro-market
reformists over conservatives47. The general economic policy aimed at liberalization: From
the mid-1990s, small and medium-sized SOEs were privatized, price control was ended,
and various industries were opened for foreign and domestic private investors.
In contrast to the liberalization in the non-state sector, the tax reform of 1994 aimed
at re-gaining political (central) control over the financial (monetary and fiscal) system. The
reform aimed at simplifying taxation by reducing the number of taxes levied, establishing
clear rules for the division of total tax revenue between the centre and local administrative
units, harnessed by the establishment of a professional, “neutral” tax bureaucracy, and
curtailing local extra-budgetary revenues (EBRs) (overview in Bahl 1998).
First, the VAT so far applicable to only 12 categories of products was established as
the dominant indirect sales tax with rates of 17 and 13 percent replacing the product tax.
The business tax with rates between 2 and 20 per cent became the VAT equivalent in the
service industry. The direct income tax drastically reduced the top income tax rate from 55
to 33 per cent simultaneously ending different tax rates for firms with different ownership.
A consumption tax was maintained for those goods whose consumption the government
wants to discourage, such as cigarettes, liquor, patrol or cars.
A “tax sharing system” in which taxes were defined as central, local or shared tax
whose revenue was divided accordingly replaced the “fiscal contracting system”. Under
the new system, tax legislation was centralized, i.e. local governments were deprived of
47 See Jiang Zemin’s report on the Fourteenth Party Congress, 12 October 1992 and other documents,
such as Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jianli shehui zhiyi zhichang jingji tizhi ruogan wenti de
jueding (Resolution of the CCP central committee on issues regarding the establishment of a socialist
market economic system), (14 November 1993), Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu zhiding guoming
jingji he shehui fazhan “jiuwu” jihua he 2010 nian yuanjing mubiao de jianyi (Suggestion of the CCP
Central Committee regarding establishing the ninth five-year plan of economic and social
development and 2010 vision), (28 September 1995), the second amendment to the Constitution
approved by the Eighth NPC on 29 March 1993, and the third amendment approved by the Second
Session of the Ninth NPC on 15 March 1999.
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tax legislative power but remained the collecting agency of those taxes which the national
legislation (National People’s Congress, State Council, Ministry of Finance or the State
Administration of Taxation (SAT)) had defined as “local”.48 Subsequently, to ensure the
collection of central tax revenue and enforcement of central tax legislation, the tax bureau
was split into two separate administrative organs with distinct lines of hierarchy. The
national tax bureaus (guoshuiju, NTBs) subordinate to the SAT became responsible for
collecting and monitoring central and shared taxes while local tax bureaus (dishuiju, LTBs)
subject to dual leadership of the SAT and local governments administered local taxes. Yet,
as the SAT gives only operational guidance (yewu zhidao) to provincial LTBs and
comments on personnel issues to the provincial government, the LTBs are de facto a local
government institution.
The argument that the rationale behind the changes in taxation and tax
administration are efficiency considerations cannot easily dismissed. The streamlining of
sales and direct taxes reduce monitoring and collection costs. The establishment of a
national tax administration reflect a gradual top-town hierarchical bureaucratization where
monitoring fewer higher-level officials is easier than monitoring the more numerous and
more distant lower-level officials (Kiser and Tong 1992). On the other side, the reforms
also reflect a compromise between the central government and “powerful” local
government agencies with entrenched interests in revenue resources (Nee and Peng 1994;
Tsang and Cheng 1994; Wong 2000). The latter effectively hindered the central
government to build up a central tax administration, let alone giving up the national and
local tax structure. Finally, the question of legitimacy re-appeared when local governments
increasing turning “entrepreneurial” but allocating locally controlled land and industrial
assets to best used or using (monopolistic) pricing as an additional revenue source. In this
case the legitimacy referred to the notion of the “owner state” which would link the then
new competitive non-state sector with the socialist past. Yet, at the same time increasing
protest, if not violence, revealed the lack of legitimacy of these revenue sources.
5.2.3. Taxation as a Means for Re-distribution: Since 2000
In the context of China’s entry into the World Trade Organization the Sixteenth Party
Congress acknowledged a Socialist Market Economy by making the protection of private
property rights a constitutional right in 200449.
48 The SAT was separated from the Ministry of Finance in 1988, given full ministerial status under
the State Council in 1993, and put in charge of all tax policy.
49 See the revised Article 13 in the fourth amendment to the Constitution, 14 March 2004.
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Another aspect the Party wanted (and needed) to address was the widening
inequality in income distribution across regions (costal and inland), groups (urban and
rural), and classes (rich and poor), as shown by a rapid rise of Gini coefficient from 0.3 in
1980s to 0.45 in 2002 exceeding the international threshold which asked for remedies of
0.4 (UNDP 2005). Only poorly reflected in the national statistics are the rapidly increasing
(and widely varying) costs for medical treatment, schools and housing which further
contribute to the increasing differences in life chances and life income. The illegal
confiscating of land by Party or government officials, the deterioration of the environment
and corruption further fuelled social unrests50. A 2003 Party resolution stressed the
necessity to address the problem of income inequality and more effective control of tax
evasion, if not corruption51. The present government’s appeal to build a Harmonious
Socialist Society is an attempt to appease mounting social conflicts stemming from uneven
distribution of the Reform gains52. Tax policy plays a major part in this attempt.
First, the tax-for-fee reform sought to relieve rural tax burden and enhance
peasants’ income (Yep 2004) by abolishing the (local) EBR-fees. Experiments with this
policy started in 2000 (Anhui) in form of the santi and wutong-policy 53 but became not
national policy till 200354. As a further means to lift the overall tax burden, agriculture
taxes were abolished in 2006. Second, the income tax was modified. The threshold for
taxable income was raised from 800 RMB to 1,500 RMB in 200555. Indirect taxes on
inheritance and property acknowledge and tax the increasing wealth of households. Stricter
regulations forced (self-employed) individual to file tax declarations. Charges against
several celebrities for tax fraught and more frequent investigations of corruption underline
the seriousness of the claim to fight “illegal” and thus non-taxable income56. Third,
50 Official records report 58,000 cases of “public order disturbance” in 2003, 74,000 cases in 2004,
and 87,000 cases in 2005 (Lum 2006).
51 Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu wanshan shehui zhuyi shichang jingji tizhi ruogan wenti de
jueding (Resolution on issues Regarding the Improvement of a Socialist Market Economic System),
14 October 2003.
52 Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu goujian shehui zhuyi hexie shehui ruogan zhongda wenti de
jueding (Resolution on major issues Regarding the Building of a Harmonious Socialist Society), 11
October 2006.
53 Santi refers to three village fees: 1) accumulation fund (gongjijin) for collective investment such
as irrigation construction, collective enterprises, etc., 2) collective welfare fund (gongyijin) for old
and poor families, 3) administrative fees (guanlifei) to cover salary of village cadres and running
overhead expenses; Wutong refers to five township fees for expenditure on rural education, birth
control, welfare for veterans, militia training and transportation.
54 Guowuyuan guanyu quanmian tuijin nongxun shuifei gaige shidian gongzuo de yijian (Circular of
the State Council on guidance concerning well-round furthering rural tax-for-fee pilot reform), 27
March 2003.
55 Amendment to Article 6 and 8 in the Individual Income Tax Law on 22 October 2005.
56 Violating tax collection and dereliction of duty of tax official became a criminal offence after
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considerable tax incentives were announced in 2000 to encourage investment in
underdeveloped western inland regions in line with the propagated regionally balanced
development strategy57.
In sum, the description of the tax reforms since 1978 shows an attempt to cope with
the quick economic development and the search for market-conforming taxation. The
reforms started with “creating” a group of tax payers, establishing the tax base for direct
and indirect taxes, while insisting on extra-budgetary revenues as additional source for
local governments. While the tax structure established direct and indirect taxes plus EBRs
as main source for government revenue the differing weight attached to the different
sources asks for an explanation. The history of the tax reforms shows that different
purposes influenced the choice of tax base and tax rates. Some taxes were chosen mainly
for generating (enough) revenue for the different layers of governments, some were chosen
in order to mitigate the distributional consequences of economic development and some
were chosen for educational purposes when certain behavior (consumption) was to be
discouraged. Subsequently, the reforms delineated a different “mix” of taxable items and
tax rates. The descriptive part already suggests changes in the mix are not at random.
Following historical institutionalism (Hall 1986; Steinmo 1993) that sees actors’ behaviors
(rational, imitative, habitual, or otherwise) following certain goals, preferences, and rules
endogenously shaped by the institutional context, we derive context-specific factors from
historical and contextual information of changes of China’s tax system. Three factors seem
to have played a role: First, efficiency considerations, when it was complained that
taxation is too complicated, tax compliance hard to monitor and tax collection hard to
enforce; Second, power, when specific groups of economic actors, such as local
government agencies can influence national legislation, or when groups of tax payers can
influence tax reform implementation to their often conflicting advantages; Third,
legitimacy when specific groups judging the overall tax burden, specific taxes, or tax
enforcement as “unfair” if not corrupt react by withholding information about the “real”
income, evade taxes or embark on open protest.
5.3. Conceptual Background: Tax Structure as the Outcome of
Institutional Changes
1997, see amendment to Chapter 3 (new article 121), and Chapter 9 in Criminal Law on 14 March
1997.
57 Guowuyuan guanyu shishi xibu dakaifa ruogan zhengce cuoshi de tongzhi (Circular of the State
Council concerning several policies on carrying out the development of China’s vast western
regions), (26 October 2000).
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5.3.1. Tax Structure as an Institution
Tax structure is an economic, political and social product. More precisely, it is a part of
overall institutional setting of the state. “Taxes not only helped to create the state. They
helped to form it. (Schumpeter 1918, p.108)” According to North’s (1990, 1991, 1994)
definition of institutions58, the tax structure refers to formal rules (tax codes, legislations)
and informal constraints (negotiated taxes and tax compliance). As suggested by the
summary of the development of the tax system in previous section three dimensions
efficiency, power and legitimacy seem to have played a role.
5.3.2. Efficiency
Starting with the Leviathan-hypothesis both New Institutional Economics and Public
Choice assume that governments/rulers attempt to maximize revenues within the limits of
political parties, ruling families or, in the modern version, army units competing for the top
executive positions (Brennan and Buchanan 1980; Buchanan and Tullock 1962, see also
the historical institutionalism (Hall 1986; Steinmo 1993)). In contrast, public choice
approaches open the “black box” of the state, i.e. a single central focus of authority
whether manifests in a constitution or a centralized political regime. Disaggregating the
state into an executive and administrative branch (see the seminal work by Niskanen 1971)
or by introducing different layers of “federal” government (Buchanan and Tullock 1962;
see overview in Mueller 2003) helps to understand how government agencies behave.
Supported by empirical studies the models show that governments and bureaucracies
attempt to maximize “discretionary expenditure power” rather than total budgets. With
respect to tax revenue this means that local branches of tax administration try to maximize
the difference between the sum of tax revenue and (collected) tax transfer minus
obligations for subsidies (Mirrlees 1971, 1976). This turns the problem of optimal taxation
into a principal-agent relationship problem where the question is how the government
monitors and controls a tax bureaucracy.
It was further shown that political competition (for votes) is one, but not the only
factor “taming the Leviathan”. Next to international (tax) competition (Bond and
Samuelson 1986; Doyle and van Wijnbergen 1994; Janeba 2000, 2002; King, McAfee, and
Welling 1993), voting by feet (Tiebout 1956), decentralization and transaction costs play a
role. In the decentralized Chinese financial system transaction cost models would suggest
58 Institution refers to the rules of the game, the players of the game, and their equilibrium strategies
(e.g. North 1990; Williamson 1998; Aoki 2001). See a critical review in Nelson and Sampat (2001).
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to align the interests between the central and local government agencies. And indeed, the
history of tax reforms in China offers illuminating evidence. Tax farming in the eighties
which could make use of the already existing government agencies was an effective way to
implement tax reform when compared to the need to establish a new tax bureaucracy. At
the same time, tax farming offered monetary incentives and side payments for local
government agencies to support the reform course. The descriptive evidence begs the
question whether such an attempt for “optimum taxation” is serendipitous or reflects a
systematic element as the approaches claim. One way to test this is to claim that the search
for an effective tax administration will show in a negative correlation between
administrative costs and tax revenue.
Yet, as explained above decentralization leading to local autonomy changed the
rule of the game. Within the limits imposed by political supervision local government
agencies can either search for more cost-efficient ways to monitor and collect taxes of
which they can claim part of revenue, or they can search for other revenue sources. This
might be income from local enterprises, profit from local monopolies, such as electricity,
water or land management, or they can levy quasi-taxes in form of fees. In short, the EBRs
“soften” the (central) budget constraint with the result that there is less incentive to search
for more efficient tax administration. Once more, for testing whether this behavior is a
systematic factor caused by the institutional set up of the tax system, the assumption would
be that efficient tax administration is negatively correlated to EBRs. All in all the insights
from the public choice analysis suggest:
Efficiency hypothesis: Efficient tax administration is positively correlated to (a larger
share of) direct and indirect taxes and negatively correlated to (a smaller share of) EBRs.
It follows from this line of argument that local government agencies can no longer
be modeled as the mute or neutral bureaucracy where the conventional principal agency
relation approaches apply. Instead taxation in China turns into a strategic tax game where
political power considerations play a role.
5.3.3. Power
While the New Institutional Economics literature concentrates on countries competing
with regard to the services they provide, i.e. the expenditure side (North 1990), the public
finance literature includes also regulatory competition (Mueller 2003; Sutinen and
Kuperan 1999) such as taxation. Conventional models in which one political centre, e.g.
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national legislation designs a tax regime while a state bureaucracy by implementing tax
policy imbues costs (Niskanen 1971) can no longer describe Chinese reality. As the
literature on decentralization has shown increasing fiscal autonomy intensifies the
inter-jurisdictional competition for mobile resources and tax bases as it induces yardstick
competition (Besley and Case 1995; Shleifer 1985) among local officials. In this sense,
fiscal decentralization serves as an effective institutional constraint on local government
expansion (Zhu and Krug 2005).
The analysis of the tax structure can shed further light on the mechanism by which
vertical competition between local government agencies is linked to horizontal competition
between local government agencies and yardstick competition. Taking into account that
there are basically two revenue sources at the local level, the empowerment of local
government agencies makes the analysis to predict, that local autonomy is positively
correlated with EBRs or (to put it differently) negatively correlated with direct and indirect
taxation.
The power to influence the tax structure is however not limited to a political player
such as local government agencies. As was shown in the analysis of yardstick competition
where a specific benchmark, for example a “model” – county, serves as a yardstick for
assessing the bundle of public goods and regulations potential tax payers can expect for
his/her tax payment (Besley and Case 1995; Shleifer 1985; Feld et al. 2003) such
economic actors can and will influence tax structures. Depending on mobility and
information about alternative jurisdictions economic actors “move” to that jurisdiction
which offers the best tax payment – local policy output ratio. If local government agencies
want to avoid the migration of tax payers and capital they need to search for similar tax
payment – policy output ratios. One effect is that, as was shown elsewhere, fiscal
decentralization limits total government spending (for China see Lin and Liu 2000; Zhang
and Zou 1998; Zhu and Krug 2005). Another effect is that those groups which control
mobile resources, are close to information about the working of other local tax regimes,
and/or face more than one alternative where to move to at ”low cost” have “power” in the
sense that they can force local government agencies to change the tax system to their
advantage. Such a group is first of all the urban population. By threatening to move to
neighboring jurisdictions they will force local government agencies to lower local fees.
Thus, with national taxes making only few differences between rural and urban tax bases,
yardstick competition expects that there is a negative correlation between urbanization and
EBRs and a positive correlation between urbanization and direct/indirect taxation.
The theory on interest groups (Becker 1974; Olson 1971; Moe 1980) identified two
factors, size and degree of organization, to explain how special interest groups affect
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political decisions such as selecting a tax structure that shifts the tax burden onto
non-organized groups (Hunter and Nelson 1989). The literature on transition economies
adds a third factor, namely the ownership structure of firms. While the Grabbing-Hand
hypothesis insists that economic transformation does not automatically lead to less formal
and informal taxation of firms, the State-Capture hypothesis provides evidence that former
state firms and well organized “cartels” can “buy” the policy they want (Hellman et al.
2003) shifting the tax burden to less organized industries and private households. Which
group of potential tax payers has most leverage to influence the tax structure in China is
first of all an empirical question. Yet as in the case of European transition economies two
groups stand out, namely firms whose ownership structure secures a direct link to the
central government.
First, SOEs whose number and survival indicates path dependency. The persistence
of the notion of the Owner-State for “crucial” sectors translates into a bail-out guarantee
for firms in sectors over which the central government claims control (Kornai 1992).
Operating outside the local economy even profit-making SOEs do not contribute much to
local tax revenue. Local governments need to resort to EBRs as major revenue source for
budget alimentation. Thus, a high share of SOEs correlates positively with EBRs and
negatively with direct and indirect taxes. Second, foreign firms for which national tax
policy designed a hospitable niche in return for capital inflow. This turns foreign firms into
a powerful “interest group” vis-à-vis local government agencies (e.g. empirical studies by
Li 2005; Zhang and Reinmoeller 2006). Foreign firms are not much different from SOEs
when the central government offers generous tax concessions independent of economic
performance. These concessions reduce the discretionary expenditure power of local
government agencies which need to rely on other revenue sources. Subsequently a high
share of foreign companies shows a positive correlation with EBRs and a negative
correlation with direct and indirect taxes.
In short, power as a factor shaping the tax structure in China takes the form of local
autonomy, yardstick competition and the acknowledgement of special interest groups.
Power hypothesis: There is a positive correlation between EBRs and local autonomy, a
high share of SOEs and foreign companies; there is a negative correlation between
direct/indirect taxes and local autonomy, a high share of SOEs and foreign companies;
there is a negative correlation between urbanization and EBRs and a positive correlation
between urbanization and direct/indirect taxes.
5.3.4. Legitimacy
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Generally speaking the legitimacy of a state (or any government) depends on its ability to
accommodate a society’s demand (Gallarotti 1989). As tax changes affect the distribution
of incentives, sanctions, and entitlements legitimacy becomes a pre-requisite while
simultaneously the outcome of tax changes will affect the legitimacy of the implementing
agencies (e.g. government). As country studies have shown (US: Frey and Schneider
1978a, UK: Frey and Schneider 1978b, Germany: Schneider 1979 and Australia: Schneider
and Pommerehne 1980) the better the overall economic performance the more legitimacy
an incumbent government can claim in a democratic setting. China-specific studies also
stress the link between overall economic performance and legitimacy which shows that
positive growth rates mitigate political conflicts that stem from a (re-) distribution of
rewards and entitlements (Nee 1989; Nee and Cao 1999, 2005; Nee and Lian 1994; Walder
1996).
At the individual level, legitimacy of taxation is linked to tax moral which is
explained by intrinsic motivation (Deci and Ryan 1985), norms and values (Alm et al.
1995; Baldry 1986) , education (Dubin and Wilde 1988; McGraw and Scholz 1991;
Schwartz and Orleans 1967 or fiscal equity (Spicer and Becker 1980). The latter refers to
the fact that a tax payer will regard a tax structure as legitimate when and if the value of
public goods provided by the state matches the total tax burden (Alm et al. 1992; Becker et
al. 1987). Roughly speaking, this means that taxes a voluntarily paid if the share on overall
state activities that can be appropriated by individuals equals the individual tax burden. It
is this kind of equity which renders legitimacy.
Legitimacy is however an ex post concept, as the matching between taxes paid and
benefits appropriated can be assessed only in retrospect. Whether to pay taxes turns
therefore the question of legitimacy into a question of trust in government (Scholz and
Lubell 1998). As the literature on trust has shown a record of past fiscal equity is one
factor influencing tax morale. Another factor is the interaction between tax authorities and
tax payer where “procedural justice” matters (Tyler 1990). If tax authorities treat tax
payers “with respect” tax compliance increases (Feld and Frey 2002).
Thus, support for the Reforms is strongest amongst those tax payers who fare best
in “fiscal equity” terms. In the case of China this refers to high income and high human
capital as these got the “best deal” for their taxes paid compared to the Pre-reform era
where income and educational level were politically suppressed. Subsequently, the
literature would predict increasing trust into government activities. As many studies on
China’s tax system stress (Bernstein and Lü 2003; Eckaus 2003; Lee 2000; Tsui and Wang
2004; Wong 1998; Yep 2004), EBRs are ambiguous in legal status and lack uniform
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procedures with respect to computation, base, rate, or frequency which are less legitimated
than direct and indirect taxes. We would expect the high income educated tax payers to
respect tax obligations in general but not the EBRs. Here we use per capita GDP to
measure both individual income level and overall economic performance of the society
(Schneider and Pommerehne 1980). Therefore, we have:
Legitimacy hypothesis: Per capita GDP and individual educational level are positively
correlated with direct and indirect taxes while negatively correlated with EBRs.
5.4. Empirical Model
5.4.1. Variables and Model
Following Hettich and Winer (1984, 1999), we construct an empirical model to test the
influence of efficiency, power and legitimacy factors on changes of Chinese provincial tax
system. Tax system embraces three components: tax bases, rate structures, and special
provisions, such as exemptions and deductions (Hettich and Winer 1988). This chapter
focuses mainly on the tax base, i.e. the composition of tax revenue, and leaves other parts
to the future research. The empirical model is as follows:
TSit= 0+ EEit+ PPit+ LLit+ uit (1)
Respectively, i and t denote province and year. TSit stands for tax structure. Eit, Pit and Lit
are variables for efficiency, power and legitimacy, respectively. uit denotes the error term.
We choose provincial level as analysis level because two reasons. On the
conceptual side the use of disaggregated (provincial) data acknowledges China's
decentralized fiscal system. The transfer of regulatory power to lower levels of government
in combination with revenue sources outside the control of the central government led to a
fragmentation of China's economic system. This does not mean that China is riddled with a
burgeoning underground economy as local autonomy and different local business systems
are regarded as legitimate. Although it can be disputed whether provinces represent the
boundaries of the different local business systems they are a useful starting point for the
analysis. After all it is at the provincial level where further decentralization to lower
administrative level, such as county or township is negotiated. On the technical side panel
data allow going around the problem of insufficient numbers of observation.
The tax structure is defined as the ratio of each tax revenue (source) to total tax
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revenue (Hettich and Winer 1999). Three revenue categories, i.e. direct and indirect tax
(Musgrave 1969) and extra-budgetary revenues (EBRs) are examined. As shown in Table
5.2, the direct tax (DIRECT) includes individual income tax, enterprise income tax,
income tax on FIEs and FEs, real estate tax, and land appreciation tax; the indirect tax
(INDIRECT) comprises VAT, consumption tax, business tax, resource tax, orientation
adjustment tax on investment in fixed asset, urban maintenance and construction tax,
stamp tax, land usage tax, vehicle and vessel tax, slaughter tax, banquet tax, and custom
duties59; the EBRs cover three major parts: 1) government funds and surtaxes, such as
agriculture surtax, and education surtax, levied on the income, consumption, profit or
turnover base; 2) a hold up of special funds of SOEs, such as depreciation, major repair,
and innovation funds; and 3) locally self-raised funds and administrative fees, such as road
construction fund, public utility fee, road toll, and tuition fee60.
Table 5.2: Description of Dependent Variables
Variable Description
DIRECT Individual income tax, Enterprise income tax, Income tax on FIEs and
FEs, Real estate tax, Land appreciation tax
INDIRECT VAT, Consumption tax, Business tax, Resource tax, Orientation
adjustment tax on investment in fixed asset, Urban maintenance and
construction tax, Stamp tax, Land usage tax, Vehicle and vessel tax,
Slaughter tax, Banquet tax, Custom duties
EBRs Extra-budgetary revenue, such as surtaxes, fees, service charges, funds
The independent variables are based on previous empirical literature (e.g. Kenny
and Winer 2001; Zhu and Krug 2005) and the availability of data. The proxy for efficiency
is tax administration and collection cost (Simon and Nobes 1978; Yitzhaki 1979),
measured by the number of tax staffs per million RMB revenue (ADM_COST). Large
amount of manpower means low efficiency of tax administration and collection and thus a
negative correlation is predicted with direct and indirect taxes and positive correlation with
EBRs. The proxy for power of local government is revenue decentralization (DEC),
measured by the ratio of per capita sub-national to central consolidated revenue (budgetary
and extra-budgetary). The proxy for power of SOEs is measure by the share of SOEs in
gross industrial output value (GIOV_SOEs). OPENNESS (measured by ratio of total
59 Due to unavailable data, the indirect tax excludes the custom duties in the regression.
60 Major changes of composition of extra-budgetary revenue in 1993 and 1997 excluded the
innovation fund, the major repair fund and government funds.
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import and export to GDP) is proxy for power of foreign enterprise. The power of urban
populace (URB) is measured by the ratio of urban population. The negative correlation is
expected for DEC, GIOV_SOEs, and OPENNESS with direct and indirect taxes and
positive with ERBs while for URB positive correlation with direct and indirect tax and
negative with ERBs. As discussed in Section 5.3, we use per capita GDP (PCGDP) to
measure the state of the economy and individual income level. Educational level is
measured by total graduates of higher education, specialized and regular secondary school
as percentage in the population (EDU). We expect positive correlation of PCGDP and
EDU with direct and indirect taxes and negative with EBRs. Table 5.3 describes the
independent variables and predicted signs of coefficients.
Table 5.3: Description of Independent Variables
Variable DIRECT INDIRECT EBRs Description
Efficiency
ADM_COST - - +
Number of tax staff per million RMB
revenue
Power
DEC - - +
Ratio of per capita sub-national to
central consolidated revenue (budgetary
and extra-budgetary)
GIOV_SOE - - +
Share of state-owned and state-holding
enterprises in total gross industrial
output value
OPENNESS - - +
Ratio of foreign trade (import plus
export) to GDP
URB + + -
Ratio of non-agriculture population to
total population
Legitimacy
PCGDP + + - Per capita GDP
EDU + + -
Ratio of total graduates of higher
education, specialized and regular
secondary school to total population
5.4.2. Data
Owing to empirical difficulty of collecting data prior to 1995, we only use the data from
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1995 to 2003 in this paper61. Data of DIRECT, INDIRECT and EBRs are from China Tax
Yearbook and China Finance Yearbook; ADM_COST is from China Tax Yearbook;
PCGDP, GIOV_SOE, OPENNESS, and EDU are from China Statistical Yearbook; URB is
from China Demographic Yearbook.
Table 5.4 shows descriptive statistics of data. To mitigate the potential
heteroskedasticity problem, all variables are measured in percentage or per capita value
instead of absolute value. The indirect taxes are major revenue source of 31 Chinese
provinces that retains average 56 per cent of total revenues for the period of 1995-2003.
Extra-budgetary revenues and indirect taxes contribute 30 and 14 per cent, respectively.
Average DEC is 1.64 (larger than 1) indicates considerable decentralization of revenue
power. SOEs seem to remain a major role in local economy in terms of its average
percentage of GIOV of 60 per cent. Urbanization is low with regard to China’s huge
population which has only 28 per cent urban populace.
Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables: 1995-2003
Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. Obs.
DIRECT 13.60632 13.10887 40.07807 3.686092 5.40746 277
INDIRECT 56.43043 55.94302 78.78088 16.83194 8.160134 277
EBRS 29.96326 30.27799 78.52513 7.05946 10.37036 277
ADM_COST 0.84157 0.7945 2.305 0.0471 0.4574 277
DEC 1.640221 1.096281 8.570383 0.404244 1.499101 277
GIOV_SOE 59.56698 62.92526 89.88356 13.1138 19.0655 277
OPENNESS 27.0794 11.90004 175.692 4.004986 33.26239 277
URB 28.01947 23.50699 71.53953 9.42623 13.61387 277
PCGDP 7833.886 6038.508 36533.08 1740.932 5462.209 277
EDU 19.38182 19.87364 31.48091 3.698333 5.274466 277
5.5. Empirical Results
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Fisher tests (1932) indicate that series of GIOV_SOE,
OPENNESS, URB, PCGDP and EDU contain a unit root and thus are non-stationary
61 Data of Chongqing in 1995 and 1996 are not applicable since Chongqing became autonomous
municipality (zhixiashi) in 1997.
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(Table 5.5). When independent variables are non-stationary the OLS regression might
produce invalid estimates. We, thus, perform a Johansen cointegration test (1991) to
examine whether a stationary linear combination exists among our independent variables.
Trace test and Max-eigenvalue test indicate two and three cointegrating relation at the 0.05
level, respectively (Table 5.6). In other words, despite above five non-stationary variables,
the combination of all independent variables maintains stationary and thus is regarded as
cointegrated that still generates valid estimates in the regression.
Table 5.5: ADF Fisher Unit Root Tests
Method Statistic Prob. Obs. Cross-sections
included
ADM_COST ADF - Fisher Chi-square 208.09*** 0 234 31
ADF - Choi Z-stat -7.06535*** 0
DEC ADF - Fisher Chi-square 215.252*** 0 228 31
ADF - Choi Z-stat -8.57132*** 0
GIOV_SOE ADF - Fisher Chi-square 35.6049 0.9972 239 31
ADF - Choi Z-stat 2.61246 0.9955
OPENNESS ADF - Fisher Chi-square 62.1791 0.4697 234 31
ADF - Choi Z-stat 1.66118 0.9517
URB ADF - Fisher Chi-square 59.4574 0.568 238 31
ADF - Choi Z-stat 0.71977 0.7642
PCGDP ADF - Fisher Chi-square 28.2755 0.9999 233 31
ADF - Choi Z-stat 8.71722 1
EDU ADF - Fisher Chi-square 54.9397 0.7255 238 31
ADF - Choi Z-stat -0.48621 0.3134
Notes: a. Null Hypothesis is unit root (individual unit root process); b. * Statistically significant at 10 per cent level; ** statistically
significant at 5 per cent level; *** statistically significant at 1 per cent level; c. Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear
trends; d. Automatic selection of maximum lags; e. Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 1; f. Probabilities for Fisher tests are
computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.
Before we run regressions, we need to choose our specification between fixed and
random effects models since the former is costly in terms of degrees of freedom lost while
the latter may suffer from the inconsistency due to the correlation between the included
variables and the random effect (Greene 2003). Hausman test (1978) helps determine
which model is preferred. It examines whether there is a significant correlation between
the unobserved individual specific random effects and the regressors. If there is no such
correlation, then the random effects model may be more powerful and parsimonious.
Otherwise, the random effects model would be inconsistently estimated and the fixed
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effects model would be more suitable. The results in Table 5.7 indicate the rejection of
random effects model at 1 per cent level. Therefore, we use fixed effects model.
Table 5.6: Johansen Cointegration Tests
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
Hypothesized
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Trace Statistic Critical Value 0.05 Prob.
None * 0.367642 189.6253 125.6154 0
At most 1 * 0.269851 119.5054 95.75366 0.0005
At most 2 * 0.25978 71.38592 69.81889 0.0373
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)
Hypothesized
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Max-Eigen Statistic Critical Value 0.05 Prob.
None* 0.367642 70.11995 46.23142 0
At most 1 * 0.269851 48.11946 40.07757 0.0051
At most 2 * 0.25978 46.0237 33.87687 0.0011
Notes: a. Trace test and Max-eigenvalue test both indicate 3 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level; b. * denotes rejection of the null
hypothesis at the 0.05 level; c. MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values; d. Included observations: 153 after adjustments; Trend
assumption: Linear deterministic trend; Series: ADM_COST, DEC, GIOV_SOE, URB, OPENNESS, PCGDP, EDU; Lags interval (in first
differences): 1 to 3.
Table 5.7: Hausman Tests
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.
Direct Cross-section random 26.224541*** 7 0.0005
Period random 9.133186 7 0.2432
Indirect Cross-section random 26.838727*** 7 0.0004
Period random 24.514654*** 7 0.0009
EBRs Cross-section random 28.377239*** 7 0.0002
Period random 34.681357*** 7 0
Notes: a. Null Hypothesis is random effect model is preferred; b. * Statistically significant at 10 per cent level; ** statistically significant at
5 per cent level; *** statistically significant at 1 per cent level; c. Cross-sections included: 31; Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 277.
Table 5.8 reports the Panel Least Squares estimates. Efficiency considerations do
play a part in the development of China's tax system as shown by the variable of
ADM_COST, which present predicted sign in three regressions although only significant at
10 per cent level in indirect tax and EBRs regressions. This confirms that high efficient
collection and administration is correlated with higher share of direct and indirect tax and
smaller share of EBRs. It also indicates that the arbitrary EBRs demand more manpower to
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cope with ambiguous administrative procedures of computation, base, rate, and frequency
as well as noncompliance from payers. The typical case is the tax-for-fee reform in
Chinese rural region designed to improve tax collection by gradually replacing numerous
EBRs with standardized tax levies. The pilot reform carried out in Anhui province in 2000
abolished 40 EBRs and streamlined more than 110,000 cadres at grassroots administration
in rural region, who used to go from door to door collect hefty EBRs (People’s Daily
2003).
Table 5.8: Panel Least Squares Estimates for Tax Structure: 31 Provinces/1995-2003
Dependent Variable DIRECT INDIRECT EBRs
Variable
C 0.176725*** 0.72842*** 0.094855
(8.177661) (10.13067) (1.101276)
ADM_COST
-0.01589 -0.049787* 0.065676*
(-1.33073) (-1.673296) (1.81874)
DEC
-0.01458*** -0.04316** 0.057739***
(-2.74969) (-2.529476) (3.014856)
GIOV_SOE
-0.00041* -0.001277* 0.00169*
(-1.81213) (-1.661241) (1.789592)
OPENNESS
-0.00065** -0.000817* 0.00147***
(-2.26466) (-1.630424) (2.692626)
URB 0.000388*** -0.00036 -2.78E-05
(4.096203) (-0.908282) (-0.060381)
PCGDP 4.79E-06*** 7.19E-06** -1.20E-05***
(3.367759) (2.399301) (-3.457557)
EDU
-0.00049 2.77E-05 0.00046
(-0.8519) (0.017885) (0.252119)
Period effect Yes Yes Yes
Provincial effect Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.86254 0.685719 0.726578
Cross-sections 31 31 31
Observations 277 277 277
Notes: a. t-statistics in parentheses. b. * Statistically significant at 10 per cent level; ** statistically significant at 5 per cent level; ***
statistically significant at 1 per cent level. c. White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected).
As for power variables, DEC, GIOV_SOE, OPENNESS, and URB present
significant signs as predicted showing that power factors play a part in the development of
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China's tax structure. This might come as a surprise to those only who assume that the
central government or the CCP (still) controls the institutional design of the country. The
findings rather illustrate the inherent adaptability of the institutional structure which is
obviously able to cope with interest groups, such as SOEs, private enterprise, foreign firms
or local government agencies. As we have seen, the central government decentralized
fiscal power to align local governments’ interest with economic development at the
beginning of the reform. However, suffering from a declining fiscal position, the central
government launched a tax reform in 1994 aimed at recentralizing tax revenues, yet had to
accept several compromises to mitigate immense local resistance (Tsui and Wang 2004;
Zhang 1999). A major compromise was a tax rebate scheme to guarantee local
governments’ tax revenue in the new tax sharing system no less than under the old fiscal
contracting system (Wong 2000). Likewise, the tax-for-fee reform in 2000, which
abolished various EBRs at the local level, resulted in a compensation for local
governments in the form of central fiscal transfers (Yep 2004). Again, the failure of
tax-for-profit reform on SOEs in 1983 and 1984 demonstrated that the implementation of a
reform package was constrained by the multiplicity of interest groups involved (Tsang and
Cheng 1994). In particular, when a new tax reform impaired the entrenched interests of
powerful groups, they thwarted its implementation. In 2005, for example, foreign firms
lobbied against a reform scheme on corporate income tax aimed to abolish their tax
privileges. Finally, the long-awaited new Corporate Income Tax Law was promulgated in
2007 on the condition of granting foreign firms a five-year grace period. URB variable
shows a significant positive correlation with direct tax as predicted. This actually confirms
the reality that individual and enterprise income taxes are mainly generated in urban
regions. We observe that urban wage and salary earners contribute most to individual
income tax (65 per cent of the total in 2004). However, it is worth mentioning that we also
witness urban group’s fight against their tax burden by recent individual income tax reform
which relieves their tax burden by lifting the threshold for taxable income from 800 RMB
to 1,500 RMB per month.
For legitimacy variables, PCGDP presents significant predicted signs supporting
the legitimacy hypothesis while EDU offers non-significant results. Yet, illustrative
evidence supports the claim that legitimacy considerations play a role. This can best be
illustrated by the position and development of the EBRs. On the supply side EBRs are used
as a means for securing an independent revenue base for local government agencies. On
the demand side they are objected to as long as they are regarded as "arbitrary", too costly,
or riddled with unfair procedure. Since the proliferation of EBRs not only undermines the
central control over the macro economy but also causes substantive social unrest in rural
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regions (Bernstein and Lü 2003), to curb EBRs therefore is one of major concerns of tax
reforms. In 1996, for instance, local governments were requested to put 13 categories of
EBRs under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) so that the central
government could effectively monitor the collection and spending of EBRs at local level
(Jin and Zou 2000). The tax-for-fee reform in 2000, on the other hand, aimed to abolish
heavy arbitrary EBRs levies in rural regions (Yep 20004) as the central government
perceived that two-thirds of China's 1.3 billion population were peasants who are the
largest and most important social class in the country and to standardize rural taxes and
reduce peasants’ financial burden conduces significantly to social stability.
5.6. Conclusions
This chapter intends to put forth a theoretical framework and empirical research of taxation
applicable to the non-democratic background in China and contribute to wide application
of New Institutional Economics. Based on a systematic analysis of tax reforms in China,
we find that the evolution of China’s tax system is an equilibrium outcome of interaction
between the central government (CCP), local governments, and various interest groups
(firms). Despite numerous and complicated reforms, some systematic factors are singled
out. The changes of tax structure follow efficiency considerations, reflect the power
influences between emerging interest groups within the political sector, and confirm the
CCP’s concern with legitimacy. Empirical test provides supportive evidences and a variety
of policy implications. First, EBRs are, if not illegitimate, at least, less legitimate than
formal tax (Wong 1998; Eckaus 2003). They should be eliminated or replaced by formal
tax means, thereby improving efficiency of overall provincial revenue collection and
administration. Second, for those EBRs that directly finance local public goods and
contribute to local economic development (Fan 1998), they should be brought into formal
budget. Third, the decentralization setting should be adjusted to incorporate positive
incentive for local governments to collect tax, such as, changing revenue sharing rule in
favor of local governments. It is worth mentioning that the quality of disaggregated data
makes it hard to test model that meet the usual requirements. This should however not
make academics shying away, as the alternative would be to limit empirical research to
topics for which sufficient data are available. On the other hand, our exercise shows that
the institutional economics and public finance literature can contribute to explaining
institutional change of tax system in China provided one keeps in mind that 1) the
identification of explainable variable asks for a meticulous descriptive analysis, and 2)
concepts need to be selected which offer the best fit with Chinese realities.
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6. Summary and Conclusions
he essentialness of a tax system to an economy is self-evident, in particular, for those
transition countries because the transformation of a society always involves a crisis of
the old fiscal methods (Schumpeter 1918). Compared to the failure of the “big bang” and
“shock therapy” in Eastern European countries, China’s huge success of a gradualism
approach further demonstrates the overwhelming importance of how tax system changes in
economic development. The tax system, as a formal institution, could be rapidly switched
from an old “owner state” surviving upon state-controlled resources (Campbell 1996) to a
modern “tax state” relying on its tax capacity to extract surplus from economic sector by
enacting laws and regulations but its enforcement characteristics, to a large extent, are
embedded in underpinning informal institutions that evolve in an incremental and lengthy
process. The unique China’s “central-local dual-track” tax system, therefore, lends
tremendous opportunity for economists, political scientists and sociologists to study the
interplay of its formal and informal components in the context of institution building.
This dissertation answers the question of how and why China’s tax system changes
by studying its evolution process and mechanism. Seeing the central government, local
governments and firms as three major agents for the institution building of the tax system,
the research reveals that formal and informal interactions between these agents shape the
transformation course of the tax system under various economic, political and social
constraints.
Chapter 2 presents a logic of emergence of China’s unique “central-local
dual-track” tax system. At the inception of reform in 1978, the economic development was
the uppermost priority of the whole society. In order to develop economy, the central
government mobilized local governments by fiscal decentralization which provided strong
economic incentives for local governments to foster local economic prosperity. They
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rendered a “helping hand” to private entrepreneurs (firms) rather than a “grabbing hand”
compared to their counterpart in Russia (Frye and Shleifer 1997). The initiative goodwill
greatly contributed to the mutual trust and cooperation between local government and
private entrepreneurs (firms), thereby leading to a market-conforming federalism that
significantly encourages the boom of private sectors (Montinola et al. 1995; Qian and
Roland 1998; Qian and Weingast 1996, 1997; Weingast 1995). Local governments also
competed for mobile tax bases (firms) by offering considerable local preferential tax
treatments. Despite no permission from the central government, local governments,
however, manipulated tax policy with growing local autonomy. The direct result was
diverse local tax systems and declining central share of tax revenues in 1990s. Running
deficits incited the central government to launch an overhaul tax reform in 1994 to
recentralize fiscal capacity and reinforce control over local governments. Yet, reckoning
local resistance and practical reasons, the central government spilt tax revenues and
administration into central and local part, respectively, to secure its share of tax revenues.
Consequently, the “central-local dual-track” tax system was resulted. On the one hand, a
formal and standardized national tax system operates under the custody of central
government while de facto informal, flexible, and diverse local tax systems are managed
by local governments on the other hand.
A centralized party cadre system and top-down supervision in China induces a
yardstick competition among local officials that restricts their behaviors despite the lack of
bottom-up election constraint. Therefore, according to the Leviathan model (Brennan and
Buchanan 1980), Chapter 3 claims that fiscal decentralization curtails the expansion of
government size in China, which also explains why China departs from not only
theoretical prediction of Wagner’s Law but also the empirical facts from those market
economies that the expansion of the public sector is positively correlated with economic
growth. We find empirical evidences for the Leviathan model from vertical
decentralization, horizontal fragmentation, yardstick competition and intergovernmental
collusion. In particular, effects of vertical decentralization on government size at different
level are poles asunder. Central-provincial decentralization stimulates the expansion of
provincial government spending whereas provincial-local decentralization curtails it.
Based on game models, Chapter 4 examines pervasive bargaining games between
firms and local governments over preferential tax treatments in local China. Firms perform
either an exit strategy by establishing subsidiaries in other localities, changing
organizational forms, and diversifying investments or a voice strategy in a Chinese specific
way of cultivating, maintaining and expanding a guanxi network with government at all
levels. The models indicate that relative exit-voice costs and information structure are
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critical factors in determining equilibrium outcomes. Moreover, exit and voice are not
mutually exclusive, but can be combined to reinforce each other in an exit-cum-voice game
(Hirschman 1995) instead of an exit-versus-voice game (Hirschman 1970). Keeping the
exit option as a credible threat, the firm expresses voice via guanxi network forcing the
local government to offer tax concessions. Furthermore, an asymmetric information
structure in favor of the firm enables it to bluff even without a feasible exit option. The
local government rather believes the threat is ‘credible’ and thus agrees to offer preferential
tax treatments. Empirical cases show that a rational firm performs a mixed strategy of
exit-cum-voice to enhance mobility and the credibility of its exit threat and thus to boost
the effectiveness of voice.
With regard to the limitation of Public Finance and Public Choice literature on
taxation research in transition economy, Chapter 5 extends application of New Institutional
Economics into this field by combing North’s (1990) theoretical framework of institutions
and institutional changes and Steinmo’s (1993) historical institutionalism to model the
evolution of China’s tax structure in the context of non-democratic environment. The
model sees the tax system as an institution shaped by interaction among the central
government (CCP), local governments, and various interest groups (firms). The systematic
analysis of the evolution of China’s tax structure shows that the changes follow efficiency
considerations, reflect the power influences between various interest groups within the
political sector, and confirm the CCP’s concern with legitimacy.
In short, this dissertation intends to put forth a theoretical framework and empirical
methods of taxation research applicable to non-democratic background in China and
contribute to wide application of New Institutional Economics. It’s a first step towards this
approach that calls for further theoretical and empirical research for transition economies
in general and for China in particular.
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Samenvatting (Abstract in Dutch)
Het belastingsysteem is een van de beste startpunten voor een onderzoek naar China’s
transitie omdat de transformatie van een maatschappij altijd gepaard gaat met snelle
veranderingen in het oude fiscale regime. Dit boek ziet de centrale overheid, lokale
overheden en ondernemingen als de drie grote spelers en laat zien dat interactie tussen
deze drie spelers heeft geleid tot China’s unieke, ‘centraal-lokaal tweesporige’
belastingsysteem. De centrale overheid mobiliseert lokale overheden door fiscale
decentralisatie, wat resulteert in toenemende lokale autonomie en hen drijft tot
maximalisatie van lokale belastingopbrengsten. Zij concurreren voor mobiele belasting
bases – ondernemingen – door het lokale belastingbeleid te manipuleren. Dus, in
tegenstelling tot een formeel en gestandaardiseerd nationaal belastingsysteem dat
gecontroleerd wordt door de centrale overheid, worden informele en flexibele lokale
belastingsystemen geleid door lokale overheden. Dit boek bevat vier essays. Het eerste
essay analyseert systematisch de evolutie en huidige status van China’s belastingsysteem.
Het illustreert hoe de formele en informele interactie tussen de centrale overheid, lokale
overheden en ondernemingen vorm geeft aan de instituties van China’s belastingsysteem.
Het tweede essay onderzoekt de interactie tussen de eerstgenoemde twee spelers in fiscale
decentralisatie en laat zien dat deze de grootte van de overheid beperkt. Het derde essay
modelleert de interactie tussen de laatstgenoemde twee spelers in een onderhandelingsspel
waarin een onderneming een exit en voice strategie gebruikt om te onderhandelen met een
lokale overheid voor gunstige belastingen en verklaart daarmee de diversiteit in lokale
belastingsystemen. Het laatste essay modelleert de veranderingen van het belastingsysteem
als een interactie tussen de drie spelers onder variërende economische, politieke en sociale
beperkingen; de veranderingen bereiken een evenwicht waarin efficiency, macht en
legitimiteit in balans zijn.
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Essays on China’s Tax System
The tax system is one of the best starting points for investigating
China’s transitional course because the transformation of a society
always involves rapid changes in its old fiscal regime. Seeing central
government, local governments and firms as three major players, this
dissertation shows that interactions between them lead to the
emergence of China’s unique “central-local dual-track” tax system.
The central government mobilizes local governments by fiscal
decentralization, which results in growing local autonomy and thus
drives them to maximize local tax revenues. They compete for mobile
tax bases – firms – by manipulating local tax policies. Thus, in contrast
to a formal and standardized national tax system overseen by the
central government, informal and flexible local tax systems are
operated by local governments. This dissertation consists of four
essays. The first essay systematically analyzes the evolution history
and status quo of China’s tax system, which illustrates that the formal
and informal interaction between the central government, local
governments and firms shapes the institution building process of
China’s tax system. The second essay, then, examines the interaction
between the former two players in fiscal decentralization and finds
that it curtails the expansion of government size. The third essay
models the interaction between the latter two players by a
bargaining game in which a firm employs an exit and voice strategy
to bargain with a local government for preferential tax treatments
and thus explains the diversity of local tax systems. The last essay
models changes of the tax system as a result of interactions between
the above three players under various economic, political and social
constraints; the changes reach a general equilibrium in which
efficiency, power and legitimacy are balanced.
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